An Investigation of the Link between Governance And Performance in Nonprofit Organizations (original) (raw)
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Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 2011
This article examines some of the main limitations of research on the governance of nonprofit organizations. It argues that there are limitations in both the way governance has been conceptualized and the ways in which it has been researched. It suggests that research has focused too narrowly on the boards of unitary organizations, and ignored both the wider governance system and the more complex multilevel and multifaceted governance structures that many organizations have evolved. It also argues that the dominant research designs employed have been cross-sectional and positivist in orientation. As a result, too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Based on this analysis, some new directions for nonprofit governance research are briefly mapped out.
The mechanisms of governance in nonprofit organizations
Corporate Ownership and Control, 2007
This paper discusses the governance issues in nonprofit organizations (NPO). The theoretical framework of agency theory is used to analyze the relationship between agents and principals (donors and volunteers) in such kinds of organizations. Similarly to the for-profit organizations, the mechanisms of incentives and monitoring are crucial to the alignment of interests among principals and agents. However, considering the NPO’s intrinsic characteristics, due to the difficulty to implement external and internal governance mechanisms, the challenges of alignment are far more complicated. The NPOs are idiosyncratic, being in many situations complex to establish performance comparisons with similar organizations
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(6), pp. 1117–1136., 2012
This paper examines some of the main limitations of research on the governance of nonprofit organisations. It argues that there are limitations in both the way governance has been conceptualised and the ways in which it has been researched. It suggests that research has focussed too narrowly on the boards of unitary organisations, and ignored both the wider governance system and the more complex multi-level and multi-faceted governance structures that many organisations have evolved. It also argues that the dominant research designs employed have been cross-sectional and positivist in orientation. As a result too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Based on this analysis some new directions for nonprofit governance research are briefly mapped out.
Deepening and broadening the field: introduction to Research Handbook on Nonprofit Governance
Research Handbook on Nonprofit Governance
Governance has in many respects become the new management. Just as management succeeded administration from the 1960s onwards (Grey, 1999), so governance has replaced management as the label for steering practices and the distribution of authority in organizations, nation states, politics and various other subfields of society. In this introductory chapter, we will weave the contributions to this Handbook together with prior research into the governance 'story' of the 2020s, and thereby discuss the ways in which the Research Handbook on Nonprofit Governance covers and advances the field. We structure this chapter as follows. First, we review governance definitions and the development of the nonprofit governance concept. Then we map the field of nonprofit governance through a focus on organizing contexts, environmental contexts and constituencies, and we consider some of the governance practices that emerge within them. Next, we examine the governance theory-practice nexus by sketching out the theoretical perspectives considered by the Handbook's contributors. We conclude by indicating some of the lacunae that remain.
Nonprofit boards: Size, performance and managerial incentives
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012
We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 1998
How do key stakeholders of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) judge the effectiveness of their organization? Are the judgments of stakeholders similar, and how are board effectiveness and the use of practitioner-identified correct management procedures related to judgments of effectiveness? This study focuses on a subset of especially effective and less effective NPOs from a larger sample and finds that the especially effective have more effective boards (as judged by various stakeholder groups), have boards with higher social prestige, use more practitioner-identified correct management procedures, and use more change management strategies. Practical implications discussed include adopting more correct management procedures and change management strategies.
1999
The purpose of this article is to provide a new, more comprehensive stakeholder theory of the relationships between nonprofit, for-profit, and government sectors. This theory com-bines aspects of neoclassical economics and principal-agency theory to complement the traditional notions that these organizations either compete or exist in a vacuum relative to one another. The article discusses nonprofit organizations that are employee groups (unions and professional associations), shareholders (institutional investors including pension funds and endowments), community and other interest groups, government contractors, competitors, consumers, and suppliers. By viewing these organizations as agents relative to a principal for-profit (or government) organization, it is possible to hypothesize about relationships and behaviors between organizations of different sectors of the economy. This new perspective allows a better understanding of the many relation-ships observed in the nonprofit sec...
Relationships between nonprofit and for-profit organizations: a stakeholder perspective
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 1999
The purpose of this article is to provide a new, more comprehensive stakeholder theory of the relationships between nonprofit, for-profit, and government sectors. This theory combines aspects of neoclassical economics and principal-agency theory to complement the traditional notions that these organizations either compete or exist in a vacuum relative to one another. The article discusses nonprofit organizations that are employee groups (unions and professional associations), shareholders (institutional investors including pension funds and endowments), community and other interest groups, government contractors, competitors, consumers, and suppliers. By viewing these organizations as agents relative to a principal for-profit (or government) organization, it is possible to hypothesize about relationships and behaviors between organizations of different sectors of the economy. This new perspective allows a better understanding of the many relation- ships observed in the nonprofit sector and of a much greater range of nonprofit stakeholders than is currently possible given existing theory.