A Priori Voting Power in Hierarchical Organizations (original) (raw)

2003

Abstract

Power in hierarchical organizations can be investigated in different ways This paper focuses on the study of a priori voting power in such organizations. It is shown that every ‘restricted ’ game with a permission structure can be represented as a compound game. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the existing research in voting power in hierarchical structures is necessary, but not sufficient to understand the nature of a priori voting power in hierarchical organizations. This is because it does not take into account: (i) that players who participate in a decision-making in hierarchical organizations in general have a damatis personae, and (ii) that the top of a hierarchical organizations can have a board-structure. Once we account for these two factors we arrive at some counterintuitive characteristics of hierarchies, i.e. the violation of known monotonicity properties of power in hierarchical organizations such as structural monotonicity and dis- and conjunctive fairness.

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