Specific Interests and the Origins of Electoral Institutions (original) (raw)
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Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Institutions
A recent wave of studies explores the effects of electoral institutions on economic interests. This paper instead examines the effects of economic interests on electoral institutions. We argue that electoral rules are a function of the nature and geographical dispersion of economic interests.
Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems
American Political Science Review, 2007
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped ...
Electoral Systems and Economic Policy
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008
This article discusses recent empirical and theoretical research on the electoral rule, which is one feature of modern democracies. It determines that the electoral rule systematically shapes economic policy. An outline of some key objectives of electoral rules is presented in the first section; it further notes the stability and systematic selection that characterize real-world constitutions. It then introduces the main concepts that categorize different electoral rules, and explains how these elements help shape the accountability of government and the size of political rents and corruption. Finally, the article deals with representation in government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?
2003
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending. JEL classifications: H00, D72, D78.
American Political Science Review, 2006
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
2015
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, ma-joritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others
2003
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the composition of governing coalitions, whether these are conceived as electoral alliances between classes or alliances between class parties. Our argument implies a) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, while center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems, and b) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
“Policy Consequences of Electoral Rules.”
One of the fastest growing areas of research on electoral systems has been on the effects of electoral systems on policy outcomes. Research has looked at the effect of electoral systems on a wide range of policies, including: public spending, regulations that affect consumer prices, public deficits and debt, tariffs and subsidies, and the balance between broad and geographically-targeted public goods.
Political Institutions and Redistribution
2000
The paper develops a model of a parliament and analyses the political-equilibrium tax and spending decisions. The underlying economy is an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour taxation and capital taxation is used to finance public goods provision, period by period. Potentially any individual may form a party, and individuals vote on those parties that have decided to run for election. The number of seats obtained by a party in parliament is proportional to the number of votes it gets. Given the election result parties form coalitions to bargain over policy proposals. The implemented proposal is the one getting more than half of the votes in parliament. If preferences over public goods are enough disperse, there is a unique equilibrium where no single party has majority and where policy is a compromise (as opposed to an ideal point). If population growth is positive, the largest party in parliament consists of old with strong preferences for the public good. The political-equilibrium coalition is between the largest party and a party consisting of young with weak preferences for the public good. Distribution, though, goes from old to young. If there is negative population growth the largest party consists of young with strong preferences for the public goods. The coalition is between the largest party and a party consisting of old with weak preferences for the public good. Distribution, in this case, goes from young to old. If there is little dispersion in preferences (i.e. when there is roughly only one-dimensional heterogeneity), then the political-equilibrium policy coincides with the policy predicted by median-voter model.