A New Voting Model For Groups With Members of Unequal Power and Proficiency (original) (raw)
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This paper proposes a new approach to allow the voters to express their preferences on a set of candidates in ranked voting systems. This approach assumes that the votes of all voters have not equal importance and there is a priority among voters. Here, voters are classified into several groups in terms of their priorities that the vote of a higher category has a greater important than that of lower category. Then, the existing ranking methods are extended to discriminate efficient candidates in our proposed model. Moreover, a new criterion to obtain a total ranking by evaluating different ranking methods based on classical voting system is given. Finally the proposed method is illustrated with an application example and shows to be effective and practical.
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Ranked voting data arise when voters select and rank more than one candidate with an order of preference. Cook et al.[1] introduced data envelopment analysis (DEA) to analyze ranked voting data. Obata et al.[2] proposed a new method that did not use information obtained from inefficient candidates to discriminate efficient candidates. Liu et al.[3] ranked efficient DMUs on the DEA frontier with common weights. They proposed a methodology to determine one common set of weights for the performance indices of all DMUs. Then, these DMUs were ranked according to the efficiency score weighted by the common set of weights. In this paper, we use one common set of weights for ranked voting data.
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Le modèle traditionnel du choix social admet une multitude d'impossibilités et n'a abouti à aucune méthode incontestable pour élire un candidat ou ranger des compétiteurs. Un nouveau modèle permet de contourner les impossibilités avec une méthode éminemment pratique, "la valeur-majoritaire".
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International Journal of Management Research and Social Science , 2021
Election is the main challenge to the political and social science. In the meantime, in the literature, several methods to decide the winner of elections have been proposed; theoretically there is no reason to be limited to these models. Hence, in this paper, we assume three new approaches (1. election result prediction by pre-election preference information using Markov chain model [to identify the efficient electoral strategy for each candidate]. 2. Improved Borda's function method using the weights of decision makers [or voters]. And 3. A new interval TOPSIS-based approach applying ordinal set of preferences [so, data is ordinal form that first convert to interval value and then inject them into the conventional interval TOPSIS model]) for ranking candidates in voting systems. Ultimately, three numerical examples in social choice context are given to depict the feasibility and practability of the proposed methods. In sum, this paper suggests a mind line for decreasing the wrong choice winner risks correlated with voting systems.
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In ranked voting systems, each voter selects a subset of candidates and ranks them from most to least preferred. The preference score obtained by each candidate is the weighted sum of votes receives in different places. The main drawback of this approach is that it assumes there is no preference among voters. In this paper we first attempt to analyze and show some drawbacks of this approach. Then, we propose a new method in which voters are classified into several categories based on their priorities that the vote of a higher category may have a greater importance than that of the lower category.
Mathematical Sciences
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Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a new voting theory called Majority Judgment which tries to circumvent this limitation. In Majority Judgment, voters are invited to evaluate candidates in terms taken in a well-known common language. The winner is then the NGOIE, SAVADOGO and ULUNGU 10 one that obtains the highest median. Since the Majority Judgment proposal was made, authors have detected insufficiencies with this new voting system. This article aims at reducing these insufficiencies by proposing a voting system to decide between the median-based voting and the meanbased one. It proposes, moreover, a new tie-breaking method computing intermedian ranks mean.
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