Improving knowledge on law enforcement in drug policy (original) (raw)

Licit and illicit drug policies: a typology

Addiction, 1990

To foster comparison of policy interventions across the various categories of licit and illicit drugs, we develop a typology of policies intended to address drug abuse problems. The principal dimensions of the typology are policy type and intervention channel. While the typology has important limitations, as a mechanism to organize information and stimulate thought it holds the potential to improve understanding of commonalities and distinctions among policies applying to widely discrepant drug problems, both within and across cultures. As such, it could contribute to the development of more effective approaches to grappling with a diverse set of drug policy issues.

Drugs misuse and the criminal justice system: a review of the literature

1996

Since 1990 the Home Office Drugs Prevention Initiative has been piloting a communitybased approach to drugs prevention. In the first phase, l 990-95,20 small teams were set up to work with local communities. Their aim was to inform, encourage and support communities in their resistance to drug misuse. In all, they supported more than 1,500 drugs prevention projects. These projects drew help and support from local business people, voluntary workers and a wide range of statutory and non-statutory organisations.

Crime and the Partial Legalisation of Heroin: Comments and Caveats

Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 1992

STEPHEN K MUGFORD (1992) 25 ANZJ Crim other countries attempt to check those imports the US Government steps in to protect its industry using considerable political pressure including threats of trade sanctions to achieve its ends. This can properly be targeted as hypocritical and the weak response that 'one is legal, the other is illegal' is merely self-serving. Turning, then, to the section on arguments, Weatherburn correctly identifies three main arguments that have been advanced, whether in exactly these words or not, in favour of the partiallegislation of heroin. I will deal with them in turn. Responseto the Discussion ofArgument 1 Weatherburn first looks at the argument that law enforcement cannot in principle achieve the aims of prohibition. He interprets this as an economic argument and offers a detailed analysis of both evidence on actual elasticity and of micro-economic analyses of hypothetical market models. It is some while since I was sufficiently practised in economics to be able to offer adefinite view on his argument here, but my sense is that it is weIl made in so far as it goes, and I would be interested to see the reactions of a practising economist to the way he argues. More importantly, I would concur with the broad conclusion that he wishes to draw, for quite other reasons to those stated. Indeed, I think the argument he confronts here must necessarily be incorrect, for it is possible to identify numerous historical examples of successful prohibitions. What is important is that we can also identify, from such examples, the conditions necessary for that to occur. That is, my objection to Weatherburn's case would not be so much as to what is said as to what is not said. It is, for example, quite possible to argue on entirely different grounds that there are systematic barriers to the success of prohibition in general. (I think that may be a slightly better way to phrase Argument 1.) These centre upon two matters, one organisational, one political. Earlier work by Polich et al (1984) and others on the organisation of street suppliers and supplies have suggested that the maximally effective form of enforcement might centre upon the repeated harassment of low level dealers. As Weatherbum correctly notes, following Moore, '... the effective price of heroin ... [includes] ... the time and money costs incurred in seeking out reliable dealers and in holding the drug prior to consumption'. It is relatively easy, especially in the short run, to raise those costs dramatically. One achieves that by vigorous street level policing, arresting all the 'small fry' and harassing their routine operations. The idea of catching the Mr Bigs is abandoned-it is difficult, time consuming and has low long run payoff-in favour of the regular 'mowing' of the streets. For the users, this means severe disruption to supplies and, where dependency is involved, pressure to move into treatment. As a very short run 'blitz' strategy, this has undoubted impact, but in the longer run it begins to run into the organisational limit mentioned. This concerns police and police work. Police work is, in its most basic features, like most other work. That is, the workers seek to find routines in which (a) their lives are routine and predictable, (b) they can do more of the interesting work and less of the drudge. In addition, police are trained in, and value a 'solution' oriented logic. That is, they like to tackle a problem, solve it and move on. They find 'maintenance' work less appealing. Put these factors together, and the response to a 'mowing' strategy is predictable. Within a short time, the work will be seen as boring, low status, an irritation, 'not real police work'. This will be doubly so if the same people turn up in the street again and again. (Which, for reasons explored below is almost inevitable.) The next logical step is that police, in conjunction with their supposed targets, gradually develop a system of 'understandings'. As with the enforcement of prostitution laws, a de facta roster of