Putin's War Was Never Actually About NATO (original) (raw)

The paper studies Russia’s Ukraine policy since the Orange Revolution. Russia’s policy toward its western neighbor has evolved from unhappy relations with Victor Yushchenko to rapprochement with Victor Yanukovich and then confrontation over the revolutionary power change in Kiev in February 2014. The paper argues that Vladimir Putin’s actions following February revolution in Kiev demonstrate both change and continuity in Russia’s foreign policy. Although these actions constituted a major escalation, relative to Russia’s previous behavior toward Ukraine, the escalation of relations with Kiev also reflected a broader policy pattern of Russia’s assertive relations with the Western nations adopted by the Kremlin since the mid-2000s. What made Russia’s conflict with Ukraine possible, even inevitable, was the West’s lack of recognition for Russia’s values and interests in Eurasia, on the one hand, and the critically important role that Ukraine played in the Kremlin’s foreign policy calculations, on the other. The paper provides an empirically grounded interpretation of Russia’s changing policy that emphasizes Russia–Ukraine–West interaction and a mutually reinforcing dynamics of their misunderstanding. It also addresses four alternative explanations of Russia’s Ukraine policy and discusses several dangers and possible solutions to the crisis.

This dissertation aims to analyse the significance of contemporary Ukrainian crisis to Europe. Firstly, the dissertation focuses on explaining the present-day regional dichotomy of Ukraine by analyzing the historical process of the formation of Ukrainian identity. The first chapter will introduce Samuel Huntington’s (1997) definition of Ukraine as a ‘cleft country’, that initially understood the regional division in terms of religious and historical occurrence. In order to examine further details that influenced current dichotomy, the first chapter argues Huntington’s approach while presenting various academic works focusing on details of the dichotomisation process. Likewise, chapter one demonstrates the appearance of the Kremlin-backed ideology of Russkii Mir (Russian World), and its influence on the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. Secondly, the dissertation explores key issues that inspired the protests of Euromaidan. The second chapter provides the chronological information of the Euromaidan protests, as well as the analysis of Viktor Yanukovych’s unpopular decision against the Association Agreement. Likewise, the chapter exposes truth behind alleged ‘nationalist coup’ of Ukraine and indicates on differences between neo-Nazism and patriotism. The Russian response is accordingly examined, explaining the annexation of Crimea and the support of the Donbas separatists as well as the link between those events and previously discussed ideology of Russkii Mir. The chapter also indicates on the International response to the events in Ukraine. Lastly, the dissertation aims to demonstrate the significance of Ukrainian crisis to overall security of Europe. The third chapter analyses the eventual division of views among the Western actors, caused by imposed economic sanctions against Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Likewise, the third chapter indicates on Europe’s dependency on Russia’s energy resources being an initial reason for the European passivity over the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Strategic importance of Ukraine to the West is also demonstrated in the third chapter, explaining the potential security threats facing the West in case of allowed Russian ‘adventurism’. Lastly, the chapter exposes different solutions to the contemporary Ukrainian crisis by criticising EU’s unwillingness of larger financial contribution for Ukraine and demonstrating the potential solution to the crisis in case of Western armament supply to Ukraine.

Ukraine was all over the international headlines from the end of 2013 through summer 2014. The fast changing, complex story was usually narrated through rather simple frames and the greatest attention was devoted to issues with international significance. As the war in eastern Ukraine became protracted and Russia showed no signs of reversing its annexation of Crimea, the story began slipping from the international news.

Russian-Western relations are at their lowest level since the end of the Cold War following Russia’s confrontation with the West over the Ukraine crisis. The ongoing conflict between Russia and the West has engendered a wide debate over the origins of the renewed tensions. Much of the debate is dominated by Realism, which holds that the current deterioration in Russian-Western relations is caused by the West’s interference into Russia’s sphere of influence. This paper refutes the Realist argument by showing that the West did not provoke the ongoing confrontation with Moscow. Rather, the root cause of the renewed tensions between Russia and the West is Russian expansionism. Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine has not been a defensive reaction to a threat posed by the West but, rather, has been motivated by an offensive logic.

By focusing on the role of, and interplay between, external actors and domestic factors, the present essay explores the evolution of Ukraine’s foreign policy. It argues that this policy has been shaped to a significant degree by positive and negative externalities, being a response to domestic developments as well as external challenges and opportunities. Acknowledging the importance of cost–benefit calculations by domestic actors, the essay does furthermore explore the role of norms and values in forming Ukraine’s foreign policy preferences.