Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is this Right Different from All Other Rights? (original) (raw)
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† Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to the participants in Vanderbilt University Law School's faculty workshop, the Prison Scholarship Roundtable, John Boston, and (as always) Sam Bagenstos. All remaining errors are my own responsibility. I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan. This Article may be copied and distributed for free or at cost to students or prisoners.
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