Geography and the International System (original) (raw)

Russian warfare and influence: States in the proximity of Russia

Russian warfare and influence: States in the proximity of Russia, 2024

The turmoil descending on Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has altered many of the pre-existing conceptions of Russia as an actor in European security. Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 served to reintroduce Russia as a main focus of security debates across Europe. Crucial insights that could have aided in anticipation were not deduced after the 2008 invasion of Georgia, that is that Russia was no stranger to the use of force in pursuit of its national security objectives. Nevertheless, in the perceptions of the threat posed by Russia, military options were understood to be reserved for states that the Russian regime claimed were within its legitimate sphere of interest. Other, non-kinetic and hybrid means of power and influence were thought to be the main cause for concern to the rest of the Western world. Russian interference in the 2016 US and 2017 French elections, as well as funding of right-wing populist parties across Europe; concerted activity in the cyber arena; and a range of influence operations seemed to vindicate the nature of the new security environment. Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, followed by the unified Western response in the form of sustained military and economic support for Ukraine, comprehensive sanctions against Russia and decisions by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, has fundamentally altered the map of potential threats that the West needs to confront. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that Russia is both prepared to go further in retaining its influence and domination in its ‘near abroad’, and to accept larger risks in this regard, than previously anticipated. Moreover, the preparations, 2planning and conduct of the Russian operation have revealed surprising degrees of incompetence and strategic miscalculation, and therefore of recklessness, which has served to alter the conceptions of deterrence previously applied. Previous instances of post-1991 Russian warfare abroad, in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, were all delimited in scope, utilizing a controlled amount of force in operations designed to avoid triggering third-party involvement and unwanted escalation. Yet as an effect of its failure to subdue Ukraine, and the significance of Western military support in this regard, the Russian regime now claims to be at war with NATO. And while the Russian regime likely understands that this is not really the case and what a war with NATO would actually imply, escalation beyond Ukraine is a scenario that remains unlikely but whose consequences would be too serious to ignore. However, while its engagement in Ukraine makes Russian military adventurism elsewhere unlikely at present, there is an extensive catalogue of other measures that Russia can employ in its conflict with the West. These capabilities have not receded to the same extent as Russia’s military capability and the risk of more brazen actions against states other than Ukraine grows in tow with the Russian regime’s desperation and the increasing threat to the longevity of the regime. A recent example is the apparent attempt to stage a coup in Moldova, disclosed in February 2023. Many of these are well known and have frequently been discussed in terms of a strategy of hybrid warfare or hybrid threats emanating from Russia (along with a whole range of similar but not synonymous terms).[1] While the conflict with Russia warrants extensive rethinking and funding of defensive capabilities, military and civilian, across the West, nowhere is this conflict felt more acutely than in the states geographically located at the intersection between Russia and the West. Moreover, these states have considerably longer experience in managing the implications of ‘living close to’ Russia than their counterparts located further away from Russia. In this context, the states emerging after the break-up of the USSR have followed radically different trajectories in their foreign and domestic policies, and they have developed diverse relations with Russia along with the former imperial power’s increasingly assertive external policies.