the Philosophy of Language, by Graham (original) (raw)
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Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 2013
ver the past decade, Graham Stevens has built his reputation as a lucid, durable, and oftentimes groundbreaking historian of analytic philosophy. His latest book, entitled The Theory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language, will only add to that burgeoning scholarly legacy. If it has not been established already, this book will doubtless cement Stevens' place amongst the leading Russell scholars in the world today. It may very well herald Stevens' arrival on the scene as a noteworthy contributor to contemporary philosophy of language as well. The central goal of the book is "to bring the historical and purely philosophical analyses of [Russell's] work into closer alignment" (p. 3). Stevens hopes to overcome a "striking disparity" (p. 2) in the ways that Russell's contributions to the philosophy of language have been conceived by expositors of his philosophy, on the one hand, versus philosophers of language, on the other. In particular, though contemporary philosophers of language would tend to view Russell's enormous contribution to that subject as being "undeniable" (p. 1), and to be "bewildered" (p. 94) by any suggestion to the contrary, expositors of Russell's philosophy have nevertheless been at pains to emphasize that Russell "was not engaged in the philosophical study of language" (p. 2). As Stevens notes, this situation is especially puzzling since "these two groups [of scholars] overlap to a considerable extent" (p. 2). Stevens' strategy for overcoming this disparity is two-pronged. First he aims to tackle, head on, the fallacious arguments of Monk, 1 Dummett, 2 and others, to the effect that Russell was not engaged in the philosophy of language. According to Stevens, such arguments have principally appealed to either (1) ______ 1 Ray Monk, "What Is Analytical Philosophy?".
Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mind. The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.
Chapter 3. Use, Mention, and Russell's Theory of Descriptions
Use, mention, and Russell's theory of descriptions A typical way of identifying an object is by means of properties that uniquely characterize it in a determinate context. The properties used are often simply an aid to identification, for we may have no interest in them aside from helping to identify the object. This is very common. Suppose I want you to bring me my copy of Word and Object from my study. I remember that I left the book on top of the printer, and I say: Bring me the book on top of the printer in my study. I am not interested in the printer, or in the fact that my copy of Word and Object is on it, except insofar as it helps me to identify the book I want you to bring me. I am interested in getting the book, and I am talking about it, and I use the fact that the book is on the printer at that time to identify it for you. Intuitively, there is a reasonably clear distinction between what we are talking about, what we want, what we are interested in, and the means we use to talk about it or to get to it. This distinction is related to the use-mention distinction, but the latter is usually drawn in a very narrow way. We say that to mention an object we can use a name or description of it, but that this name or description is not mentioned, only used. If we want to mention the name or description, or linguistic expression generally, we need some device-quotation marks, for instance-to obtain a name or description of it. This is a rather superficial analysis, however, and the standard story about quotes is not very convincing. 1 What is it that I use, after all, when I say 'the book on top of the printer in my study'? Although I use a linguistic expression, I also use my mouth and my tongue. Why concentrate on the former rather than on the latter? Not because it is a bunch of sounds, or marks, but because it is an expression of something; namely, of a property, or characteristic, or feature of the book at that moment. It is not important whether I write down my instruction or utter it, nor is it important whether I use that specific form of expression; the description 'the book on the printer in my study' would have done just as well. It is not even important whether I use this language or that, so long as we both know it, or whether I use a mixture of language and gestures: 'the book on the printer in there', pointing to my study. What is important is the property expressed: being the book on top of the printer in my study. This is a complex property, involving the relations 'is on top of' and 'is in', the property 'is a book', the printer, my study, and some logical properties and relations. Why not say that I am using those things, as well as the linguistic expression-and my tongue, my mouth, my larynx-to identify or refer to my copy of Word and Object?
Minimizing the presuppositions of Russell's theory of descriptions in "On Denoting"
PhD Dissertation, 2024
This thesis endeavors to reduce the presuppositions inherent in Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions as presented in "On Denoting" (OD). We conduct a detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of OD, elucidating the theory's objectives, its contrasting theories, and its merits. Nonetheless, Russell's presentation of the theory introduces complications due to imprecise terminology and occasional divergences from the core analytical focus. This has sparked considerable debate regarding the accurate interpretation of OD's arguments and definitions. Among these debates is the examination of the infamous Gray's Elegy Argument. Our analysis posits that a rephrasing of the argument's verbal expression reveals its validity, which, upon closer inspection, bifurcates into two interconnected arguments. Engaging with this argument illuminates the propositions Russell intends to challenge and uncovers his motivations for developing the Theory of Descriptions, which extend beyond the theory's immediate scope. However, these motivations inadvertently burden the theory with extraneous elements. In our study, we differentiate between presuppositions integral to the theory and those extraneously incorporated into OD. Our aim is to introduce a novel conceptualization of presupposition that is applicable to theoretical constructs holistically. This approach enables us to identify and discard presuppositions that, while present in OD, do not contribute to the core theory. By removing these extraneous presuppositions and reevaluating those that are pertinent but not indispensable, we streamline Russell's Theory of Descriptions, thereby achieving a more concise, focused and invulnerable theoretical framework.
Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions
Philosophical Studies, 2003
A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellan’s classic paper“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russell’s theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G’ would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style arguments, thenew argument does not rely upon the mereexistence of referential uses of definitedescriptions or the possibility of conveyinginformation about an object by misdescribingit. I argue, however, that we ought to rejectthis new line of reasoning and rest contentwith a Russellian theory of definitedescriptions.