Introduction to the Philosophy of Language Winter 2004 Erich Rast (original) (raw)
Related papers
Presuppositions as conversational phenomena
In this paper, I distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic presuppositions. I also propose that we should be interested in conversational presuppositions, which could also be called speaker-meant presuppositions or speaker's presuppositions. I also distinguish between potential and actual presuppositions. I propose that, in some cases, presuppositions can be conversationally implicated and cancellation is possible. I specify what the hard cases are and I try to explain them through ontological considerations. I try to reduce the hard cases through (a) the notion that all actual presuppositions are speaker-meant; (b) the distinction between ontological and linguistic presuppositions; and (c) the uncontroversial notion that even ontological presuppositions are susceptible to semantic under-determination that has to be tackled though pragmatic intrusion. Pragmatic intrusion for presuppositional cases, however, cannot really amount to completing or expanding or in any case computing an explicature in an ordinary sense, as explicatures have to do with truth-conditions and aim to create propositionally complete forms that are truth-evaluable, unlike propositional fragments
Referential Presuppositions, Epistemic Possibilities, and Epistemic Content
Master of Philosophy thesis, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2017
The necessary a posteriori poses a problem for possible worlds semantics. Truths such as Hesperus is Phosphorus are necessary and a posteriori. Necessary truths are true in all possible worlds, but a posteriori truths are informative and thus rule out some possible worlds in virtue of being false in them. Stalnaker uses his two-dimensional framework of pragmatics to represent the informativeness of necessary a posteriori truths. He represents the informativeness with possible worlds with alternative semantic facts, which are ruled out by utterances of such truths because they express falsehoods in those worlds. Soames points out that speakers make referential presuppositions about the names that they use, so those worlds are excluded from the context set before the utterances are made. Instead of metaphysical possibilities with alternative semantic facts, Soames proposes using metaphysical impossibilities as epistemic possibilities, and attributes this view to Kripke. However, as a main exegetical contention of the present work, Kripke has his own conception of epistemic possibilities in terms of epistemic counterparts. With the notion of epistemic counterparts, I propose the epistemic counterpart function that generates epistemic possibilities, and the description function that eliminates a proper subset of them. I then develop a notion of epistemic content along that line, and present a challenge to the project of representing epistemic states with possible worlds. I propose the epistemic function that takes, for any evidence, prior epistemic states to posterior epistemic states, in response to the challenge. I will then apply the notion of epistemic content to pragmatic contexts, and point out its complementary role to Stalnaker’s theory of pragmatics.
In this paper, I distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic presuppositions. I also propose that we should be interested in conversational presuppositions, which could also be called speaker-meant presuppositions or speaker's presuppositions. I also distinguish between potential and actual presuppositions. I propose that, in some cases, presuppositions can be conversationally implicated and cancellation is possible. I specify what the hard cases are and I try to explain them through ontological considerations. I try to reduce the hard cases through (a) the notion that all actual presuppositions are speaker-meant; (b) the distinction between ontological and linguistic presuppositions; and (c) the uncontroversial notion that even ontological presuppositions are susceptible to semantic under-determination that has to be tackled though pragmatic intrusion. Pragmatic intrusion for presuppositional cases, however, cannot really amount to completing or expanding or in any case computing an explicature in an ordinary sense, as explicatures have to do with truth-conditions and aim to create propositionally complete forms that are truth-evaluable, unlike propositional fragments
On the Availability of Presuppositions in Conversation
In: The Fragmented Mind (eds. C. Borgoni, D. Kindermann, A. Onofri), 2021
Presuppositions—information speakers mutually take for granted in conversation—play important explanatory roles in pragmatics and semantics. This chapter argues that not all presuppositions in a conversation are equally available, or accessible, to speakers at a given stage in a conversation. Contrary to common assumption, some pieces of information may be presupposed yet not be available to speakers for conversational actions. Standard conceptions of the conversation’s common ground—the set of presuppositions—cannot account for such differences in availability. This chapter presents an account of the common ground that makes room for a notion of availability of presuppositions relative to a conversational task. The notion is implemented in a conception of a Fragmented Common Ground that draws on three independently motivated ideas: the notion of context as common ground, mental fragmentation, and questions as guiding and structuring discourse.
Compositionality and Believing That
This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with a discussion of translation and belief individuation (section 3). Later Salmon (2001/ 2007) reinforces Church’s position, but I will argue that it is still possible to make my case by clarifying the nature of my proposal, i.e., understanding explanations of action from the third-person point of view (section 4). Now, Fine (2007) agrees with Putnam that there is indeed a puzzle to be solved, but he argues that Putnam’s solution of it is problematic, and that his own semantic relationism is a better view. In response to this, I will recast the notion of compositionality based on a certain conception of belief individuation, namely that the semantic content of a sentence is a function of the semantic contents of its parts and of the structure of intensional discourses (sections 3 and 5). Finally the paper will end with a reconsideration of the recalcitrant Kripke’s puzzle about belief (1979/1988), since it might seem to put some pressure on my account. It turns out that my understanding of this puzzle is again different from Fine’s perspective (section 6).