Power, Freedom, and Voting (original) (raw)
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This paper develops the symmetric power order, a measure of voting power for multicandidate elections. The measure generalizes standard pivotality-based voting power measures for binary elections, such as Banzhaf power. At the same time, the measure is not based on piv-otality, but rather on a measure of freedom of choice in individual decisions. Indeed, I use the symmetric power order to show that pivotality only measures voting power in monotonic elections, and is not a good measure in multicandidate elections. Pivotality only provides an upper bound on voting power. This result establishes a relation between voting power and strategyproofness.
Power and freedom: Reflecting on the relationship
Koers, 2021
This article contributes to the debate on the relationship between power and freedom. Freedom is currently a burning issue in political discourses. It is therefore important to evaluate the relationship between these two important concepts and present a basis for further critique and cognition about this relationship. The article briefly evaluates certain philosophical perspectives in this regard; particularly the theoretical contributions of Oppenheim, Pettit, Kristjánsson and Morriss. By reflecting on these perspectives it is concluded that human beings' rational capacities present them with the opportunity to imagine freedom. However the option of freedom to choose one's own preferences is constrained by a social contract that guarantees and limits freedom. In contrast, power could interfere with freedom by eliminating specific actions or frustrating others from choosing actions or by not suppressing obstacles in this regard. The protection of freedom lies therefore in continuous negotiation, open dialogue and struggle for it.
The Voting Power Approach: A Theory of Measurement
European Union Politics, 2003
Max Albert has argued that the theory of power indices “should not ... be considered as part of political science” and that “[v]iewed as a scientific theory, it is a branch of probability theory and can safely be ignored by political scientists”. Albert’s argument rests on a particular claim concerning the theoretical status of power indices, namely that the theory of power indices is not a positive theory, i.e., not one that has falsifiable implications. I re-examine the theoretical status of power indices and argue that it would be unwise for political scientists to ignore such indices. Although I agree with Albert that the theory of power indices is not a positive theory, I suggest that it is a theory of measurement that can usefully supplement other positive and normative social- scientific theories. Preprint: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/PDF-files/List-EUPolitics.pdf
Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
Social Choice and Welfare, 2005
In this account of the history of voting-power measurement, we confine ourselves to the concept of a priori voting power. We show how the concept was re-invented several times and how the circumstances in which it was reinvented led to conceptual confusion as to the true meaning of what is being measured. In particular, power-as-influence was conflated with value in the sense of transferable utility cooperative game theory (power as share in constant total payoff). Influence was treated, improperly, as though it were transferable utility, and hence an additive and distributive quantity. We provide examples of the resulting misunderstanding and mis-directed criticism.
Freedom Is Power: Reinventing Representative Democracy
The Good Society, 2018
In this article I propose a different founding view of liberty to help reinvent representative democracy: freedom as power through representation. I argue that representation and associated relations of power can be assessed contextually in terms of whether they enable or disable domination and enhance judgment in politics. I submit that freedom obtains if and only if the existing forms of representation manage power relations to minimize domination in the determination of needs and interests. I end by proposing a set of institutional changes for reinventing representative democracy in line with my account of freedom as power through representation. These include ideas around district assemblies, a revitalized consiliar system, an updated tribunate of the plebs, and constitutional revision. I thereby suggest that my account of liberty in Freedom Is Power would underpin a more robust, critical view of representative democracy.
Measuring power in voting bodies
Public Choice, 1973
In analyzing power, the nature of one's conceptual framework can have important consequences for the conclusions one draws. For instance, if one defines power as an attribute or possession, consistent inferences may be drawn only so long as the relations of power are relatively stable or constant. However, once the relations of power change, a definition of power in terms of an attribute or possession may become misleading. A good example of this type of shift can be found in the literature on international relations. Several writers have noted that changes in relations have severely reduced the scope of power of nations armed with nuclear weapons. 1 Although these nations have increased their power in terms of the nuclear power attributed to them or the number of nuclear weapons they possess, they find that they can no longer infer that the increase in this source of power will be relevant in achieving their goals in the international system. 2 Alternatively, if one defines power as a relation, one's analysis of power may be limited by changes in the sources of power attributed to or possessed by a given *We would like to thank Professor Steven J. Brarns for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011
In this paper, we experimentally approach the question of which aspects of a voting procedure are able to restrict elected candidates' willingness to use their power in an opportunistic way. For this purpose, we rule out re-election concerns and analyze whether the presence of a vote by itself matters for the exercise of power. We compare two kinds of electoral campaigns: self-descriptions of personality and promises regarding prospective in-office behavior. We find that social approval as conveyed by a vote does not suffice to induce pro-social choices by elected candidates. On the other hand, when campaigns are promisebased, elected candidates transfer more to their recipients than candidates selected by a random draw even though promises do not differ. This refutes explanations based on a taste for consistency or costs of lying. In contrast, the fact that the correlation between dictators' promises and their beliefs on voter expectations is considerably strengthened in the presence of a vote offers support to a guilt-aversion hypothesis. However, this support is qualified by the correlation between dictators' second-order beliefs and their choices, which is weaker than predicted. Overall, our results suggest the power of voting to limit the self-oriented exertion of power is limited and context specific.
Conceptions of Power in Political Science
The concept of power has long been argued within the academic community with many academics not agreeing to any one interpretation or theory. With such varying opinions and ideas it is difficult for a political scientist to decide on which conception of power it most useful to use. By exploring the varying theories and interpretations of power offered by Weber, Lukes, Bachrach and Baratz as well as other prominent academics; the conception of power most suited for political science will be determined, with a focus on western politics. The main problem which is encountered when attempting to determine the type of power that is best suited to the field of political science resides in the varying definitions of power and how they can be applied to the large field of political studies. To show how agenda setting is the most effective form of power, due to the sway it can create, to be used when studying political science. There will be a focus on western governments as examples to show that agenda setting has the ability to influence other factors within politics. This ability to influence another by exercising power over another is the first of Lukes’s concepts of power (Plaw 2007, 489 - 490) and leads into the concept of authority which is vital in explaining legitimate power. Legitimate authority as explained by Weber is given to many governments, primarily western ones, also known as rational legal authority (see Uphoff 1989) and has a direct relationship with power and how it is used to control not only a nation state but the people within the state. In summary the power of agenda setting in political science is most useful as it is present in many forms of power presented by prominent academics and is able to yield the desired outcome consistently.