Illocutionary constructions: Cognitive motivation and linguistic realization1 (original) (raw)
Related papers
Grounding, Semantic Motivation, and Conceptual Interaction In Indirect Directive Speech Acts* 1
Journal of Pragmatics, 2002
In this paper we attempt to develop the still programmatic but insightful proposal made by Thomburg and Panther (1997) and Panther and Thomburg (1998), according to which the identification of the intended meaning (or illocutionary force) of indirect requests (and by extension of indirect speech acts in general) is based on conceptual metonymies operating on the grounds of the different components of illocutionary scenarios. We build into Panther and Thornburg's account other aspects of indirect directives which they have not considered yet. Thus we examine issues such as the semantic motivation of indirect directives, the prototypicality degrees of the constructions used to convey them, their instantiation potential, their image-schematic basis, and the cognitive motivation of some of their features in discourse. We argue that calculating the illocutionary force of an utterance is ultimately a matter of conceptual interaction between propositional, image-schematic, metonymic, and metaphorical idealized cognitive models or ICMs.
Grounding, semantic motivation, and conceptual interaction in indirect directive speech acts
Journal of Pragmatics, 2002
In this paper we attempt to develop the still programmatic but insightful proposal made by Thomburg and Panther (1997) and , according to which the identification of the intended meaning (or illocutionary force) of indirect requests (and by extension of indirect speech acts in general) is based on conceptual metonymies operating on the grounds of the different components of illocutionary scenarios. We build into Panther and Thornburg's account other aspects of indirect directives which they have not considered yet. Thus we examine issues such as the semantic motivation of indirect directives, the prototypicality degrees of the constructions used to convey them, their instantiation potential, their image-schematic basis, and the cognitive motivation of some of their features in discourse. We argue that calculating the illocutionary force of an utterance is ultimately a matter of conceptual interaction between propositional, image-schematic, metonymic, and metaphorical idealized cognitive models or ICMs. 0 teach linguistics at the University of La Rioja (Spain). They have done research on pragmatics, and on cognitive and functional linguistics and collaborate with researchers from the universities of La Rioja, Castelhm, and Murcia in the study of frame semantics, metaphor, and metonymy, and their relationships with the various levels of grammatical explanation, on the one hand, and with pragmatic inferencing, on the other. Professor Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza coordinates work by some of these researchers on redeveloping frame semantics theory in terms of relational networks and their interaction with metaphoric, metonymic and image-schematic models. Dr. Lorena Perez has carried out extensive research into speech act theory, especially from the point of view of cognitive modelling.
2020
Reconsideration of legal phenomena by legal language means is a typical feature of analytical tradition in the legal philosophy, since legal regulations are expressed not only in language, but are inextricably linked with the linguistic content of rules whilst applying them. Language as a form of communication and representation of the world is a holistic and specific phenomenon, that is localized in speech acts that form subject's intentions and his further actions. It is necessary to count the meaningful use of signs for the reality perception, that form the language. Legal reality and its language forms are inseparable, and thus, we can learn more deeply the essence of legal phenomena by interpreting legal texts and speech acts that illustrate legal intentions and actions. So in the speech acts theory of J.L. Austin introduces the category of com missives , denoting the obligations declared by the intentions of the person (promise, agree, intend, plan, provide, allow, swear, etc.). In legal language speech acts are used with the purposes of execution, prohibition, coercion for maintenance of a social order, therefore legal discourse has performative character. Performative expressions in legal language are characterized by speech stereotypes due to repetitive procedures (for example, procedural actions in criminal proceedings or court hearings). If it is a question of acts of application of the right, from the point of view of their performative form they have declarative character, that is contain instructions and obligations of legal character. The illocutionary function of these proposals is to form a respectful attitude to the established norms, and the perlocutive force is to impose compliance with these norms. The question of the relation of speech acts and actions in a different context was considered by Gilbert Ryle.
Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity
Sbisà on Speech as Action, 2022
Speech act theory has traditionally been concerned with a particular subset of linguistic rules: illocutionary rules. Illocutionary rules are rules that govern the performance of illocutionary acts 1. For example: "You should promise to do something only if you intend to it", or "Advising someone to do something is appropriate only if the action advised is in the audience's interest". Speech act theorists have been concerned with studying the nature and scope of these rules, and with identifying which rules govern which illocutionary acts. Throughout the years and in different areas of the world, various schools and traditions have emerged, each attempting to formalise and model the various norms governing illocutions. Although these different traditions share a common background, there are often terminological and theoretical differences. Often, theoretical convergence between schools is fairly evident despite differences in vocabulary. For instance, Searle's opposition between 'defective' and 'unsuccessful' illocutions parallels (and derives from) Austin's opposition between 'abuses' and 'misfires' 2. In other cases, it isn't clear whether terminological divergencies reflect actual theoretical differences. For example, to describe the rational expectations that govern conversational exchanges, Grice (1989) chooses the term 'maxims' instead of 'rules'. Whether this lexical choice reflects a concern for a genuinely distinct kind of normativity is up for dispute. Finally, there are traditions that use the same term in different ways. For instance, as we shall see, different schools characterise 'constitutive rules' in radically different, incompatible ways. These terminological and theoretical differences can make the speech act theoretic literature difficult to navigate. Even experts often disagree on which Kind of rule Sets conditions for: Consequences of violation Kinds of norms falling under the category Constitutive rules Conditions for performance The speech act isn't performed Austin's A-rules and B-rules Searle's constitutive rules Bach & Harnish's success conditions Maxims Conditions for appropriate performance
2009
The term indirect speech act is used to name every utterance that conveys illocutionary force in an implicit way. The set of indirect utterances presents a large display of possibilities of conveying a message that largely overcomes the conventional or semantic meaning of the used expressions. The problem of meaning vs. use illustrated by the case of indirect speech acts puts us before the choice between conventional and nonconventional meaning. Indirect assertion would be the meeting point of semantics and pragmatics. This paper presents a case against illocutionary potential of sentences and argues the redundancy of the term indirect illocutionary act, exploring the communicative meaning on the semantics-pragmatics border.
Toward a pragmatic account and taxonomy of valuative speech acts
Pragmatics, 2019
This paper presents an account of value ascription as an illocutionary force, based on four claims: (1) that value ascription is a kind of illocutionary force, defining a specific kind of speech act, i.e. valuative speech acts (VSAs); (2) that the point of VSAs is ascribing an axiological value to a ref-erent; (3) that VSAs create a weak, inside-oriented truth commitment; and (4) that they are therefore more about the valuating subject than they are about the valuated object. This illocutionary force is described using criteria taken from contemporary speech act theory as well as others that have proven informative. This description results in a rich taxonomy of VSAs. This shows the viability and fruitfulness of a pragmatic account of value ascription, and it contributes to the development of speech act theory, specifically with regard to the distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary points, and the speech act taxonomy itself.
How to Establish Authority with Words: Imperative Utterances and Presupposition Accommodation
in: A. Brożek, J. Jadacki & B. Žarnic (ed.), Theory of Imperatives from Different Points of View (2), Warszawa 2013 (Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University, Vol. 7), 145-157., 2013
"The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at providing an account of an indirect mechanism responsible for establishing one’s power to issue binding directive acts; second, it is intended as a case for an externalist account of illocutionary interaction. The mechanism in question is akin to what David Lewis calls “presupposition accommodation”: a rule-governed process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted to make the utterance acceptable; the main idea behind the proposed account is that the indirect power-establishing mechanism involves the use of imperative sentences that function as presupposition triggers and as such can trigger off the accommodating change of the context of their utterance. According to the externalist account of illocutionary interaction, in turn, at least in some cases the illocutionary force of an act is determined by the audience’s uptake rather than by what the speaker intends or believes; in particular, at least in some cases it is the speaker, not her audience, who is invited to accommodate the presupposition of her act. The paper has three parts. The first one defines a few terms — i.e., an “illocution”, a “binding act”, the “audience’s uptake” and an “Austinian presupposition” — thereby setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The second part formulates and discusses the main problem of the present paper: what is the source of the agent’s power to perform binding directive acts? The third part offers an account of the indirect power-establishing mechanism and discusses its externalist implications. "