the Left Turn in Latin America: Diverging Outcomes in Bolivia (original) (raw)
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Over the last decade, leftist presidents in Latin America have sought to recentralize authority by reversing the decentralizing reforms that swept the region in the 1980s and 90s. The pursuit of recentralization has emerged as a particularly important dynamic in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, where the opposition has been marginalized within national institutions and found political shelter in subnational governments. This paper explains why the subnational opposition was able to resist recentralization in Bolivia, but not in Venezuela or Ecuador. I argue that subnational opposition elites increase the chance of success against the president if they can transcend their inter-elite policy struggles with him and mobilize average citizens into a larger battle over the defense of regional identities. In Bolivia, the concentration of subnational opposition victories in four eastern lowland departments, which share a common regional identity and dense organizational networks, enabled governors to enlist broad societal support in defense of decentralization, bringing the country to the verge of civil war in 2008 and ultimately forcing compromise upon the president. In Ecuador and Venezuela in contrast, the geographic diffusion of opposition jurisdictions foreclosed the possibility of encouraging societal opposition through appeals to common regional identities, allowing presidents to proceed with recentralization unchecked.
Presidents Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales have all sought to reverse the policies of decentralisation that were adopted in the s in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. This article adapts ideational and institutional hypotheses from the earlier literature on decentralisation to explain this recent movement in the opposite direction. At the ideational level, because of the close association of decentralisation with liberalisation in each country, recentralisation emerged as a way for presidents to reverse the legacies of their neoliberal predecessors. Beyond ideology, recentralisation can be explained by paying attention to the territorial distribution of electoral support; presidents used it to weaken the sub-national governments where the opposition had found political shelter, while simultaneously redirecting recentralised resources toward supporters.
Party System Dynamics in Bolivia: Regionalized Party Politics in a Devolving State
2012
In 2009, Bolivia adopted a new constitution that grants significant political autonomy to the country’s nine departments. The creation of nine autonomous departmental governments with elected executives (governors) and legislatures (departmental assemblies) represents a radical departure from the traditional unitary state model. This raises a number of empirical and theoretical questions about the relationship between national- and department-level institutions in the context of a devolving and democratizing state—particularly one with a hegemonic government party facing regionally concentrated opposition. This paper is a preliminary, and primarily descriptive, exploration of how parties in decentralized, devolved, or “federalized” states operate simultaneously in two distinct electoral arenas, and that their relative position in each arena informs their behavior. The paper looks at the national-level party system and electoral competition as only one key dimension (rather than assuming department-level party systems simply replicate national-level party dynamics), and treats each department as a unique “system” with its own evolving dynamic. It contributes to our understanding of how political parties compete and organize themselves in decentralized or federal states.
Decentralization and Democratization in Bolivia
2000
Bolivia’s decentralization under the 1994 Ley de Participación Popular (LPP) cannot be characterized as federalism or administrative decentralization. The Bolivian model demonstrates the importance of ideological discourse and the role of decentralization in democratization. The ideological and historical roots of Bolivia’s state decentralization explain its divergence from other decentralization strategies. Bolivia’s LPP includes citi- zen-initiated Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTB) which provide communal democratic control over municipal governments. This unique strategy makes Bolivia a possible case for emulation among other decentralizing (and democratizing) regimes.
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies | Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe
The regimes of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa undermine contestation while simultaneously increasing the material inclusion of the poor and the excluded. These regimes that are usually lumped together show distinct patterns in fostering participation. Whereas in Ecuador participation is reduced to voting in elections, participatory institutions were created in Venezuela and Bolivia. And whereas mobilization in Bolivia comes mostly from the bottom up, in Venezuela and Ecuador it comes from the top-down. To compare their divergent patterns this paper analyses: 1) the strength of subaltern organizations when these leaders were elected; 2) the confrontation between governments and the oppositions; and 3) the views of democratization of the coalitions that brought these regimes to power.
Governing for the Long Haul: Coalition-Building and Power-Sharing in “Revolutionary” Bolivia
What explains a reformist party's ability to retain its original transformative project when confronted with the challenges of governing? Why are some of these parties more successful than others at managing the potentially conflicting interests of their diverse social bases? Despite the importance of parties for democracy, we know surprisingly little about their internal lives. We argue that foundational choices-the strategies undertaken by party leaders in founding and building a coalition of support-shape a party's ability to retain a reformist character when confronted with the challenges of governing. Specifically, the nature of the party's organizational core, together with its strategies to craft social coalitions to win and share state power, establish a coalitional logic that is difficult to reverse once it has been put into place. This logic shapes a party's ability to impose costs on coalitional partners without threatening the viability of the coalition itself. We elaborate this argument by comparing the coalition building and maintenance of two reformist parties in Bolivia: the historic Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). Our findings have implications for how scholars theorize about the importance of organizational resources for explaining longterm trajectories of party building.
Social movements and state power_ Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador
outside the region. In effect, there is a bloc of neoliberal regimes arrayed against Chavez' anti-imperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that Chavez remains true to his independent foreign policy, his principal allies are the mass social movements and Cuba. Myth 5-The defeat of the referendum was a major tactical defeat of US imperialism and its local vassals. But a defeat of imperialism does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation, as post-Chavez post-election appeals to Washington and big business demonstrate. More indicative of Chavez' politics is the forthcoming 5billioninvestmentagreementswithTexaco−MobilandExxontoexploittheOrinocogasandoilfields.TheeuphoriaoftheleftblindsthemtothependulumshiftsinChavez′discourseandtheheterodoxsocialwelfare−neoliberaleconomicpoliticshehasconsistentlypracticed.PresidentChavez′policyhasalwaysbeenacarefulbalancingactbetweenrejectingvassalagetotheUSandlocaloligarchicrentiersontheonehand,andtryingtoharnessacoalitionofforeignandnationalinvestors,andurbanandruralpoor,toaprogramofwelfarecapitalismontheother.HeisclosertoFranklinD.Roosevelt′sNewDealthantoFidelCastro′ssocialistrevolution.Intheaftermathofthethreepoliticalcrises−thefailedcivil−militarycoup,thedebacleofthecorporateexecutives′lock−out,andthedefeatofthereferendum−Chavezofferedtodialogueandreachaconsensuswiththemediabarons,bigbusinessplutocrats,andtheUSgovernment,onthebasisoftheexistingpropertyrelations,mediaownership,andexpandedrelationswithWashington.Chavez′commitmenttocentrist−reformistpoliciesexplainswhyhedidnotprosecuteownersofthemassmediawhohadopenlycalledfortheviolentoverthrowofhisgovernmentandalsowhyhetooknoactionagainsttheassociationofthebusinessleaders(FEDECAMARAS)whohadincitedmilitaryrebellionandviolentattacksontheconstitutionalorder.InEurope,NorthAmerica,andPrefaceixxSocialMovementsandStatePowerand5 billion investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and Exxon to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fi elds. The euphoria of the left blinds them to the pendulum shifts in Chavez' discourse and the heterodox social welfare-neoliberal economic politics he has consistently practiced. President Chavez' policy has always been a careful balancing act between rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the one hand, and trying to harness a coalition of foreign and national investors, and urban and rural poor, to a program of welfare capitalism on the other. He is closer to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal than to Fidel Castro's socialist revolution. In the aftermath of the three political crises-the failed civil-military coup, the debacle of the corporate executives' lock-out, and the defeat of the referendum-Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus with the media barons, big business plutocrats, and the US government, on the basis of the existing property relations, media ownership, and expanded relations with Washington. Chavez' commitment to centrist-reformist policies explains why he did not prosecute owners of the mass media who had openly called for the violent overthrow of his government and also why he took no action against the association of the business leaders (FEDECAMARAS) who had incited military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional order. In Europe, North America, and Preface ix x Social Movements and State Power and 5billioninvestmentagreementswithTexaco−MobilandExxontoexploittheOrinocogasandoilfields.TheeuphoriaoftheleftblindsthemtothependulumshiftsinChavez′discourseandtheheterodoxsocialwelfare−neoliberaleconomicpoliticshehasconsistentlypracticed.PresidentChavez′policyhasalwaysbeenacarefulbalancingactbetweenrejectingvassalagetotheUSandlocaloligarchicrentiersontheonehand,andtryingtoharnessacoalitionofforeignandnationalinvestors,andurbanandruralpoor,toaprogramofwelfarecapitalismontheother.HeisclosertoFranklinD.Roosevelt′sNewDealthantoFidelCastro′ssocialistrevolution.Intheaftermathofthethreepoliticalcrises−thefailedcivil−militarycoup,thedebacleofthecorporateexecutives′lock−out,andthedefeatofthereferendum−Chavezofferedtodialogueandreachaconsensuswiththemediabarons,bigbusinessplutocrats,andtheUSgovernment,onthebasisoftheexistingpropertyrelations,mediaownership,andexpandedrelationswithWashington.Chavez′commitmenttocentrist−reformistpoliciesexplainswhyhedidnotprosecuteownersofthemassmediawhohadopenlycalledfortheviolentoverthrowofhisgovernmentandalsowhyhetooknoactionagainsttheassociationofthebusinessleaders(FEDECAMARAS)whohadincitedmilitaryrebellionandviolentattacksontheconstitutionalorder.InEurope,NorthAmerica,andPrefaceixxSocialMovementsandStatePowerand20 billion in new exploration and exploitation. No doubt these MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in order to monopolize all Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving the failures of Washington they are content to share some of the oil wealth with the Chavez regime. The tactical divergences between Washington and Wall Street are likely to narrow as the Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase toward FEDECAMARAS and Washington. Given Washington's defeat in the referendum, and the big oil deals with key American multinationals, it is likely that Washington will seek a temporary 'truce' until new, more favorable circumstances emerge. It will be interesting to see how this possible 'truce' will affect Venezuela's critical foreign policy. Myth 7-The main thrust of the current phase of the Chavez revolution is a moral crusade against government corruption and a highly politicized judicial system tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition. For many on the left, the radical content of the 'No' vote campaign was rooted in the proliferation of communitybased mass organizations, the mobilization of trade union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic process of voter involvement based on promises of future consequential social changes in terms of jobs, income, and popular political power. Moralization campaigns (anti-corruption) are commonly associated with middle-class politics designed to create 'national unity' and usually weaken class solidarity. The left's belief that the mass organizations mobilized for the referendum will necessarily become a basis for a 'new popular democracy' has little basis in the recent past (similar mobilizations took place prior to the failed coup and during the corporate bosses' lock-out in mid-April 2002). 1 Nor do government-sponsored moralization campaigns attract much interest among the poor in Venezuela or elsewhere. Moreover, the focus of the Chavista political leaders is on the forthcoming elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources of governance. The left's facile projection of popular mobilization in the post-referendum period creates a political mythology that fails to recognize the internal contradictions of the political process in Venezuela. CONCLUSION The massive popular victory of the 'No' vote in the Venezuelan referendum gave hope and inspiration to hundreds of millions in Latin America and elsewhere that US-backed oligarchies can be defeated at the ballot box. The fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the Organization of American States (OAS), President Jimmy Carter, and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez' strategic changes in the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional outcome. At a deeper level of analysis, the conceptions and perceptions of the major antagonists among the right and the left, however, are open to criticism: the right for underestimating the political and institutional support for Chavez in the current conjuncture; the left for projecting an overly radical vision on the direction of politics in the post-referendum period. From a 'realist' position, we can conclude that the Chavez government will proceed with his 'New Deal' social welfare programs while deepening ties with major foreign and domestic investors. His ability to balance classes, leaning in one direction or the other, will depend on the continued fl ow of high returns from oil revenues. If oil prices drop, hard choices will have to be made-class choices. Preface xi 'pre-revolutionary situation'; they wrote of 'dual power' between the 'piqueteros', neighborhood assemblies, and the 'occupied factories' on the one hand, and the existing state apparatus, on the other. All of the divisions and agents of the state apparatus (the judiciary, the police, the armed forces) as well as the traditional parties, politicians, and Congress lost legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of Argentinians in the events leading up to and immediately after the uprising of December 2001. This chapter takes the events of December 19-21 as the basis of an analysis of subsequent developments in the relationship of the state to the popular movement. At the center of this relationship is Nestor Kirchner, a politician of the Justicialista Party, which was responsible for bringing Argentina to the brink, but who, as the latest occupant of the 'Pink House' (the executive branch of the government), has managed to restore a measure of economic and political order. The political dynamics of the Kirchner regime since December 2001 allow the authors to refl ect on the theoretical and
Democratization, 2021
Authoritarian-era elites often do not quietly withdraw from political life after democratic transitions. Recent scholarship shows how elites can often perpetuate their influence under democracy through authoritarian successor parties. But what are the implications for the quality of democracy when former authoritarian elites lack visible formal organization under democracy yet manage to obtain a wide range of influential positions across government? We begin to answer this question using original data on authoritarian-era elites and their official positions under Latin American democracy from 1900 to 2010. We find that former authoritarian elites' access to influential posts across state and government institutions per se matters for the overall quality of democracy, regardless of whether elites are organized in an authoritarian successor party or democracy operates under holdover authoritarian institutions. This finding is an important corrective to the prevailing notion that the survival of authoritarian-era elite individuals after democratic transition hinges on the survival of authoritarian-era parties. Elites may be broadly dispersed across parties under democracy, but their influence is undiluted when they are also broadly dispersed across state and government.
Making or Breaking Politics: Social Conflicts and Partisan Realignment in Democratic Bolivia
This study explains why only some social conflicts translate into salient dimensions of partisan competition in Bolivia. The recent politicization of the regional autonomy movement represented a stark difference with how conflicts had impacted party politics in the past. The study argues that social conflicts became politically transformative thanks in part to the ruling party elite. Elected politicians addressed social conflicts according to their electoral interests and their capacity to act on those interests. The study makes this argument by situating the recent regional conflict within the country's longer history of mobilizational politics and fully specifying the range of strategies that ruling party elites employ in the face of social conflict. In explaining when and how social conflicts become politically transformative, the study highlights the remarkable agency of electorally motivated elites in emerging democratic regimes. WORKING DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION.
's populist resurgence in the 1990's has attracted scholarly interest into considering to what extent this political phenomenon was characterized by more continuity than change with its political past and why. However, as Terry Lynn Karl (2003:139) contends, in Latin America 'the past still has its claws in the present' asserting that traditional patterns of oligarchic politics never really disappeared. In using Mazzuca's (2010) observation that these problems are issues of patrimonialism and a failure of bureaucratisation, I will argue that these enabled the oligarchy to build in its interests into the structure of the state explaining its tendency to reproduce despite regime change. My argument will emphasize a deep historical case to show how Latin America was characterized by a distinct trajectory of state formation where the absence of war and its patrimonial colonial legacy led to a weak state which was conducive to this process of patrimonial state formation. To show this, I will first determine what characterizes traditional patterns of oligarchic politics by focusing on three patterns; corruption, clientelism and the weak rule of law. Secondly, I will compare the populist regime of Fujimori in Peru with that of Chávez's in Venezuela because although their access to power was different their exercise of power reflected the continuity of these traditional patterns of oligarchic politics. Finally, I will seek to explain this continuity as being rooted within a larger historical process of state formation where I will look at how Latin America's lack of interstate war was responsible for its weak state capacity. This meant that it had to negotiate with regional and oligarchic powers in the immediate post-independence chaos to establish order and authority. The result was that the Latin American state never developed independently from the oligarchies built in interests which drew its patrimonial logic from its colonial legacy Firstly, it is necessary to establish what constitutes traditional patterns of oligarchic politics to determine to what extent these patterns are reproduced in both Fujimori's and Chavez's populist regimes. In the academic literature, the oligarchy is commonly understood as being a form of government where political power lies in the hands of a small minority (Smelser and Bates, 2001). Consequently, Foweraker (2007) notes that oligarchic politics are characterized by its exclusionary nature and its strategy of seeking immunity of the state. On the other hand, he notes that democracy is about equality, transparency and above all accountability. From this perspective, oligarchic politics stand in stark contrast with democratic ideals. Moreover, its relationship with democracy is further problematized by its strong tendency to rely on informal