1 On the Two Reasons to Vote : Why the Expressive Account Is Insufficient (original) (raw)
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SOLVING THE PARADOX THE EXPRESSIVE RATIONALITY OF THE DECISION TO VOTE
The renowned paradox of voting arises when one tries to explain the decision to go out and vote in an exclusively instrumental framework. Instead of postulating that voters always derive utility from the act of voting, I want to search for the reasons that underlie the absence or presence of a preference for voting. In my noninstrumental account of expressive rationality, citizens want to express who they are and what they care about. Whether or not one votes therefore depends on the force of one's commitments to principles, norms, ideologies or particular persons. This has been confirmed by empirical research showing that citizens vote because they feel they have to, not because they like doing so. Complementing instrumental rationality, this concept of expressive rationality gives a fuller, deeper and more adequate view of the way citizens make political decisions, thereby solving the paradox of voting.
Theoretical models of voting behaviour 1
This article reviews the main theoretical models that explain the electoral behavior -sociological model of voting behavior, psychosocial model of voting behavior and rational choice theory -, stressing the continuity and theoretical complementarity between them. It also proposes a reconceptualization of the concept of partisanship in order to integrate all relevant contributions of the three main models of voting behavior in a holistic approach to electoral behavior.
Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Voting Behaviour: A Comparative Analysis
sjesr, 2020
The study of voting behavior is a sub-field of Political Science. Voting represents an important aspect of public participation in a democratic system. Keeping in view the importance of voting behavior in a democratic dispensation, social scientists have paid much attention to its determinants. At least three kinds of theoretical models can be discerned in the works of social scientists: a sociological model, a psycho-social model, and a rational choice model. The focus of the sociological model is on social factors, the psychosocial model focuses on psychological or political factors, while the rational choice model emphasizes economic factors. The main aim of the paper is to present a brief overview of these three kinds of models comparatively.
Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
University of Copenhagen Economics Working Paper No. 16-12, 2016
Standard economic reasoning assumes that people vote instrumentally, i.e., that the sole motivation to vote is to influence the outcome of an election. In contrast, voting is expressive if voters derive utility from the very act of expressing support for one of the options by voting for it, and this utility is independent of whether the vote affects the outcome. This paper surveys experimental tests of expressive voting with a particular focus on the low-cost theory of expressive voting. The evidence for the low-cost theory of expressive voting is mixed.
The calculus of voting: An empirical test
European Journal of Political Research, 2000
According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to voterespondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P , and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.
Theory and Decision, 1992
The formal framework of social choice theory is generalized through the introduction of separate representations of preferences and choices. This makes it possible to treat voting as a procedure in which decisions are actually made by interacting participants, rather than as a mere mechanism for aggregation. The extended framework also allows for non-consequentialist preferences that take procedural factors into account. Concepts such as decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and stability are redefined for use in the new context. The formal results obtained confirm the universality of strategic voting.