A Critical Analysis on Pension Fund Performance: An Assessment in the Perspective of Political Economy of Accounting (original) (raw)
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International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2016
This research has long-term objective to reconstruct performance appraisal model for pension fund by taking into account the fairness of distribution of power and wealth of related parties, namely the employers, pension fund trustees, and pension fund participants. The specific objective of this research was to elaborate the factors namely fairness of power and wealth distribution of related parties, namely the employers, pension fund trustees, and pension fund participants before and after the implementation of Good Pension Fund Governance (GPFG). This is a descriptive qualitative research by nature using the theory of critical paradigm of Political Economy of Accounting (PEA). Data collection technique in this study was carried out directly and indirectly on the Pension Fund of Merdeka University Malang, Central Association of Pension Fund Indonesia (ADPI), KOMDA VI East Java and surroundings, as well as the Financial Services Authority (OJK). Sources of data for this research were obtained from informants through observation and interviews in the form of both financial data and also non-financial. Results of this study are to formulate performance appraisal model for pension fund before GPFG where the fairness of power and wealth distribution of the employers, pension fund trustees and pension fund participants, including general management, administration of financial and participation as well as accounting and investments, while the formulation of the evaluation model of pension funds performance after GPFG where fairness of power and wealth distribution of the employers, pension fund trustees and pension fund participants including sixteen guidelines for the application of GPFG.
Reconstruction of Pension Fund Performance Model as an Effort to Worthy Pension Fund Governance
Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 2017
This study aims to reconstruct the performance assessment model on Pension Fund by modifying Baldrige Assessment method that is adjusted to the conditions in Dana Pensiun A (Pension Fund A) in order to realize Good Pension Fund Governance. This study design uses case study analysis. The research sites were conducted in Dana Pensiun A. The informants in the study included the employer, supervisory board, pension fund management, active and passive pension fund participant as well as financial services authority elements as the regulator. The result of this research is a construction of a comprehensive and profound retirement performance assessment model with attention to aspects of growth and fair distribution. The model includes the parameters of leadership, strategic planning, stakeholders focus, measurement, analysis, and knowledge management, workforce focus, standard operational procedure focus, result, just and fair distribution of wealth and power. KEY WORDS Modified baldrige assessment, pension fund, governance.
IOSR Journals , 2019
This study aims to formulate and implement performance assessment model on Pension Fund by making some modifications on Baldrige AssessmentMethod that is adjusted to the condition of Pension Fund A in order to realize Good Pension Fund Governance. This study was designed using case study analysis. The site of the study was done on Pension Fund A.Furtermore, the informants in this study include the elements of employers, the element of supervisory board, the element of Pension Fund administrators, the element of Pension Fund participants both active and passive, as well as the financial services authority as the regulator. The result of this study was a formula of Modified Baldrige Assessment, which includes the parameter of leadership, strategic planning, stakeholders focus, measurement, analysis, and knowledge management, workforce focus, standard operational procedure focus,result, just and fair distribution of welath and power.Performance assessment reveals that the performance of Pension Fund A is excellent. However, there are elements of hegemony and domination by employers, administrators, and the regulator.
Pension Accounting and Research: A Review
This paper provides a review of empirical research on pension accounting. Empirical research on pension accounting has focused mainly on two issues, the value relevance of pension accounting information and earnings management in pension accounting. Further work has been done on the information efficiency of capital markets with regard to pension accounting information. I outline how research in these areas has evolved over the past decades and discuss the results that have been obtained. I also point out methodological issues. Furthermore, this review reveals that almost all existing studies on pension accounting are based on US accounting and capital-market data. I therefore discuss which effects national or regional differences in, for instance, pension regulation, taxation, funding, have on the production of pension accounting information by preparers, and on the processing of this information by analysts, investors and other users. Finally, I highlight that national institutional differences as well as ongoing changes to pension accounting standards raise interesting opportunities for future empirical research on pension accounting.
The logic of pension accounting
Accounting and Business Research, 2009
going research to a wider audience and to facilitate intellectual exchange and debate. The papers have been through a refereeing process and will subsequently be published in a revised form. Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the publisher of this series. The School of Management, Royal Holloway University of London has over 65 academic staff who are organised into different research groups. Currently research groups include: Accounting, Finance and Economics Strategy and International Business Marketing Technology and Information Management Organisation Studies and Human Resource Management Public Services Management
Intellectual Economics, 2016
Results achieved by the pension fund depend on how well they are managed or more specifically-on whether all decisions taken by the management are in favour of the fund participants. The goal of this paper is to examine how to harmonize interests of second pillar pension fund participants and fund managing company shareholders. An interview with executives of all pension funds managing companies was performed twice-in 2011 and 2016. The answers allow to make conclusions about possible conflict of interest in pension fund management and measures taken by the companies and the state to minimize the risk. A survey of 507 pension fund participants was performed in order to obtain information on participants' attitude and expectations. Despite the fact that most of participants are dissatisfied with the pension fund performance results, they would not agree to allocate additional resources to hire more competent managers. To protect the interests of pension fund participants the stability of the pension accumulation system as a whole must be ensured. Also it is important to promote mutual confidence of all interested parties, to provide participants with easily understandable information, reflecting real performance results.
On the Governance of Public Pension Fund Management
Policy Research Working Papers, 2002
Impavido surveys the empirical literature on the reducing the political risk that is associated with central, relationship between governance of public pension fund public pension fund management. The author highlights management and investment performance. He makes a the need for further work to support the development of preliminary attempt to identify good governance a satisfactory set of governance guidelines. practices and distill governance guidelines aimed at This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to study the effects of contractual savings on financial markets. Copies of the paper are available free from the
Governance and Performance Measurement of Pension Supervisory Authorities
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
Governance and Performance Measurement of Pension Supervisory Authorities The governance, oversight and performance measurement of financial supervisory authorities are increasingly recognized as important topicsnot least due to the recent financial crisis and perceived problems in (and lack of) the regulatory oversight of financial institutions. Yet this is a relatively under-researched area, particularly in relation to pension supervision. This paper therefore attempts to combine theoretical material from a range of financial sectors along with practical examples from the pensions sector to establish what the good governance of pension supervisory authorities entails, how it is applied in practice, and how it can be monitored and measured. Good governance of pension supervisory authorities can be summarized in four categories: Independence: requiring clarification of the authority's responsibilities and powers, processes for appointing its governing board and the ability to secure resources and operate without undue influence; Accountability: involving external audits, suitable internal organisation and measuring performance; Transparency: ensuring that the authority's objectives and achievements are understood, and that a consultative relationship with industry is established; Integrity: requiring codes of conduct, discretion to apply powers, internal controls and competent staff. In terms of performance, though it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of pension supervisory authorities as ‗counter-factuals' (i.e. what did not happen) and external factors play a large part, supervisory authorities could establish a range of measures looking at the following categories: Effectiveness measures: looking at outcomes against the authority's high level objectives; Efficiency measures: using the supervisor's credibility or reputation with its key stakeholders as a proxy or performance pledges; Economy measures: which could take the form of cost per inspection or cost of overheads relative to operational activities