Interest Group Framing and Belief Diffusion in the Battle Over Housing Finance (original) (raw)
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2011
Abstract This project examines how interest groups create partisan connections among US House members. Although the rise of ideologically motivated groups has been identified as a potential cause of legislative partisanship, there is very little research on how interest groups affect the nature of partisan coalitions. We consider how interest group donation strategies create connections between legislators and how the resulting networks affect the nature of lawmaking in the House.
Coalition portfolios and interest group influence over the policy process
An interest group coalition exists whenever two or more interest groups collaborate in advocating their public policy agendas. Working together in coalition is one of the most common tactics that interest groups use to advance their interests in the policy process. The extant literature on coalitions emphasizes interest group decisions to participate or not in one coalition, or their strategy toward coalitions in general, but gives insufficient attention to interest group participation in multiple coalitions. To rectify this deficit, this article examines the implications of groups’ participation in multiple coalitions for their ability to influence the policy process. In order to account for interest group involvement in multiple coalitions, we introduce the concept of the coalition portfolio, which is the set of all coalitions within a given area of public policy in which an interest group participates at a particular point in time. The portfolio concept recognizes that interest groups may have a wide variety of coalition strategies depending on the mix of coalitions that they join. Variations in the structure of these portfolios matter both to interest groups and to policymakers. Moreover, coalition portfolios evolve over time as coalitions form and dissolve, and as political conditions adjust over the course of the policy process. We develop and test hypotheses that the change in the composition of coalition portfolios increases the influence of interest groups over public policy when: (i) the number of coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger; (ii) the average size of the coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger or smaller; and (iii) a group’s portfolio improves its position within the overall network of coalitions. Network position is measured based on the betweenness of interest groups in coalition networks, which gives higher scores to groups that lie on the shortest paths between other groups. We test these hypotheses while accounting for other explanations for interest group influence, including: (i) the group’s position in communication networks; (ii) the group’s number of registered lobbyists working on Medicare; (iii) whether or not the group has a Political Action Committee; (iv) the extent to which a group’s lobbying contacts lean toward one political party; (v) whether or not the group endorsed the legislation in question; (vi) the organization’s age in years; and (vii) whether the group is a citizens advocacy organization, a business advocacy organization or some other organizational type. We evaluate these hypotheses using a study of 115 interest groups involved in the enactment and implementation of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. This legislation established an outpatient prescription drug benefit in Medicare – a government health insurance program for the elderly and disabled in the United States – and made other significant changes to the program. We conducted personal interviews with representatives of 102 of these groups. We analyzed data resulting from these interviews using negative binomial and ordinary least squares regression models. The results support Hypothesis (iii); groups gain influence over the policy process when their coalition portfolios increase the extent to which they are situated between other groups in the coalition network. However, interest groups are limited in the extent to which they can create portfolios that have desirable levels of betweenness because network position is also a function of membership decisions made by all other groups in the network. These results provide insight into how the composition of coalition portfolios affects the ability of interest groups to exert influence over the policy process. This analysis is most directly applicable to policy debates over complex pieces of legislation.
Agenda Setting and Influence of Interest Groups.docx
American Policy Process: Agenda Setting & the Role of Interest Groups " The flaw in the pluralist heave is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent ". –E.E. Schattschneider (1960) The narrative of American inequality breeds dramatic economic and political changes (Hacker & Pierson, 2010) witnessed over the last few decades. Not only has the economy evolved, but also has the political fabric with the emergence of vast financial bids for reelection, lobbying activities by corporations, businesses and professional organizations as interest groups which have drastically drowned the voice of the mass citizenry and public interest. Since, power and influence play a key role in the policy process. In the policy process interest groups influence the policy arena or are the decisions representative of the larger welfare society? To reach the answer, it is necessary to understand the role and influence of these very interest groups in the context of the American policy process, especially during the agenda setting and decision making stages as outlined by scholars. This paper examines valuable insights into the policy process through recognized frameworks in the field; it explores the importance of both the agenda setting and decision making stages in the policy process as stages of problem solving public issues; and it highlights the central role of interest groups in context of the American pluralism. Policy Process In the political sphere, the debate of policy formation must include the role and influence of the mass public, the American citizenry. As a government of democratic ideals, the public is an integral part of public policy process. Democracy, conceptualized, depends on citizens having the means and capacity to form meaningful opinions about acts of governance. This premise is based on the notion that the public not only has access, but also influences in the policy process. In reality, there exists a certain economic inequality in society which leads to certain groups having more influence than others. Even Aristotle wrestled with the question of whether substantial economic inequality was compatible with democracy. In the last decade, even the American Political Science Association concluded that political scientists know very little about the effects of economic and political changes on American democracy. Since it is recognized that economic inequality breeds an advantaged influence within certain groups of society, it is important to understand its implications on public policy (and hence, democracy in general). The policy process is a complex problem solving approach involving relative power and influence of stakeholders. It is the system of logical cycle of events which lead to problem solutions. Charles O. Jones (1984) was the first to integrate policy and political science into a framework of policy analysis for a comprehensive sequence of recurring cycles. According to his framework (which has through the years been both revered and criticized) includes perception and definition of a problem; aggregation in reference to its importance; organization of actors involved; representation as decision makers; agenda setting; formulation of a proposed solution; legitimating and support of the problem; budgeting; implementation; evaluation; and adjustment and termination of the adopted solution. Through policy analysis, decisions by stakeholders are made on adopting solutions. These decisions are methodical and use both qualitative and quantitative methods of defining the problem, evaluation a criterion, identifying and evaluating alternatives, and recommending the Mohyuddin 1
The Revolving Door, Partisan Alignments, and Communication Networks Among Health Reform Lobbyists
Revolving door lobbyists sit at the intersection of two communications networks, one connected to Capitol Hill actors, the other to fellow lobbyists. A growing body of research has investigated revolvers’ success in gaining access to legislators, but we know less about whether congressional experience improves lobbyists’ position in interest group networks. We provide an informational rationale for why revolvers will be better connected in communications among lobbyists, arguing that this comparative advantage will be structured by prior partisan alignments. Using a new dataset on the self-reported communications among lobbyists active on the Affordable Care Act, we test our hypotheses recently developed techniques of inferential network analysis. We find that revolvers do enjoy an advantage in lobbyist communications, and that the advantage is particularly strong among copartisan lobbyists.
Interest organizations, information, and policy innovation in the US Congress
Sociological Forum
Interest organizations are hypothesized to strongly affect public policy, but the evidence that they do so is mixed. This article argues that one reason for the disparity is a gap between theory and research: theory suggests that information provided by interest organizations should strongly influence elec-ted officials, but there is no systematic research on its impact. We examine a potentially important source of information for members of the U.S. Con-gress—testimony at committee hearings—to ascertain if it affects the enact-ment of policy proposals. The data, based on content analysis of almost 1,000 testimonies on a stratified random sample of policy proposals, describe who testifies, their arguments, and the evidence they provide. Supporters of a proposal emphasize the importance of the problem being addressed, while opponents claim the proposed policy will be ineffective and try to reframe the debate. Information—particularly information regarding policy effective-ness—does a...