Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing Government Lawsuit Abuse (original) (raw)

Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and the Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General

2003

Employing a critical-mass theory of collective action, this article models the emergence of cooperation among state attorneys general in litigation against the tobacco industry. These suits were not independent events, nor was cooperation based on prior agreement among the attorneys general. Rather, cooperation emerged over time as a result of interdependent decision-making, with early lawsuits increasing the likelihood of later suits. The model emphasizes the "production function" of the collective good and the heterogeneity of the attorneys general and their political environments as keys to the development of cooperation. The model is tested against data using event history analysis.

Litigation and the political clout of the tobacco companies: cigarette taxes, prices, and the Master Settlement agreement

2004

The goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the changes in cigarette excise taxes and cigarette prices can be attributed to litigation brought by the states and the resulting settlements, holding other factors constant. Using pre-post as well as state excise taxes on beer as controls, the evidence provides support for the view that litigation changes the political equilibrium: state cigarette excise taxes were approximately $0.10 higher in the post-MSA period. For tobacco prices, the increases are attributable to the method the settlement used to structure payments as well as the market structure of the cigarette industry.

Tobacco Control and the Role of Litigation: A Survey of Issues in Law, Policy, and Economics

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008

This article examines the course of tobacco litigation in the United States and its implications for law and policy in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. In our view, the different legal traditions and attitudes of other countries when applied to the current balance achieved in the U.S. through a mix of litigation, settlement, and regulation will lead the majority of such states to opt for the direct and transparent regulation of tobacco activities through formal and perhaps consensual channels, thereby bypassing the long and costly stage of litigation that characterized the U.S. process. Therefore, despite some increased litigation in the product liability area as a whole, the approach to tobacco control on the international level is likely to be characterized by the continuing, and, indeed, increased reliance on direct regulation rather than on ad hoc litigation, the efficiencies of the former approach having now become evident. JEL codes: L59 (regulation-other) K33(international law) I18 (public health policy) Keywords: Tobacco litigation, tobacco regulation. * We benefited from the comments of Nuno Garoupa and acknowledge the excellent work of Guilherme Vilaça and Michael S. Navarro research assistants. Opinions expressed reflect solely our views.

Litigation in tobacco control: past, present and future

Tobacco Control, 2022

This paper reviews progress in tobacco litigation since Tobacco Control’s founding 30 years ago, with a focus on cases which are ongoing or recently decided. Litigation in tobacco control falls into several classes: legal challenges brought by the tobacco industry to block implementation of tobacco control measures, public interest litigation brought by civil society to push for higher standards of implementation of tobacco control measures and liability litigation by governments and individuals to hold the tobacco industry accountable for the harm it causes. In each class of cases, there are a number of major case studies which show the importance of international frameworks, including most significantly the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, to tobacco litigation.

States' Allocations Of Funds From The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement

Health Affairs, 2005

This study assesses six states' allocation decisions for funds from tobacco settlement agreements, using information from newspaper articles and other public sources. State allocation decisions were diverse; substantial shares were allocated to areas other than tobacco control and health, including capital projects and budget shortfalls. The allocations did not reflect the stated goals of the lawsuits leading to the settlements. This outcome reflects a lack of strong advocacy from public health interest groups, an unreliable public constituency for tobacco control, and inconsistent support from state executive and legislative branches, all combined with sizable budget deficits that provided competing uses for settlement funds.

Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law Institute's Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies

Iowa law review, 2012

The American Law Institute ("ALI") is a prestigious and influential organization that creates treatises on the current state of the law, including "Restatements" of case law that guide judicial decisions and legislation. This paper uses previously secret tobacco industry documents made available as the result of state and federal litigation against the industry to describe how the tobacco companies, acting both indirectly through their trade organization, the Tobacco Institute, and directly, using influential lawyers, quietly influenced the ALI's writing of the Restatements. The tobacco industry's ease of access to the ALI calls into question the Institute's independence, the preparation of major policy documents such as the Restatements, as well as the Institute's ability to monitor and control conflicts of interest. The ALI's conflict of interest policies lag behind comparable organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences and the In...

The United States Government's Racketeering Lawsuit against the Cigarette Industry

2004

Cigarettes manufactured by fewer than half a dozen domestic companies cause approximately 440,000 deaths and $155 billion in medical and lost productivity costs each year in the United States. Despite this toll, Congress has not authorized the United States Food and Drug Administration to regulate cigarette design or marketing. Likewise, the Consumer Product Safety Commission cannot regulate cigarettes and the Federal Trade Commission has played a relatively passive role over the past two decades.

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

Tobacco Control, 2001

Background-Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its protobacco agenda. Objective-To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. Design-This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. Results-In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political eVort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These eVorts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other protobacco policies from being enacted in several states.