ARC Federation Fellowship Islam , Syari ’ ah and Governance BACKGROUND PAPER SERIES Indonesia ’ s Islamic Educational Institutions and Radicalism Among Muslim Youth Dr (original) (raw)
was appointed as an ARC Federation Fellow in 2006, a 5-year appointment funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) to research "Islam and Modernity: Syari'ah, Terrorism and Governance in SouthEast Asia". Terrorism in Southeast Asia responds to challenges that western-derived modernity poses for Islam, including market economies, democracy and nation states. Professor Lindsey will examine the different responses to these challenges through research in regional Muslim communities, institution building, mentoring young scholars and community engagement in the Southeast Asian region. The Fellowship also aims to help strengthen the University of Melbourne's new Centre for Islamic Law and Society as a hub for research and public engagement on issues related to Islam and law in our region. He aims to achieve a better understanding in Australia of Islam in Southeast Asia and thereby strengthen Australia's capacity to navigate our regional relationships. Islam, Syari'ah and Governance Background Paper Series The Islam, Syari'ah and Governance Background Paper Series seeks to provide a considered analysis of important issues relevant to Islam, syari'ah and governance in Southeast Asia.
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