Group Agency and Collective Intentionality (ed. with Martin Kusch and Hans Bernhard Schmid) (original) (raw)

A Constitutive Account of Group Agency

Erkenntnis 9, 79, 2014, pp. 1623-1639, DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9632-y

"ABSTRACT Christian List and Philip Pettit develop an account of group agency which is based on a functional understanding of agency. They claim that understanding organizations such as commercial corporations, governments, political parties, churches, universities as group agents helps us to a better understanding of the normative status and working of those organizations. List and Pettit, however, fail to provide a unified account of group agency since they do not show how the functional side of agency and the normative side of agency are connected. My claim is that a constitutive account of agency helps us to a proper understanding of group agency since it ties the functional part of acting to the group agent’s self-understanding and its commitment to specific norms, principles and values. A constitutive model of agency meets much better what List and Pettit seek to accomplish, namely conceiving of group agents as artificial persons, constituted by normative principles and entertaining normative relations to others to whom they are accountable. "

The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility

Journal of Social Ontology, 2020

Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment-as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit's theory of group agency-face the so-called "problem of the first belief" that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups.

From Individual to Collective Intentionality/ Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2016)

2016

I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.

Groups as Persons? A Suggestion for a Hegelian Turn

Journal of Social Ontology, 2017

Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently argued for a performative theory of personhood in which all agents who manage to perform in the space of obligations are taken as persons. Based on this account they claim that group agents are also persons. This theory has been challenged on the grounds of its historical accuracy, lack of political relevance, and contestability of the concept of personhood. This paper aims to take a new perspective on the debate by approaching it through the Hegelian idea of recognition. The claim is that recognition theory provides a multi-dimensional view of personhood that gives a clearer account of what is at stake with collective personhood. Link for the full open access paper: https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0019

Interconnected Blameworthiness

The Monist, 2021

This paper investigates agents' blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent's blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial (and some resultant) luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent's vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents' contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent's degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness-but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her.

How Autonomous Are Collective Agents? Corporate Rights and Normative Individualism

Corporate responsibility requires a conception of collective agency on which organizations are able to form moral judgments and act on them. In spite of claims to the contrary, existing accounts of collective agency fall short of this kind of corporate autonomy, as they fail to explain how collective agents might be responsive to moral reasons. I discuss how a recently proposed conception of shared valuing can be used for developing a solution to this problem. Although the resulting conception of corporate autonomy is useful for making sense of corporate responsibility, it also gives rise to what I call ‘the Corporate Autonomy Problem’. Autonomous collective agents are in principle entitled to the same rights as autonomous individual agents. However, at least some individual rights, such as the right to vote, the right to life, and the right not to be enslaved cannot plausibly be attributed to collective agents. This intuition is supported by normative individualism, the position according to which corporate agents are not entitled to non-derivative rights at all. I argue that without a proper solution to this problem – I sketch the available options – saving corporate responsibility requires giving up on normative individualism.