Chapter 4 No Exit: Framing the Problem of Justice (original) (raw)

The Survival of Egalitarian Justice in John Rawls's Political Liberalism1

Journal of Political Philosophy, 1996

In John Rawls's second book, Political Liberalism, 2 the doctrines of his historic book, A Theory of Justice, 3 are placed in a new light. It is not, however, the new book's primary purpose to reflect upon and "rethink" the theory of the first book. 4 It is no exaggeration to say that the two books are not about the same subject. The first is primarily about justice;

Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice: Opinion, Tradition and Objectivity in Political Liberalism

Journal of Moral Philosophy

In Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes the practical character and aims of his conception of justice. Justice as fairness is to provide the basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political agreement by locating grounds for consensus in the fundamental ideas and values of the political culture. Critics urge, however, that such a politically liberal conception of justice will be designed merely to ensure the stability of political institutions by appealing to the currently-held opinions of actual citizens. In order to evaluate this concern, I suggest, it is necessary to focus on the normative character of Rawls's analysis. Rawls argues that justice as fairness is the conception of justice that citizens of modern democratic cultures should choose in reflective equilibrium, after reflecting fully upon their considered judgments regarding justice. Since judgments in reflective equilibrium are grounded in considered judgment, rather than situated opinions, I argue that the criticism fails.

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF JOHN RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

2019

This dissertation is a critical analysis of John Rawls’s theory of justice in its historical and philosophical context. To that end, his works from A Theory of Justice (1971) to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) are examined. Not only Rawls’s theory of justice but also his approach to metaphysics and metaethics are also tackled to understand justice as fairness deeply. While setting out Rawls’s main arguments and theses, a critical approach is adopted with his foremost critics. This study thus searches for answers to the questions such as whether Rawls’s theory is workable, what does he precisely defends, what does he aim at with justice as fairness, and whether it is consistent or not. Unfortunately, it is seen that Rawls fails to propose a coherent egalitarian as well as liberal theory of justice. Hence, he could not reconcile the ideas of freedom and equality.

Justice and the Public Sphere: A Critique of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism

2017

This article criticizes John Rawls’ conception of political liberalism, which insists that political sphere governed by his two principles of justice can be separated from any comprehensive moral doctrines, and that the validity of his conception of justice is political, not metaphysical nor comprehensive. I argue that Rawls’ project is flawed by showing that his two principles of justice and political liberalism are presupposed by the very comprehensive/ metaphysical doctrines which he denies. Whether he realizes it or not Rawls chooses a particular comprehensive theory of the good/person, specifically that of an unencumbered self. I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from two points of view. First, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from political economy points of view, which I argue that the foundation of Rawls’ principles of justice lies in his particular theory of the person. Second, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from philosophical points of view, which I argues th...

DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND RAWLS'S CRITICISM OF WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM

Ethics, Politics and Society. A Journal in Moral and Political Philosophy, 2022

Despite the accusation of developing an abstract theory, detached from real conditions, depoliticizing, and ultimately inclined towards the status quo, Rawls did not fail to analyze, since 1971, the political-economic conditions in which his theory could become viable. The analysis of this topic concludes with the statement that the principles and ideals of his theory could not be satisfied under capitalism in any of its forms. This article discusses the possibilities of making justice as fairness compatible under a capitalist welfare state and shows that the reasons Rawls presented for denying this possibility remain perfectly valid. The difficulties of a capitalist welfare state to curb the tendencies of capitalism towards undemocratic inequality make this system unacceptable. The article defends that, although it is a noble ideal to prevent anyone from falling below a certain social minimum, the requirements of the principles of justice are much more demanding. The article concludes by defending Rawls' s methodology and main arguments and shows that far from having depoliticizing effects, justice as fairness allows us to broaden the political imagination both to denounce the highly oligopolistic character of capitalist economies and to combat the ubiquitous inclination of neoliberalism towards economic efficiency as an all-encompassing value.

John Rawls: Justice as Fairness behind the Veil of Ignorance

John Rawls is one of the most prominent American political and ethical philosophers of the 20th century. His major work is ‘’A Theory of Justice’’ where he set the foundations of Rawls’s construction of the original position considers that the people or hypothetical contractors of the social contract are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which makes them unaware of their particular circumstances. Justice as fairness is a sophisticated version of the well- known idea of social contract, presented by Rawls. His ideas were considered highly ambitious and progressive. They won enormous praise and inspired many authors to generate literature based on his texts. Besides that, critics have followed Rawls’ works, detecting weaknesses on certain aspects of his theory of justice.

A Modified Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice: "Justice as Fair Rights"

I presented this paper in August 2008 at the XXII World Congress of Philosophy in Seoul, South Korea. It is forthcoming (2010) in the Proceedings of that conference. John Rawls (1921-2002) and Jurgen Habermas (born 1929) are widely considered the most important and influential moral, social, and political philosophers to have written since 1950. In this paper I propose a modified Rawlsian theory of social justice (that I call "Justice as Fair Rights") which is an elaborated version of earlier versions of this theory that I put forward in "Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice" (Princeton University Press, 1990) and "Towards a More Adequate Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice" (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Special Issue on John Rawls' Political Liberalism, 75, nos. 3 & 4, Sept. Dec. 1994). It is, in part, a response to John Rawls's acceptance of three modifications I proposed to his theory in my 1990 "Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice" -- and his rejection of one other -- as indicated by him in his "Political Liberalism" (Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 7) and his "Justice as Fairness: A Restatement" (Harvard University Press, 2001, pp.44-45).

Justice between Individuals: John Rawls and the Demands of Political Liberalism

The Tocqueville Review 43(1): 147–180, 2022

John Rawls proposed a theory of justice (1971) aiming at building consensus in democratic societies. In the middle of the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the Civil Rights movement, while Americans were strongly divided, Rawls’ political liberalism offered a method to build political agreement between people with different and conflicting values and interests, to preserve peace and other benefits of stable social cooperation. Fifty years on, while authors like Katrina Forrester (2019) suggest moving on from the ideal of political consensus, other voices such as Catherine Audard (2019) remind us of the relevance of public reason in a world full of divisions. This paper builds a dialogue between these two influential authors to assess the legacy and relevance of Rawls’ political philosophy today.

John Rawls’s Concept of Justice as Fairness

PINISI Discretion Review, 2020

John Rawls's theory of Justice is one of the most influential conceptions of justice. Scholars have continued to study it to understand the principles in the formation and to further frame it in the context of contemporary situations. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by presenting Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” as it evolved from the traditional conception of justice to the modern-shift in the concept. The paper also examines Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness, and it focuses on analyzing or studying the concept of justice as fairness in terms of the principles used in its formulations. Several criticisms developed by political philosophers to critique the idea were examined. In conclusion, it was argued that Rawls's invention of the veil-of-ignorance for the original position has affected the theory negatively.

Rawlsian Liberalism - A Constructive Critique

There are several things which I hope the reader will take away from this thesis. The first is that I believe contemporary political philosophy gravely misinterprets Rawls. Discussions are too concentrated on the theories contained in A Theory of Justice. However, as demonstrated in chapters two and three, there are criticisms we can level at his thinking which prove fatal. One of the most damaging is that Rawls repeats current liberal views without sufficient justification. If we look more deeply into Rawls’ views we find that at critical points of his construction key foundations are missing. Therefore, we also come to realise that the early Rawls cannot answer the charge of cultural subjectivity. It is essential to all discussions of Rawls that this fact be taken into account. The later Rawls rejects the universalist claims of his earlier theory and thus also rejects its precepts. He states that the justice as fairness of his earlier self was culturally subjective and admits that it is, in fact, only to be applicable to Western societies. Not only that, but justice as fairness, within our Western societies, is not to be taken as any more valid than any other rationally cohesive philosophy. He ultimately fails in his aim of finding a universal theory.