Saving Morality : a Case against Moral Neutralism (original) (raw)
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On the moral distinction between morality and moralism
If morality is a socially legitimate system of normative principles and rules for the positive regulation of human behavior, it is reasonable to recognize a very important difference between morality and moralism. Let's take "moralism" as a peculiar stance that leads people to falsely take their preferred system of duties as legitimate. This being so, an obvious conclusion is that moralism is dangerous, since it promotes behavior under the pretext of doing what is right and just beyond the rules that legitimately guide liberty and justice. Here I will argue for the distinction between morality and moralism in two parts. In the first, I will argue for the moral epistemological view that people can have true moral beliefs, including moral beliefs regarding duties. I will sustain a realist view on the matter against nihilism. After this metaethical preliminary, I will present an (albeit incomplete) argument on the moral distinction between morality and moralism. If we take moralism as the view that every action is either fulfillment or violation of a duty, the conclusion is that there is no modal difference between duties and privileges (or permissions). One consequence, then, is absolutism, that is the complete conflation between all moralistic duties and all other requirements to action we may consider reasonable. Following Judith Thomson, I will suggest that we should distinguish duties from "practical oughts". Other consequences are outside the scope and space of this paper, but it is pretty clear that we should prefer a stricter view on duties (coincident with the requirements of justice and positive law) and take "moralism" as a label for an equivocal and prejudicial view about our commitments and moral (not only reasonable) requirements to action.
2020
Logical positivists have tried to distinguish meaningful questions from meaningless ones for decades. Their criterion of verifiability (and later of falsifiability) has left a strong mark in modern philosophy. However, logical positivism has been declared dead and many of the topics considered meaningless by them, such as ethics and aesthetics, are still lively debated by philosophers. It could even be argued that the conclusion that ethics and aesthetics should be dismissed as meaningless is a reductio ad absurdum of any theory of meaning. However, it is an equally absurd position to dismiss the broader idea that we must respect certain criteria in order to be entitled to claim that our statements are meaningful. In this thesis, therefore, I will try to reconcile the principles of logical positivism with ethics, proposing an alternative set of criteria for meaning and a pragmatic approach to ethics that should respect this criteria. I will do this by using Parfit's (2011) arguments in defense of objectivism as a case study. In chapter one I introduce the concepts that will serve as a foundation for my thesis. In chapter two, I begin my argumentation by laying out a fuzzy theory of meaning that allows for different degrees of meaningfulness based on Wittgenstein’s later work and concepts from cognitive science such as prototype theory and conceptual metaphors. In chapter three I argue that Parfit’s objectivism has a low degree of meaningfulness because it relies on the assumption that there is a “fundamental metaphysical relation that holds between facts, on the one hand, and beliefs, desires, aims, and actions, on the other”, a view that Smith (2017) calls “reasons fundamentalism”. Smith rejects reasons fundamentalism but accepts Parfit’s metaphysical framing of the debate. I will argue that the metaphysical nature of the argument renders it largely meaningless. Finally, in chapter four, I argue that although most metaethics is indeed meaningless, especially questions concerning the ontology of moral claims, the dismissal of moral utterances as mere expressions of emotions is also unjustified, and therefore I promote a pragmatic universalist metaethics that is compatible with the criteria of meaning described in chapter one. Essentially, I defend the thesis that the purpose of ethics is to resolve moral conflict, and that this should be done by appeal to logic, consistency, and universal moral intuitions, not contentious metaphysical commitments and category mistakes.
Metaethical Issues : The Definition of “ Morality ”
2010
In this chapter, I address human rights as an illustration of the role of comparative ethics in normative reasoning. In Section I, I distinguish comparative ethics from related intellectual enterprises inside and outside philosophy and discuss the difficulties of a comparative conception of morality. In Section II, I argue that the normative relevance of comparative studies is subtle and indirect. It flows out of three conditions of normative respect. I argue that these apply in the case of a Chinese– Western comparison but do not warrant treating all traditions as equals. These conditions underlie the appeal of a “synthesis of East and West” and illustrate the limited normative relevance of comparative ethics. I argue that any envisioned synthesis must come from continued moral discourse within the distinct normative traditions themselves. Comparativists may inform the traditions about each other and thus stimulate moral discourse but may not otherwise “guide” or adjudicate the sha...
MORAL OBJECTIVITY ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS (introduction)
Quaestiones Infinitae, 2019
What implications do recent empirical findings from the fields of biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology and history have for metaethical theories about moral objectivity? I defend the thesis that these findings detract from the plausibility of a realist account of moral objectivity but leave room for a more moderate, antirealist account of objectivity, framed in terms of stance-invariance. The dissertation consists of six articles written for publication in academic journals. In these articles I present two novel, empirically informed challenges to moral realism, and point out some shortcomings of existing challenges. One of the novel challenges builds on the second horn of Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’, according to which moral realists are committed to an implausible evolutionary hypothesis, and extends this criticism to the historical realm. The other novel challenge is fuelled by theoretical and experimental work in moral psychology, and takes issue with the presumed advantages of moral realism in explaining the qualities of our moral experience. Apart from criticizing moral realism, I also develop and defend an alternative account of moral objectivity in antirealist terms and argue that it is as least as successful as a realist account in capturing the objectivist commitments of ordinary moral discourse. In this introductory chapter I outline the aims and methods of the dissertation and demonstrate the coherence of the treatise.
NATURALISTIC METAETHICS, EXTERNAL REASONS, AND THE NATURE OF MORAL ARGUMENT
Desire-based accounts of practical argument about incompatible ends seem limited either to advice about means or to coercive threats. This paper argues that this can be avoided if the parties to the dispute desire its resolution by means other than force more than they desire the satisfaction of any particular ends. In effect, this means they must argue as if in a position of equal power. This leads to an explanation of the apparent objectivity of moral claims and of why moral reasons appear to be categorical and external. It also explains how notions such as reciprocal altruism and TIT-FOR-TAT can play a role in an evolutionary account of morality. The paper concludes with an argument to the effect that a desire-based metaethic must accept the is-ought gap and explains why there may appear to be no is-ought gap from within a given norma-tive perspective. naturalistic meta-ethic, insofar as it is a metaethics that seeks a " reduction of morality to desire, " 1 needs to explain, or explain away, at least three apparent features of moral argument. Firstly, there is the apparent objectivity of moral argument. As Jonathan Dancy puts it, " In moral choice, we struggle to fi nd, not any answer that we can bring ourselves to accept, nor any answer that we can accept in consistency with previous answers, but the right answer. We present our search to ourselves as one governed by a criterion which does not lie in ourselves. " 2 The term " objective, " Michael Smith notes, seems to signify " the possibility of a convergence in moral views. " 3 Second, there is the apparent practicality of moral argument, that is, that the conclusion of the argument is thought to have an action-guiding force, not merely informing the participants that some particular action possesses the property of
Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics
2016
Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan’s thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the subjectivists’ response to the problem of demarcating moral from non-moral judgements.
Metaethical pluralism and ethical systems. A brief enquiry on moral practices
In this paper, I briefly discuss two of the three dominant ethical systems in academic philosophy, that is virtue ethics and utilitarianism. Therefore I leave Kantian deontology aside. This contraposition between the two doctrines is meant to be a practical defense of a brand of metaethical relativism which could also be called metaethical pragmatism or consequentialism, as it is inspired in the work and philosophical attitude of John Dewey. I also offer methodological arguments in favor of this metaethical thesis; however, further study about uses and practical effects of moral theories is needed to support it. I conclude by suggesting, with Aristotle, that new habits of moral reasoning and argument help forging our characters, and that thereby they change the nature of morality too, as well of our conceptions of the good.
“What is the nature of morality? A response to Casebeer, Railton, and Ruse.”
It should be obvious that, within the confines of a short response, we cannot possibly answer the question that constitutes the title of our reply. Nonetheless, each of our commentators touched upon issues that bear directly on this question, so we've chosen it as a framework within which to reflect upon their many stimulating comments.