Byzantine Battleships and Military Transport Vessels along the Hostile Shores (original) (raw)
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Studia Ceranea ISSN 2084–140X, 2011
At the beginning of the 11th century, after decades of almost incessant wars with the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgarian state lost its political independence. In many research works on the period in question there is emphasis put on the stabilization of the Empire at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century as a major factor or a reason for the loss of our political independence for a century and a half. Naturally, the internal political state of affairs in the Bulgarian Tsardom and the decline of its military power resulting from the loss of independence also made it easier for Emperor Basil II to put pressure on the Balkans. This article deals with the issue of the reasons for the decline in the Bulgarian military power at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century, the changes in the military stratagems observed in the wars of tsar Samuel and his successors to the throne. Why did Samuel avoid pitched battles? Why do the sources speak mostly about lightly-equipped Bulgarian armies? Why did the Bulgarians of the time take over fortresses after prolonged sieges and mainly through starvation and military stratagems? The present article attempts to give an answer to these questions, based on the written sources of the period and the works of historians.
Studia Ceranea, 2011
At the beginning of the 11th century, after decades of almost incessant wars with the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgarian state lost its political independence. In many research works on the period in question there is emphasis put on the stabilization of the Empire at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century as a major factor or a reason for the loss of our political independence for a century and a half. Naturally, the internal political state of affairs in the Bulgarian Tsardom and the decline of its military power resulting from the loss of independence also made it easier for Emperor Basil II to put pressure on the Balkans. This article deals with the issue of the reasons for the decline in the Bulgarian military power at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century, the changes in the military stratagems observed in the wars of tsar Samuel and his successors to the throne. Why did Samuel avoid pitched battles? Why do the sources speak mostly about lig...
BYZANTINE – BULGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 10TH C.
2015
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Early Byzantine and Arab Naval Strategies and Organizations, 645-718 C.E. (Undergrad Thesis)
Throughout the seventh century the Byzantine Empire and Arab Caliphate waged war on the land and on the sea. By 655 CE the Mare Nostrum, the absolute control of the Mediterranean Sea by the Byzantine fleet, was ended by the emergence of powerful, Arab led, fleets. From then to the early eighth century the two powers would battle each other into a stalemate in a battleground that was waged from Spain to the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. How the Byzantines were able to outlast this serious onslaught and how the Arabs were able to take the fight all the way to the nervous center of the Byzantine Empire to siege is explained in their naval strategies. Both sides wanted to establish their own thalassocracy, their empires' maritime power, over each other. In many ways it was necessary for both powers to take their fight to the sea. The ability to control trade routes and utilize the seas for rapid transport, raiding, and invasion has often tipped the scales in favor of the power with the most powerful naval force.