Why did religiosity decrease in the Western World during the twentieth century? (original) (raw)
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Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006
R eligion has a two-way interaction with political economy. With religion viewed as a dependent variable, a central question is how economic development and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs. With religion viewed as an independent variable, a key issue is how religiosity affects individual characteristics, such as work ethic, honesty and thrift, and thereby influences economic performance. In this paper, we sketch previous studies of this two-way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with international data.
Evidence from 26 religious markets in Europe and North America between 1981 and 2006 This chapter tests the regulation hypothesis of religious market theory in 26 European and Northern American societies by examining differences in religious involvement between and within societies. The regulation hypothesis, which is assumed to be universally valid, predicts that religious involvement is higher in deregulated religious markets. Moreover, societies having deregulated religious markets for a longer period of time are supposed to have higher levels of involvement. Therefore, we test the duration hypothesis. This test is important, as it also has been argued that it may take time for deregulation to have an effect on religious involvement. Multi-level analysis on the stacked European and World Value Surveys of 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006 show troubling findings for religious market theory.
International Determinants of Religiosity
2003
Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model. According to the former theory, economic development reduces religious participation and beliefs. According to the latter theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism. We assess the theories by using survey information for 61 countries over the last 20 years on church attendance and religious beliefs. In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development--represented by per capita GDP--tends to reduce religiosity. Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. The presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the subsidies that flow to organized religion. However, in accordance with the religion-market model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market, Communist suppression, and a reduction in religious pluralism.
State Welfare Spending and Religiosity
Rationality and Society, 2004
What accounts for cross-national variation in religiosity as measured by church attendance and non-religious rates? Examining answers from both secularization theory and the religious economy perspective, we assert that cross-national variation in religious participation is a function of government welfare spending and provide a theory that links macro-sociological outcomes with individual rationality. Churches historically have provided social welfare. As governments gradually assume many of these welfare functions, individuals with elastic preferences for spiritual goods will reduce their level of participation since the desired welfare goods can be obtained from secular sources. Cross-national data on welfare spending and religious participation show a strong negative relationship between these two variables after controlling for other aspects of modernization.
The religious transition. A long-run perspective
Public Choice, 2013
We use factor analysis to derive a robust measure of religiosity from items reported in five waves of the World Value Survey. Our measure of religiosity is negatively correlated with per capita income. Development apparently causes religiosity to fall to about half its pre-modern level. Most components of the demand for religion are reduced by development. The supply of religion declines once churches lose control over the institutions providing collective goods like education, health, and social security. These goods used to be supplied by churches jointly with religious services but tend to be supplied by the state with rising levels of development. Aspects of supply and demand are integrated in a CES production function framework that can explain the direction of causality in the observed negative correlation between income and religiosity.
Religion and Economic Growth across Countries
2003
Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth has typically neglected the influence of religion. To fill this gap, we use international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. To isolate the direction of causation from religiosity to economic performance, we use instrumental variables suggested by our analysis of systems in which church attendance and beliefs are the dependent variables. The instruments are dummy variables for the presence of state religion and for regulation of the religion market, an indicator of religious pluralism, and the composition of religions. We find that economic growth responds positively to the extent of religious beliefs, notably those in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance. That is, growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging. These results accord with a perspective in which religious beliefs influence individual traits that enhance economic performance. The beliefs are, in turn, the principal output of the religion sector, and church attendance measures the inputs to this sector. Hence, for given beliefs, more church attendance signifies more resources used up by the religion sector. participants in several seminars and classes.
2003
Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth has typically neglected the influence of religion. To fill this gap, we use international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth.
E¤ect of Religion on Economic Activity
2014
This research establishes that religiosity has a persistent e¤ect on economic outcomes. First we use a sample of migrants in the US to establish that religiosity at the country of origin has a long lasting e¤ect on the religiosity of migrants. Second, exploiting variations in the inherited component of religiosity of migrants, our analysis uncovers the causal e¤ect of religiosity on economic activity using a panel of countries for the period 1935-2000. The empirical ndings suggest that i) church attendance has a positive impact on economic outcomes; ii) religious beliefs in the existence of god, hell, heaven and miracles have no systematic e¤ect on economic outcomes, and iii) stronger faith is associated with prosperity. Moreover we extend our analysis to uncover the channels via which religiosity operates. Notably, the positive e¤ect of religious participation and of stronger faith on economic outcomes operates via the creation of social capital and the development of traits, such...
Dissecting the act of god: an exploration of the effect of religiosity on economic activity
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
This research explores whether religiosity has a persistent effect on economic outcomes. We follow a three-step analysis. First, we use a sample of migrants in the United States to establish that religiosity in the country of origin has a lasting effect on the religiosity of migrants. Second, by exploiting variation in the inherited component of religiosity of migrants and controlling only for a baseline set of controls, we uncover a causal link between several aspects of religiosity and income level. The empirical findings of the second step suggest that i) church attendance has a positive impact on income; and ii) stronger faith is associated with a higher income. Finally, we augment the set of controls included in the measure of inherited religiosity in order to capture the effects of social capital, education, and of traits conducive to income growth. When controlling for social capital, the effect of religious attendance on economic outcomes vanishes, and when controlling for t...