A General's Self-Depiction: The Political Strategies of Gaius Julius Caesar as Seen in the Commentarii de Bello Gallico (original) (raw)

Richard W. Westal, Caesar’s Civil War: Historical Reality and Fabrication. By. Mnemosyne Supplements 410, Leiden, NL and Boston, MA: Brill, 2017, pp. xvi+400. Hardback, €116.00, ISBN 978-90-04-35614-6

Exemplaria Classica

'History written by the protagonists' Westall stresses, 'is a rhetorical exercise in shaping a partisan vision of the past that can convince contemporaries' (89-90), something Caesar was amply capable of. On the flip-side, whilst acknowledging the problematic nature of Caesar as 'narrator of history' (84), Westall also emphasises the value of such an account for grappling with the socioeconomic issues of the late Republic. Caesar's Civil War, much like the events themselves, may be framed as a product of the financial crises and questions of legitimacy of the period. Indeed, in this detailed and thought-provoking book, Westall sets out to combine these two threads of historiographical analysis and socioeconomic history, deliberately following the geographical course and structure of Caesar's narrative in order to provoke his own reader to reflect on the relevance of the socioeconomic factors behind the outbreak of war. Factors which were in part central to, and in part obscured by, Caesar's own shaping of history. Westall demonstrates an admirable knowledge of the material and draws on his previous work on the sources for Appian's Emphylia and in particular his knowledge of Asinius Pollio to provide a nuanced if not corrective version to Caesar's own narrative. He reveals the significance of fully understanding details obscured and distorted in the historical traditions, such as his repeated reminder that the consular year was almost two months ahead of the solar year. This has implications for our understanding of Caesar's own strategies. Caesar's departure for Greece on 4 January 48 BCE in fact took place on 6 November 49 BCE, revealing that his crossing occurred just short of the mare clasum (11 November-10 March) and indeed serving to underline Caesar's rapid movement forwards Pompey's forces. Westall contextualises 'Caesar's fleeing forwards' within a fully realised moment of socioeconomic crisis, with Italy starving and the potential of a protracted campaign or an invasion from the east with Pompey's strengthened forces, if Caesar did not press the issue (197-210). The geographical structure of Westall's analysis affords him a certain amount of selectivity in terms of the episodes of the narrative he explores. This allows him to open up the account into a series of in-depth digressions on the nature of the Roman army, the imperial drive for resources and attitudes towards mineral-rich territories, relationships with, and exploitation of, foreign communities and questions of political and military

Narratology and Characterization in Caesar's War Commentaries

This paper examines aspects of Caesar’s characterization of himself and his enemies in his two war commentaries, De bello gallico and De bello civile. These two works pose different challenges of characterization to the author: the polarization of “us vs. them” is more difficult in a civil conflict than a colonial one (Batstone and Damon 10-11; Grillo 110). However, in both works, Caesar uses similar narratological techniques to reinforce the disjunction between himself and his enemies. In contrast to both the deconstruction of Caesar’s commentaries as artless propaganda (esp. Rambaud 1953) and the popular dismissal of the commentaries as monotonous, inelegant, and stylistically arid (e.g., DeWitt 1942), I highlight aspects of Caesar’s literary artistry, showing that in the war commentaries Caesar brilliantly uses various literary techniques—particularly narrative voice and contrived speeches—to create images of himself and his opponents (reinforcing his own Romanitas and barbarizing his enemies, both explicitly and implicitly). First, Caesar’s use of the third person, by disjoining Caesar the author from Caesar the character, lends an aura of objectivity to the author’s judgments (Ramage 371) and sometimes obscures the personal and political impetus behind his narration. A few revealing passages (e.g. BC 3.1) show how Caesar uses voice to bolster his ethos as a narrator. Second, Caesar effectively uses the contrived speeches of himself and his opponents (Murphy 1949) to reinforce the image of himself as a capable general and embodiment of Romanitas and to undercut the authority of his opponents. For example, Caesar’s speech at the end of BC 1 highlights his clementia and his devotion to republican institutions (in contrast to Pompey). In the speech of Critognatus in BG 7, Caesar places in the Gallic leader’s mouth an argument about libertas which is framed in specifically Roman terms, but at the same time Caesar subtly undermines Critognatus’ ethos as a speaker (cf. Mannetter 32-34; Riggsby 110-116).

Foreign Voices: Caesar’s Use of ‘Enemy’ Speech in the ‘Helvetii Campaign’

Whatever one thinks of Julius Caesar and his motives behind writing his war commentaries, he has done posterity the service of giving a voice to an otherwise mute and unknowable cultural presence of the ancient world: the peoples of Gaul. Caesar deems his ‘barbarian’ opponents worthy of a voice in his narrative, even if that voice is fabricated and only serves to justify their subjugation. In the account of the Helvetii in Book 1, Divico provides the first instance of substantial enemy speech. This paper analyzes the way in which Divico’s words set the groundwork for a strong and carefully organized justification for the Helvetii campaign. Divico enters at a midway point in the narrative, delivers his threat to Caesar, and then departs and is not heard of again. His purpose within the account is to voice a challenge to Rome and to Caesar, to which Caesar is then able to respond. However, Divico is not restricted to providing Caesar with a platform for defending Roman frontier policy. He is an equally convenient mouthpiece for any criticisms of Caesar back in Rome, allowing Caesar to defend himself while still maintaining an atmosphere of ‘us vs. them.’ When he enters the narrative, Divico assumes the position of enemy chieftain, even though his actual role appears to be that of respected warrior and elder rather than actual authority. But his significance rests on his former implication in the defeat of Cassius’ legions fifty years before [Radin; Moscovich]. Divico heads the Helvetii parlay following the destruction of the Tigurini by Caesar’s cavalry, ostensibly to reach a peace agreement. However, Divico’s words are anything but peaceful, and he goes so far as to threaten a disaster similar to that which befell Cassius. Divico’s voice characterizes the dangerous nature of Gallic temperament, legitimizing and necessitating subsequent Roman action [Otis]. Caesar’s limited use of Divico (for the old warrior does not appear again after his speech) is consciously symbolic. Divico’s arrival carries the associations of the past Roman iniuria, which Caesar couples with the private grievance – the death of his kinsman. Divico’s arrogant words allow Caesar to demonstrate how the private and public are aligned in his motivation, which in turn legitimizes his actions in the Republic’s best interest [Martin]. The use of a ‘foreign voice’ also avoids the petty pointing of fingers, enabling Caesar to counter claims brought against him without identifying the original claimant as a Roman [Murphy]. By using Divico to necessitate a reply, Caesar maintains the focus of a foreign enemy while still effectively defending himself against his critics back in Rome. The ‘foreign voice’ argument in this paper follows the same line of thought which Andrew Riggsby has so aptly used in his book Caesar in Gaul and Rome. Caesar “displaces the burden of argument” within the text and avoids the appearance of overt self-justification (Riggsby 214). Yet whereas Riggsby focuses on Caesar’s use of intertext to craft a subtle argument, this paper analyzes Caesar’s use of the non-Roman voice as justification for himself and for Rome’s presence in Gaul. Presented at APA Conference in 2015 - adapted from chapter of undergraduate honors thesis.

Caesar and Genocide: Confronting the Dark Side of Caesar’s Gallic Wars

2021

Julius Caesar’s military achievements, described in his Gallic War, are monumental; so are the atrocities his army committed in slaughtering or enslaving entire nations. He stands accused of genocide. For today’s readers, including students and teachers, this poses problems. It raises questions, not least about Caesar’s place in the Latin curriculum. Applying modern definitions of “genocide,” is he guilty as accused? If so, is it justified to condemn him of a crime that was recognized as such only recently? Without condoning Caesar’s actions, this paper seeks fuller understanding by contextual analysis, placing them in the context of Roman—and ancient (if not almost universal)—customs of imperial warfare. It emphasizes the complexity of historical persons and events, juxtaposing Caesar the brutal conqueror to Caesar the clement victor, who established clemency among a ruler’s cardinal virtues.

The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar

2017

Well-known as a brilliant general and politician, Julius Caesar also played a fundamental role in the formation of the Latin literary language and remains a central figure in the history of Latin literature. With twenty-three chapters written by renowned scholars, this Companion provides an accessible introduction to Caesar as an intellectual along with a scholarly assessment of his multiple literary accomplishments and new insights into their literary value. The Commentarii and Caesar’s lost works are presented in their historical and literary context. The various chapters explore their main features, the connection between literature, state religion and politics, Caesar’s debt to previous Greek and Latin authors, and his legacy within and outside of Latin literature. The innovative volume will be of great value to all students and scholars of Latin literature and to those seeking a more rounded portrait of the achievements of Julius Caesar.

‘Caesar, Julius. Commentaries on the Gallic War’ in Classical Literature and its Times ed. J. Moss. Los Angeles; Moss Publishing, 2006, 93-103.

Classical Literature and its Times, 2006

The literary work: Commentarii (year-by-year reports) in eight volumes, of Julius Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul and Britain between 58 and 52 B.C.E., published and distributed at the end of each campaigning year. A supplementary eighth volume (covering the years 51 and 50 B.C.E.) was later composed and published by Caesar’s general Aulus Hirtius, in the mid-40s B.C.E. Synopsis: Appointed governor of Rome’s Gallic provinces and Illyricum, Julius Caesar campaigns against the tribes of Gaul, Germany, and Britain. Despite setbacks, Caesar successfully overcomes his enemies, and establishes Roman dominion over the area that is modern day France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Caesar or Rex?: an honors thesis (HONRS 499)

2011

In the last two years of his life Julius Caesar held absolute power in Rome and he was a monarch in everything except name. Was this, however, his objective since the beginning of his political career? Some authors, both modem and ancient have contended that Caesar always had a desire for absolute power and he always worked toward achieving that singular goaL His ancient biographers, such as Suetonius and Plutarch, reported omens and miracles that occurred upon his birth and they make repeated references to Caesar's lifelong lust for power. This view is inaccurate and Caesar's goals, like those of most other people, changed over time, and he couldn't have hoped to achieve a monarchy until about 46 B.C. I will give an analysis of some of the major events in Caesar's life, discussing what his motivations were for each major action he took. politically powerful in Rome and reach the consulship, but he couldn't have hoped to attain absolute power in Rome until about 49 B.C. It could be said, however, that Caesar recognized early on that the Optimate 2 oligarchy was no longer sufficient to govern Rome's expanding Empire. 3 Heavy corruption and mismanagement of provinces was taking its toll on Rome. There was growing strife among the urban mob. The Roman nobility knew all of the problems that their empire faced, but they were not taking effective measures to solve them. Caesar knew that a serious change in government was needed to solve these problems. Most politicians of the Late Republic concentrated on events in Rome, while Caesar had a more global view. 4 His views and his way of thinking, both politically and religiously, were remarkably ahead of his time. I Plutarch. Caes. 11,3-4. 2 The political party of conservative oligarchs who supported the power of the Senate. 3 Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman (Harvard University Press, 1968) 272. Gelzer addresses this argument extensively in this book, citing the ineptness ofthe oligarchy as the cause of the Civil War. 4 Gelzer, 273. I 2 This paper will examine Caesar's life and attempt to change the misconception that Caesar had a long term goal of monarchy and that he always worked toward attaining that goal. Caesar only seriously thought about seizing absolute power when it was his for the taking following the Civil War. He was not so much pro-monarchy as he was antioligarchy, since Rome's current system of government was inadequate for running an empire. There is evidence that he wanted the title of king, but probably not earlier than 45 B.C., and he wanted to have the title forced on him by the Senate and people. This paper will also seek to prove that most of Caesar's actions were not part of a master plan for world domination, but reactions to the events, problems, and values of his time and place. I will begin with a section that will contain a brief account of Caesar's early life and the family connections with which he grew up, then moving on to discuss his political actions and motives through 60 B.C. The next section will cover Caesar's consulship, discussing the TriumvirateS and his agenda as consul. The Civil War with Pompey will be discussed in some detail, including the causes of the war, Caesar's conduct during the war, and events in Rome during the war. The aftermath of the Civil War up until the time of Caesar's death, including Caesar's actions during his dictatorship will be discussed, with emphasis on his method of government as well as the legislation and reforms that he put into place before his death. Also discussed in this section will be the honors, both political and religious, that Caesar received from the Early Life and Political Career Gaius Julius Caesar was born on July 13, 100 B.C. to a well-to-do patrician family. He was an only child, but his childhood was not overly extravagant. His education was not dissimilar from that of other young nobles. He learned well his Latin and Greek grammar, as well as history, literature, and oratory. The Julii were one of the oldest patrician families, claiming they could trace their descent all the way back to Aeneas, but the family had gained little notoriety in the political world. Caesar's father never reached the consulship, advancing only as far as the praetorship in Rome and a proconsulship in Asia. The most important family notoriety that Caesar enjoyed came from his relationship to Gaius Marius, one ofthe most celebrated Roman generals and the husband of Caesar's paternal aunt. At age 13, after Marius and Cinna seized power in Rome, Caesar first began to enjoy the fruits of this family connection, as he was chosen to hold the office ofjlamen Dialis, one of the most distinguished priesthoods 6 in Rome. Caesar, however, was not old enough to be officially inaugurated, so the office remained vacant and Caesar appears to have stayed quiet throughout the civil war that ensued during his teenage years. During this time Caesar took his first wife, Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna. This marriage was arranged for religious and political reasons, since the jlamen Dialis had to be married to a patrician. Marriage ties would later playa large part in Caesar's life, as will be discussed later. Even though being the jlamen Dialis was a high religious honor, it was a very demanding position that would have made any future political or military career for Caesar impossible, as the jlamen Dialis was not allowed to hold political office, see granted citizenship to many provincials and he even admitted some of their number to the Senate. It is clear from these efforts that Caesar was aiming for a complete reformation of the Roman government, changing the political focus from local to global, but he was killed before he could unveil any long-term plans for the Roman state.

Julius Caesar and his Security Strategy in Ancient Rome

Many Classical authors such as Plutarch, Seutonius, Lucan and even Julius Caesar himself have discussed Caesar's conquests of his political opponents/enemies in the Roman senate and other lands. Modern authors such as Dodge, Goldsworthy, Gruen, and others have concentrated on Caesar's personality, his victories and many others. Others have, in analyzing this great leader, described him as a strategist, colossus, a military commander, gentle, assertive, cunning and authoritative among many others. This paper aims to examine his strategy with regard to his securing his position as consul, his defeat of his political enemies in the Roman Senate, and other peoples. This paper argues that Julius Caesar\s philosophy of dealing devastating blows on his enemies, not only placed him on a pedestal of victory, it also placed Rome on a platform bereft of incursions from neighbouring peoples especially the Gauls who were formidable enough to have sacked Rome in 390BC. The paper concludes with the argument that Julius Caesar would have died earlier than in 44 BC if he had not adopted necessary measures to destroy his opponents, bringing honours upon himself and the Roman State.

Gallic War Songs (II): Marcus Cicero, Quintus Cicero, and Caesar’s Invasion of Britain

Philologus 158 (2014) 275–305.

This article assembles and examines the evidence for the poetic outputs of Marcus and Quintus Cicero related to Caesar's invasion of Britain. Following the establishment of a relative chronology of the evidence for their work, it is argued that Quintus Cicero most likely produced a fabula praetexta (not an epic poem, as commonly assumed). His brother, in turn, wrote an epic, based on Quintus' eye-witness reports. Careful analysis of the ancient discourse about this piece reveals insights in Cicero's poetic workshop and the creation of 'archival truth' through narrativising historical events in epic poetry. Finally, a case is made for greater attention to financial affairs between Caesar and the Ciceros that happen to coincide with the drafting process of their respective literary works.