On the Sense of Justice from the Evolutionary Perspective. In : Jusletter IT – Die Zeitschrift für IT und Recht, Juni 2011, http://jusletter-it.eu. Reprinted in: T. Hribek, J. Hvorecky (eds.), Knowledge, Value, Evolution, London: College Publications, pp. 257-272. (original) (raw)
This chapter examines the relation between distributive doctrines and human evolution. It reviews responses to the assumption that evolutionary data has conservative implications that deny the accuracy of some alleged facts, their natural origin, their social or biomedical immutability, or their normative implications. It also offers an evolutionary account of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" for humans and other mammalian persons and discusses various ways in which human nature may have more than merely instrumental relevance to distributive justice. For example, human rights, flourishing and capabilities, as well as the principles of sufficiency, priority and equality, that may regulate their distribution, can be traced to facts about our species.
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 2020
Following Mill’s (1859) definition, the ‘harm principle’ came to dominate legal debates about crime and the appropriate response of the justice system, effectively replacing official talk of morality in modern secular societies. However, the harm principle has collapsed without an accepted definition of harm or a method to adjudicate between competing claims. To address this, we propose a definition of ‘good’ derived from evolutionary perspectives. From this, a universal goal for society can be recognised, specific objectives to reach that goal can be listed, and a new definition for harm can be used to repair the harm principle and restore its ability to underpin criminal law and the principles of justice in society.
The future evolution of the human might not be marked so much by his physical change, as by his moral development. I will offer three argumants in favor of the thesis that humanity is gradually moving in the direction of superior moral relations, i.e. the configuration of individuals and societies with an expanded inclination toward justice. The first argument is Kant's, the second Doyle's (which is in fact an indirect argument), while the third one is my own contribution to the discussion. All three arguments I will not only present, but also explain how they relate to each other. I will conclude that the thesis about the gradual development of humanity in the direction of social relations with a stronger foundation in justice can be cogently substantiated.
The Variations of the Concept of Justice: An Analysis
2018
The idea of the concept of justice varies from man to man, family to family, locality to locality, state to state, country to country and even continent to continent. The inquiry about justice goes from the crudest to the most refined interpretation of it. The basis of justice can be traced to conscience and morals. Philosophers have different theories of justice. This contributes to the assertion that a definite meaning of justice is hard to come by. Some see it as a shield to the weaker people in the society; others envision a society of equal citizens with equal rights. The ‘rights of citizens’ is one of the basic features of justice. In claiming these rights by citizens, arguments build up as to unjust actions. An example is the nature of secularism in Turkey, the ban placed on the hijab and the violation of the right to freedom of religion of women. Also, an intimate look at current issues in the world brings one to the conclusion that it is not possible for everyone to be just...
ΠΗΓΗ/FONS
In this paper I offer a conceptual characterization of the idea of a “sense of justice” as a suitable motivational basis for respect for the principles of justice in force in a given society, and argue that a similar concern can be found not only in John Rawls, who expressely talks about that notion, but also in Aristotle. My main contention is that both thinkers invite readers to conceive of the sense of justice as an attitude admitting of various degrees, ranging from a fear-inspired respect for the law up to an unconditional appreciation of the established constitutional principles and the laws stemming fom such principles. In the first part of this paper, I will address Aristotle’s view of a natural capacity of human beings for sociability, political participation and functional interdependence within the city culminating in a virtue-based political friendship. In the second part I will contend that, in Rawls’ view, the individual sense of justice is at work not only after the e...
Introduction to “Justice in Animals”
Social Justice Research, 2012
In the last decade, there has been an explosion of work investigating non-human species' behavior as it relates to the human sense of fairness and justice. This work has provided a much-needed evolutionary perspective on humans, and highlighted ways in which humans' behavior is both similar to and different from that of other species. In this concluding paper, we outline the major threads of the work highlighted in this and the previous special issues of Social Justice Research and provide thoughts on future directions for the field. This is a very exciting time in our exploration of the evolution of human justice and fairness, and we eagerly await the developments of the next decade. Humans are extremely invested in fairness and justice. This is apparently a human universal; although specifics may vary, some interest in fairness crosses cultures (Henrich et al., 2001). To what degree is this unique to humans? As this and the previous special journal issues of Social Justice Research indicate, there is mounting evidence that at least some comparison-of-rewards and aversion to unequal rewards are found across a wider variety of species than just ourselves, or even non-human primates. Although no other species thus far shows the inclusive sense of fairness seen in humans, aspects are present in a wide variety of species and situations. One of the challenges, of course, is attempting to uncover these responses in species that are unable to verbally report their reactions. For instance, there is a difference between a failure to respond and a failure to notice, yet it is difficult to empirically disentangle these possibilities amongst non-verbal species (Brosnan, Newton-Fisher, & van Vugt, 2009). Moreover, it is hard to determine what differences between species might mean. If, for instance, we find a sex difference in one species, but not another, is this due to a cognitive difference, and ecological difference, or a combination of the two, and what does this mean for our understanding of the evolution of fairness? This pair of journal issues summarizes the current state of the knowledge on behaviors related to fairness, and, in particular, responses to inequitable outcomes in species other than humans. There is growing evidence from non-human primates in particular, but also from domestic dogs and fish, and we hope that this list of species and taxa will grow significantly in the coming years. While humans' sense of fairness may differ from those of other species, the differences seem quantitative rather than qualitative. What does this mean for our understanding of human behavior? As a second goal of the issue, researchers who focus on humans have attempted to put these results in this context, and suggest future avenues for research. What do we know about justice in non-human species? Experimental evidence of responses to inequity Decades of research in both psychology and economics have demonstrated that humans respond negatively to inequitable outcomes between themselves and another individual (see Chen & Houser, 2012, this issue; Skitka, 2012, this issue). This can occur at two different levels: disadvantageous or advantageous (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Walster [Hatfield], Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). In disadvantageous inequity, subjects respond negatively to receiving a lesser valued outcome than a social partner, whereas in advantageous inequity, or overcompensation, subjects respond negatively to receiving a more valuable outcome than a social partner. Although an aversion to disadvantageous inequity may be stronger than that to advantageous inequity (Greenberg, 1982; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989), both occur in humans. Considering the evolution of this behavior, it is likely that the former preceded the latter (Brosnan, 2006a, 2006b). There is clearly an immediate fitness advantage to any individual who is able to recognize when they receive a less valuable outcome than a partner and then try to rectify the discrepancy; after all, relative outcomes are the foundation of natural selection. Nonetheless, after an ability to recognize outcomes that differ between one's self and another have evolved, there are also benefits to being able to recognize when one is advantaged relative to one's partner. For instance, recognizing and correcting inequity when one is the beneficiary demonstrates one's value as a social partner, bringing long-term benefits despite the short-term costs (Frank, 1988, 2001). Species other than humans respond to inequity in a variety of situations. This has been particularly well documented in two species of non-human primates, capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees, as well as in domestic dogs. Although the specifics of the tasks vary, these species show negative reactions to continued inequity between themselves and a social partner, typically evidenced by refusals to continue participating in interactions in which the outcome is repeatedly less good than a partner's (see Price & Brosnan, 2012, previous issue, Yamamoto & Takimoto, this issue, and Bräuer &
The virtue of justice revisited
2013
Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most nonKantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentiethcentury moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in the spotlight in an unprecedented way. Here I explore the signi! cance of these developments for what it is to be a just person (the nature of “individual justice”) as it was originally understood, within the eudaimonist virtueethical theories of the ancient Greeks. By any standard, ancient thinking about individual justice seems to have been incomplete in important ways; perhaps, in virtue of these advances in moral theory, we are in position to enrich our thinking about ...
Justice as an Evolving Regulative Ideal
In this paper, I argue that justice is best understood as an evolving regulative ideal. This framework avoids cynicism and apathy on the one hand as well as brash extremism on the other. I begin by highlighting the elusive quality of justice as an ideal always on the horizon, yet which is nevertheless meaningful. Next, I explain the ways in which it makes more sense to see justice as evolving, rather than as fixed. Finally, I demonstrate the value of Charles Sanders Peirce’s concept of a regulative ideal for framing a pragmatist outlook on justice. Peirce helps us at the same time to appreciate ideals yet to let go of outmoded understandings of their metaphysical status. Ideals are thus tools for regulating behavior. Each of these qualifications demonstrates that justice is best conceived of as an evolving regulative ideal.