The Correspondence Theory of Truth (original) (raw)

New Correspondence Theory of Truth without the Concept of Fact

The Philosophicl Forum

The traditional correspondence theory of truth with the concept of fact encounters many serious difficulties, the main one of which is that it is too difficult to explain clearly the concept of ‘fact’ and how propositions ‘correspond’ to facts. This does not mean that we should abandon the correspondence theory of truth and turn to some other type of theory. In order to guarantee the objectivity of truth, any reasonable theory of truth must adhere to the core insight of the traditional theory: it is not something in our language, nor in our mind, but something in the external world, that makes the propositions we use to describe the states of affairs in the world either true or false. It is entirely possible to formulate a new correspondence theory of truth without the concept of fact but still adhere to the core insights of the traditional theory. The new theory has its own metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, and also its assumptions in the philosophy of language. Because of the generativity of language, in defining the concept of truth, the new theory must resort to a Tarskian recursive procedure. Coherence is the intrinsic element of the new theory. Contrary to deflationism about truth, the new theory maintains that the concept of truth is by no means trivial and insignificant, rather it is very substantive, and that the pursuit of truth is our cognitive mission.

Truth Primitivism and Truth as Correspondence: Some Developments in Russell’s Theories of Truth

The classical debate on truth gave us the three theories of truth that constitute a large part of the background for contemporary philosophy of truth: the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatist theory. The classical notion of correspondence truth may be found, for example, in Chapter XII of Russell’s "The Problems of Philosophy", where we read the following characterizations: ‘a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact’; ‘a belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and false when it does not’. Whatever else it may involve, the classical notion of correspondence – also known as Cambridge correspondence–at least involves the notion of fact, and does so in a way that renders the theory metaphysically robust rather than innocent. Russell was one of the chief advocates of the classical notion, but his road to it was far from easy. Originally, he advocated truth primitivism, a position according to which ‘truth and falsehood […] are ultimate, and no account can be given of what makes a proposition true or false’. In this paper, I’ll do several things. Firstly, I’ll provide a sketch of Russell’s version of truth primitivism. This will be done by a comparison with Frege’s views on truth; second, I’ll provide an account of the philosophical reasons that led Russell to reject the earlier account of truth in favour of truth as correspondence. A large part of Russell’s reasons, so I shall argue, had to do with his growing realisations of the implication of truth-primitivism for the problem of the unity of the proposition. Thirdly, I’ll provide an outline of some of the later developments that took place in Russell’s correspondence theories of truth and relate to the multiple-relation theory of judgment and the psychological theory of propositions that he began to work out around 1918–19. The story that is told here focuses on Russell’s attempts to formulate a correspondence theory of truth that (i) accounts for the unity of the proposition and (ii) explains false belief ‘without assuming the existence of the non-existent’.

OUTLINE OF AN INTERSUBJECTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH

Phänomenologie und Ethik. Perspektivische Erkundungen / Phaenomenology and Ethics. Perspective explorations, 2022

The aim of the paper is to show that truth can only be adequately interpreted through an intersubjective framework. The authors have chosen such an approach because both of the prominent approaches of truth i.e. the correspondence theories of truth and the deflationary approaches, are plagued with many difficulties, as will be shown in the first two parts of the paper. The motivation for the theory is found in both Husserl’s and late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, taken in broad terms. This means that the idea of intersubjective agreement is borrowed from the respective outlooks of the mentioned philosophers. However, we do not claim that either Husserl or Wittgenstein understood truth in such terms. One other starting point is Davidson’s approach to truth, as outlined in Davidson (1990 and 1996). We have decided for such an approach because we believe that it encompasses the ordinary nonreflective notion of truth better than both groups of theories mentioned before and because it is a more down to earth approach to truth, which means that it can be applied to a broader framework of phenomena.

On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth

Synthese 117: 133-72, 1999

The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief outlook on the "family" of theories of truth generated by the new methodology.

Truth as a Relational Property

In this paper I investigate the claim that truth is a relational property. What does this claim really mean? What is its import?-Is it a basic feature of the concept of truth; or a distinctive feature of the correspondence theory of truth; or even both? After introducing some general ideas about truth, I begin by highlighting an ambiguity in current uses of the term 'relational property' in the truth debate, and show that we need to distinguish two separate ideas: that truth is a relational property, and that truth is an extrinsic property. I go on to examine what both of these ideas are in more detail, and consider what would need to hold for truth to be in either of these categories. I then discern where all the main competitors in the truth debate stand on these issues. In doing so we learn more about these views and what they entail, and build a general picture of what stances different theories of truth take on whether truth is extrinsic or relational. Moreover, in doing this we will be able to answer one of the questions with which we began: whether truth's being extrinsic or relational is something that, if accepted, lends support to the correspondence theory of truth. We will see that this is not so, and discern some interesting variations between various theories of truth on the issues of whether truth is extrinsic or relational. Following this we will be in a better position to judge whether the notions of extrinsicality or relationality are basic features of the concept of truth. In the final part of the paper I argue that, even if we are not in a position to conclude that they are basic features, they are features that any prospective theory of truth needs to take seriously.

From one to many: recent work on truth

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory-Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common 'pluralizing tendency' with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated interface between metaphysical and formal truth theories, pointing to several promising questions that arise here. 2.2 Traditional theories: new developments Perhaps the oldest kind of truth theory, dating at least to Aquinas if not to Plato and Heraclitus, is the correspondence theory. The basic idea behind any correspondence theory of truth is that truths correspond to reality and non-truths fail to correspond to reality. Correspondence theories have long been a favorite target of philosophers who are skeptical of one or another form of realism, objectivism, or representationalism. Yet they continue to generate much favorable attention and have received highly inventive articulations by Terence Cuneo [38]; George Englebretsen [54]; Terence Horgan (and colleagues) [13], [73]; Patricia Marino [101]; Vann McGee [97], [98]; Andrew Newman [109]; Joshua Rasmussen [123]; Gila Sher [135], [136]; and Gerald Vision [144]. 3 Pragmatist theories of truth originate with the American pragmatists C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In more recent years, Cheryl Misak [104], [105] has offered a sustained defense of a Peircean conception of truth. As a neo-pragmatist, Misak urges that we divert the bulk of our attention away from metaphysical questions about truth's nature. Our primary task is rather to trace the rich connections between our concept of truth and certain other concepts, especially those of verification and practical success. 4 Misak does devote space to an account (an 'elucidation,' rather than a 'definition') of truth's essence. Yet according to Misak, the bulk of an account of truth should focus on the concept of truth, not on the essence of truth. 5 Identity theories of truth are commonly classified as substantivist truth theories, the most extensive recent defense of an identity theory coming from Julian Dodd [44]. 6 The basic thesis of an identity theory is that truths are numerically identical to facts, which sounds at first pass like a constructive proposal as to truth's nature. Yet in connection with Dodd's identity theory, first appearances are deceptive. Dodd takes his agenda as an identity theorist to be primarily critical rather than constructive. The raison d'être [44, p. 120] of his 'modest identity theory' is to diagnose a fatal flaw in correspondence theories. According to Dodd, the most defensible theory of facts and propositions takes both to be structured and to be composed of Fregean senses. It follows that contra the correspondence theorist, facts are not entities of a different kind to which true propositions correspond. Rather, says the modest identity theorist, facts just are true propositions. This result, inasmuch as it undermines correspondence theories, is for Dodd meant to bolster the case for deflationism, which he takes to be the view that [44, pp.

Truth as correspondence reconsidered

2018

Many research projects take a lot of twists and turns before they get to their conclusions. In each of the twists and turns, the contributions of different people help in fine-tuning the project. It is no different with this thesis. Hence it is proper for me to express my immense gratitude and appreciation to those whose direct or indirect contributions have shaped the final product of this research. Firstly, I render my special thanks and immeasurable gratitude to my able supervisor, Dr John Patrick Giddy for his diligence, prompt feedback, insightful comments and suggestions. I must acknowledge that from the time we began working together, the research moved steadily towards the originally proposed project. Also, I treasured your openness in listening to me when I brought contrary points of view. In addition, words cannot express my gratitude for introducing me to Dr Gerard Walmsley who is a master of the two philosophical worlds-analytical and Lonerganian-that this thesis explored. Hence, I express my unquantifiable thanks to Dr Gerard Walmsley for his sagacious comments and suggestions during our discussions. To Dr Adriano Palma with whom I worked in the early stages of this project, I say a big thank for your comments, suggestions and critique. Working with you led me to dive deeper into the truth discourses in the analytical philosophical tradition.

Correspondence Theory as a Genuine Theory of Truth

Ephemeris the Undergraduate Philosophy Journal, 2020

Kwasi Wiredu argues that the correspondence theory of truth is tautologous and thus not a genuine theory of truth. After contrasting his pragmatist theory of truth with what I call Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth, in his terminology the realist conception of reality, I argue Wiredu's pragmatist theory of truth is not a theory of the sort of truth which correspondence theory is talking about because correspondence theory is a theory of truth full-stop, while Wiredu instead offers a theory of perspective-indexed truth. If we take the pragmaticist theory of truth as pointing us towards the criteria for truth which we seem to use in everyday life and in our scientific endeavors, the correspondence theory can be seen to have explanatory power, even granting that it is in some sense tautologous. While the correspondence theory alone might only give what we already mean when we say "is true," allied with the pragmaticist theory of truth as a starting point, correspondence theory then constitutes a theory in the full sense that includes the idea of possessing explanatory power.