Securing L2TP using IPsec (original) (raw)

IPSEC: Analysis of Internet Protocol Security

—IPSEC (Internet Protocol Security) is a network layer security protocol that is designed to support secure TCP/IP environment over the Internet considering flexibility, scalability, and interoperability. IPSEC primarily supports security among hosts rather than users unlike the other security protocols. Recently, IPSEC is emphasized as one of the important security infrastructures in the NGI (Next Generation Internet). It also has suitable features to implement VPN (Virtual Private Network) efficiently and its application areas are expected to grow rapidly. In this paper, the basic concepts and related standard documents of IPSEC will be introduced.

Experimental Tests on SCTP over IPSec

2008 IFIP International Conference on Network and Parallel Computing, 2008

As telecommunication technologies evolve, security in communications becomes a more and more relevant issue. IPSec is a set of protocols aiming to enhance security at the IP layer. Specifically, IPSec and IKE are important security mechanism that provide cryptographic-based protection for IP packets, and consequently for IP services. SCTP is a standardized transport protocol whose main features include multihoming and multistreaming, and is gaining momentum as a general-purpose transport protocol. While the simultaneous use of these two protocols is feasible, it is under study how to make them work efficiently. In this paper, we present a simple method to improve SCTP-IPSec-IKE compatibility by modifying the structure of the Security Associations. Despite the conceptual simplicity of our proposal, it has not been proposed before in related literature.

Contribution to enhance IPSec security by a safe and efficient internet key exchange protocol

2013 World Congress on Computer and Information Technology (WCCIT), 2013

IPSec is a suite of protocols that provides security for internet communications at the IP layer. The security properties of IPSec mainly depend on the key exchange protocols where the efficiency and security of the key management are important parts of IPSec. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is the most common mechanism for the two hosts to exchange key materials. However, IKE is complex and vulnerable due to attacks such as (DOS, Replay and Man in the middle). In this paper, we propose a new IKE protocol based on D-H. This protocol uses three round-trips the exchange message. The advantages of our contribution are: one phase (vs. two phases on standard IKE), Best efficiency ie. optimizes transmission time (vs. longer negotiation time). The security analysis and formal verification using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) show that our contribution can resist to various attack types such as (Replay, DOS, man in the middle). We compare our IKE with other IKE protocols; the proposed protocol is more secure with less computation complexity.

VPN Site to Site Implementation Using Protocol L2TP and Ipsec

2021

Data exchange communication has developed, which leads to centralized communication, and to achieve this communication requires a type of data communication whose data is accommodated on the server and can be accessed by clients, such as at organization. As a company engaged in education, the development of centralized data communication by utilizing the intranet network has been formed. The use of an intranet network allows data communication that is vulnerable to wiretapping. To fix this using a VPN network. L2TP and IPsec VPNs have different performances, especially in the level of security provided. In this study, an analysis of the L2TP and IPsec VPN network performance was carried out on the SMB Server on the Ubuntu server and the Mikrotik router for its VPN configuration. In this study, the L2TP and IPsec VPN was designed by configuring the Mikrotik RB 450G router and the SMB Server configuration using Command Line Interface on Ubuntu 18.04 server. For security analysis, use ...

Enabling Practical IPsec Authentication for the Internet

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006

There is a strong consensus about the need for IPsec, although its use is not widespread for end-to-end communications. One of the main reasons for this is the difficulty for authenticating two end-hosts that do not share a secret or do not rely on a common Certification Authority. In this paper we propose a modification to IKE to use reverse DNS and DNSSEC (named DNSSEC-to-IKE) to provide end-to-end authentication to Internet hosts that do not share any secret, without requiring the deployment of a new infrastructure. We perform a comparative analysis in terms of requirements, provided security and performance with state-of-the-art IKE authentication methods and with a recent proposal for IPv6 based on CGA. We conclude that DNSSEC-to-IKE enables the use of IPsec in a broad range of scenarios in which it was not applicable, at the price of offering slightly less security and incurring in higher performance costs.

Implementing IPsec

The IP Security protocols are su ciently mature to bene t from multiple independent implementations and worldwide deployment. Towards that goal, we implemented the protocols for the BSD OS, Linux, OpenBSD and NetBSD 1 . While some di erences in the implementations exist due to the di erences in underlying operating system structures, the design philosophy is common. A radix tree, namely the one used by the BSD code for routing purposes, is used to implement the policy engine; a transform table switch is used to make addition of security transformations an easy process; a lightweight kernel-user communication mechanism is used to pass key material and other con guration information from user space to kernel space, and to report asynchronous events such as requests for new keys from kernel space to a user-level keying daemon; and two distinct ways of intercepting outgoing packets and applying the IPsec transformations to them are employed. In this paper, the techniques used in our implementations are explained, di erences in approaches are analysed, and hints are given to potential future implementors of new transforms.

Secure end-to-end transport over SCTP: a new security extension for SCTP

1988

In 2000, the Signaling Transport (SIGTRAN) working group of the IETF defined the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as a new transport protocol. SCTP is a new multi-purpose reliable transport protocol. Due to its various features and easy extensibility it is a valid option not only for already standardised applications but also in many new application scenarios. SCTP has several advantages over TCP and UDP. The analysis of already standardised as well as potential SCTP application scenarios clearly indicates that secure end-to-end transport is one of the crucial requirements for SCTP in the future. Up to now there exist two standardised SCTP security solutions which are called TLS over SCTP [37] and SCTP over IPSec [12]. The goal of this thesis was to evaluate existing SCTP security solutions and find an optimised and efficient security solution. Several drawbacks of the standardised SCTP security solutions identified during the analysis are mainly related to features disti...

IPsec-based anonymous networking: A working implementation

IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009

Protecting users' privacy is becoming one of the rising issues for the success of future communications. The Internet in particular, with its open architecture, presents several threats to the right of protecting personal and sensitive data.

Authentication and Confidentiality via IPsec

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2000

The IP security protocols (IPsec) may be used via security gateways that apply cryptographic operations to provide security services to datagrams, and this mode of use is supported by an increasing number of commercial products. In this paper, we formalize the types of authentication and confidentiality goal that IPsec is capable of achieving, and we provide criteria that entail that a network with particular IPsec processing achieves its security goals. This requires us to formalize the structure of networks using IPsec, and the state of packets relevant to IPsec processing. We can then prove confidentiality goals as invariants of the formalized systems. Authentication goals are formalized in the manner of , and a simple proof method using "unwinding sets" is introduced. We end the paper by explaining the network threats that are prevented by correct IPsec processing.