Foresight in Sight (original) (raw)

Animal Cognition, 2009

report innovative studies with two chimpanzees and one orangutan that suggest some capacity to select and keep a tool for use about an hour later. This is a welcome contribution to a small, but rapidly growing, Weld. Here we point out some of the weaknesses in the current data and caution the interpretation the authors advance. It is not clear to what extent the apes really engaged in any foresight in these studies.

Primate cognition: from ‘what now?’ to ‘what if ?’

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003

The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.

Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others

Current Biology, 2005

and cannot see. Our work builds on the recent insight Yale University that primates will most likely exhibit sophisticated ToM New Haven, CT 06520 abilities in experimental scenarios that mimic the natural situations for which these abilities have evolvednamely, competitive foraging situations [16, 17]. Despite robust failures in previous ToM tasks [1-2, 18], chimpan-Summary zees have succeeded in reasoning about another individual's potential visual knowledge when vying for food Paramount among human cognitive abilities is the cain competitive interactions [6, 19]. Results like these pacity to reason about what others think, want, and raise the possibility that macaques (as well as other see-a capacity referred to as a theory of mind (ToM). monkey species [20]) may possess a similar ability and, Despite its importance in human cognition, the extent therefore, that gaze-sensitive neurons in macaque corto which other primates share human ToM capacities tex may support sophisticated ToM reasoning. has for decades remained a mystery. To date, primates In the present six experiments, we ask whether free-[1, 2] have performed poorly in behavioral tasks that ranging rhesus monkeys from the Cayo Santiago popurequire ToM abilities, despite the fact that some malation reason about what a human competitor can and caques are known to encode social stimuli at the level cannot see. The monkeys in this population are naturally of single neurons [3-5]. Here, we presented rhesus curious about the foods that human experimenters bring macaques with a more ecologically relevant ToM task to the island [21]

The plight of the sense-making ape (2014) PREPRINT

2014

This is a selective review of the published literature on object-choice tasks, where participants use directional cues to find hidden objects. This literature comprises the efforts of researchers to make sense of the sense-making capacities of our nearest living relatives. This chapter is written to highlight some nonsensical conclusions that frequently emerge from this research. The data suggest that when apes are given approximately the same sense-making opportunities as we provide our children, then they will easily make sense of our social signals. The ubiquity of nonsensical contemporary scientific claims to the effect that humans are essentially--or inherently--more capable than other great apes in the understanding of simple directional cues is, itself, a testament to the power of preconceived ideas on human perception.

1970) "What the frog's eye tells the monkey's brain." Brain, Behaviour, Evolution, 3, 324-337, 1970

Monkeys with the striate cortex destroyed have been supposed to be all but blind, their vision being limited to a rudirnentary ability to respond to the total unstructured activity of the retina. During the last 2 years I have worked extensively with two such de-striate monkeys and have found this supposition to be false. It has been possible to train these rnonkeys to reach out and touch visually presented objects, and through this I have obtained evidence of acute vision which may be comparable in sensitivity and spatial resolution to that of a normal animal. Their vision does, however, have singular features that indicate that it is quite abnormal in its qualitative character.

What the Frog's Eye Tells the Monkey's Brain

Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 1970

The misbehaviour of a metacognitive monkey

Behaviour, 2015

Metacognition, the monitoring of one’s own mental states, is a fundamental aspect of human intellect. Despite tests in nonhuman animals suggestive of uncertainty monitoring, some authors interpret these results solely in terms of primitive psychological mechanisms and reinforcement regimes, where ‘reinforcement’ is invariably considered to be the delivery and consumption of earned food rewards. Surprisingly, few studies have detailed the trial-by-trial behaviour of animals engaged in such tasks. Here we report ethology-based observations on a rhesus monkey completing sparse-dense discrimination problems, and given the option of escaping trials (i.e., responding ‘uncertain’) at its own choosing. Uncertainty responses were generally made on trials of high objective difficulty, and were characterized by long latencies before beginning visible trials, long times taken for response, and, even after controlling for difficulty, high degrees of wavering during response. Incorrect responses ...

Prospective Memory in Nonhuman Primates

Japanese Journal of Animal Psychology, 2015

Prospective memory requires forming an intention that cannot be completed at the present time, remembering that intention, and then recognizing the appropriate time to execute it. We review recent work in our laboratory that has revealed prospective memory-like patterns of performance in nonhuman primates. Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys were given computerized tasks in which the monkeys either had to remember a future response they could not make immediately, or they sometimes saw a particular stimulus during an ongoing task they had to remember to later indicate seeing or not seeing. Most monkeys succeeded on these tasks and even anticipated the necessary responses. Chimpanzees also showed evidence of prospective memory. They appeared to form intentions about less valuable food items that they did not want immediately but would want later, and they responded at a later time when it was possible to obtain those items. Even when the response option was embedded within an ongoing task, the chimpanzees still showed some success in remembering to carry out the prospective intention. This research indicates that nonhuman primates form intentions for future responses, maintain those intentions during a delay, and execute them at an appropriate time. Key words：Prospective memory, Chimpanzees, Rhesus monkeys, Capuchin monkeys, Prospective cognition Prospective Memory in Nonhuman Primates Being able to anticipate the future, even on a timescale of seconds or minutes, frees one from being stuck "in the now" and allows for responses that are not tied solely to present stimuli (Atance & O'Neil, 2001). In some ways, being able to anticipate the future may offer greater adaptive advantages than being able to remember the past (

Foresight in Sight (original) (raw)

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