“Digital Media and the Informational Politics of Appropriation,” (original) (raw)
Related papers
Art and Politics of Appropriation
2012
This thesis works towards a theory of creative appropriation as critical praxis. Defining ‘appropriation’ as the re-use of already-authored cultural matter, I investigate how the ubiquity of aesthetically and commercially motivated appropriative practices has impacted concepts of creativity, originality, authorship and ownership. Throughout this thesis, appropriation is understood as bridging the artistic, political, economic, and scientific realms. As such, it strongly affects cultural and socio-political landscapes, and has become an ideal vehicle for effectively criticizing and, perhaps, radically changing dominant aesthetic, legal and ethical discourses regarding the (re)production, ownership and circulation of knowledge, artifacts, skills, resources, and cultural matter in general. Critical appropriation is thus posited as a political strategy that can draw together the different causes motivating appropriative processes across the globe, and organize them for the benefit of a ...
In The Name of “Like This”: The Appropriation of Artwork In Digital Age
International Journal of Creative and Arts Studies
The rapidly growing and massive information age in digital media platforms has created and introduced cultural ramifications on various aspects of human life.The ongoing era of globalization of the twentieth century has fuel the capabilityin digitizing and manipulating information during traffic. Cultural growth in thenew age includes: ―cultural preservation as the main ingredient of the ordinary‖;the proliferation of electronic visual images; and the construction of amultifaceted and the individual identity or social imaginary. The artworkcurrently is glorifying so many appropriations practices. All the art creations i nthe code of conduct are suitable for one aspiration, and that is the digital aestheticmarket. It is now customary to gather on the variety of artistic creations fromdifferent cultures that are appropriated as new and authentic artwork. Thus, thisarticle discusses the appropriation for the artwork in the rise of the digital mediaplatform era. This paper is an anthrop...
Appropriation Art and Cultural Institutions
This article explores the possibilities and pitfalls connected with the creative use of pre-existing images with themes linked to appropriation, creativity and collaborative practices. Appropriation is an absolutely legitimate art practice, as far as the art world is concerned. However, on the one hand, this artistic movement has been frustrating the legal experts, since it ignores and thus challenges major criteria of the copyright law such as originality and author- ship. On the other hand, it has attracted the attention of the National Courts in applying the fair use exception or proceeding in a broad interpretation of the citation exception for artistic purposes. Many museums and art galleries have embraced appropriation artistic practices in recent years in order to transgress the traditional notion of the museum as a cultural depository or a centre of research and to establish a creative dialogue with the public, to force the public to think about art. But what are the copyright implications of this movement? When do creative acts stop and copyright infringement begin? What are the museums’ obligations towards this phenomenon?
Appropriation and Reproduction Originality in the Digital Age
This is the first paper I have published and was produced in partial fulfilment of my B.A. Fine Art degree. This paper tackles the question, what is originality? Can an inspired Idea be truly original? Is it the idea, finish or technique that makes it original? It also asks if embracing reproduction could be a forward move in art. Using insights highlighted by Richard Dawkins on memes, and Walter Benjamin's take on originality and reproduction among others, I try to unravel the difference between plagiarism and reproduction.
noun | cryp.tom.ne.sia | \, krip-,täm-‘nē-zhə\ The presence of phenomena in normal consciousness, which objectively are memories, but subjectively are not recognized as such. In an attempt to strike a greater sense of harmony between copyright law and the freedom of expression – and to protect the status quo of the creative process from undue restriction and distortion – this paper proposes that the postmodern philosophy ought be applied to the analysis of non-verbatim artistic appropriation; through United States and European law. The application of the postmodern philosophy will, heretofore, be referred to as “the postmodern approach.” The postmodern approach, as it were, undertakes the “influence view” of creativity – advanced by Wendy Gordon – that “subconscious copying occurs constantly and usually bears valuable fruit.” That is to say, this paper argues that most, if not all, art is in part derivative – as a result of either deliberate appropriation or subconscious appropriation (i.e., cryptomnesia). To that end, the argument propounded is that the status quo of the creative process entails appropriation; and ought to be protected from undue restriction or distortion by doctrines such as the subconscious copying rule – where strict liability is imposed on alleged copyright infringers. This paper will, therefore, use the term “appropriation” in a neutral form to describe the act of taking – but with no intimation as to whether the act of taking is improper, or otherwise unlawful. Further, in light of the influence view of creativity, the postmodern approach posits that whether or not appropriation has occurred is irrelevant – once a sufficient transformation has been made upon that appropriation. In other words, the approach views the evolution of art as a series of building blocks that comprises art works that may occasionally appear to overlap upon one another. Further, this approach encourages the building upon the existing corpus of artwork and disregards such occasions of overlap. With regard for copyright’s economic foundations, this paper argues that the most important consideration, in determining whether the secondary work is sufficiently transformative, ought to be based on the fourth factor of the United States fair use doctrine: whether the use of the original work in the second work has effected the potential market for or value of the original work. The Supreme Court, in Acuff-Rose, held that unless the second work is a complete verbatim duplication of the original and, therefore, likely to usurp the demand for the original work; the second work, a work of non-verbatim appropriation, may go as far as to suppress the demand for the original and remain lawful. To that end, this paper does not endorse verbatim piracy, illegal-downloading or wholesale illegal distribution of copyrighted works, a practice which, invariably, would not pass the fair use doctrine. However, this paper underlines the dictum, in Feist, that holds that the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors but to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Therefore, it is argued that rigid, property-based copyright discourse is more likely it is to disincentivize innovative activities and chill speech, rather than incentivize it. To that end, the application of the labor-desert theory (i.e., property-based rhetoric), to intangibles, is demonstrated in the following paper as manifestly incorrect and, in fact, extremely problematic. Furthermore, with regard for copyright’s creative foundations, this paper argues that for the second work to be considered structurally transformative it must satisfy a different purpose or character. In line with Arthur C. Danto’s claim that there is a palpable difference between imitation and impersonation, this paper will put forward that when considering a non-verbatim second work, as a whole, where there is a sufficient degree of original contribution in addition to the appropriated portion: that second work out to fall within the meaning of the “comment” exception in the fair use doctrine and the “pastiche” exception in the Information Society Directive, in Europe. For the purpose of comparative support, examples of parody will be used to demonstrate the viability of this proposition and flexibility of the definitions of parody and pastiche exceptions,9 through both United States and European case law. Furthermore, this paper argues that the necessary degree of originality to be contributed, by way of transformative comment, ought to be directly proportional to the originality threshold in the relevant jurisdiction to secure copyright protection; in the United States and Europe, the threshold is relatively low. This paper also underlines the importance in considering the fact that, as Pamela Samuelson pointed out, many aesthetic works comprise un-protectable elements weaved together in a creative manner. Indeed, while compositions such as this are duly protected under Feist precedent, the more manifestly un-protectable the elements are that comprise the work – the more “thin” the copyright protection is said to be. Further, this actuality is something that the postmodern approach accounts for and it echoes the sentiments of Samuelson when it posits that the substantial similarity test in the United States has failed to adequately address this matter. This matter will be demonstrated with a particular interest in the Arnstein and Krofft variations of the substantial similarity test. Not merely does this paper posit that the question of discerning similarities, in law, between two works – is manifestly defective but it also argues that un-protectable elements are too often, misunderstood, misconstrued and awarded copyright protection, to the detriment of secondary artists. Jonathan Griffiths wisely noted that exceptions in copyright law provide insufficient protection for the freedom to create and that it is not enough that copyright legal structure “may” secure its compatibility with the freedom of expression. Therefore, the postmodern approach aims to provide a semblance of a legal structure that invariably will secure copyright and freedom of expression compatibility. Furthermore, the approach secures its final and most valuable prospect of support in Europe’s emerging case law regarding copyright and the freedom of expression, where both copyright and the freedom of expression are afforded fundamental rights status and decisions are made on the basis of the proportionality doctrine and with regard for the public interest. To that end, this papers argues that the progressive postmodern approach finds both historical and contemporary support in United States and European case law for the building of a more harmonious relationship between copyright law and the freedom of expression and a means to protect the status quo of the creative process as it exists for present and – as Gordon encouraged – future artists. The postmodern approach is, in itself, an expression of protection for those cannot speak for themselves.
Appropriation Art and the Law: Originality is in the Eye of the Beholder
Artists have always borrowed elements from the work of other artists; however, the practice of directly appropriating pre-existing images with little transformation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Appropriation art and design challenge longstanding assumptions about originality and authorship. This essay analyzes the legal implications of appropriating art, through examinations of several recent high-profile copyright infringement cases in U.S. courts. Several of the cases involve fashion designers appropriating street art and graffiti. The cases demonstrate a delicate balancing act of protecting the rights of original artists and encouraging proper practices by later artists and designers. As technological innovation and open access to imagery continues to grow, so too will the legal issues implicated in appropriation art.
Appropriation as Cultural Production
Poaching ideas, texts, material and its forms of distribution have become a processes inextricably entrenched in the practice of creative production. This development contributes to an ecology of creativity, where audiences are no longer spectators of culture but active users and participants in cultural production. It has simultaneously offered audiences freedom to create and regenerate content from existing sources, and yet trapped these users in regulations that inhibit appropriation on grounds of trespassing on intellectual property. This complex web of engagement and participation is transforming traditional notions of producer-consumer relations, in which ‘creator’ is increasingly applied to the appropriator of other’s work.
Originality in Postmodern Appropriation Art
Analytic analyses of "originality" as a property of works or as a property of artists have proven inadequate. But the denial of the existence of "originality" by post-modern appropriation artists and philosophers relies on a limited sense of "originality" that misconstrues the term as it is used in artistic and philosophical literature. I propose an approach to understanding "originality" which distinguishes (a) the meaning of "originality" as a relationship between the artist and the work of art, and (b) the evidence we use to assess originality, including both the relationship of the artist to the work and the relationship of the work to other works of art. This analysis better accounts for use of the concept, both in the so-called "artworld" and in a recent opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on minimal standards for originality under Federal Copyright Law.
New Objections to Cultural Appropriation in the Arts
British Journal of Aesthetics, 2021
Some writers have objected to cultural appropriation in the arts on the grounds that it violates cultures' property rights. Recently a paper by Erich Matthes and another by C. Thi Nguyen and Matthew Strohl have argued that cultural appropriation does not violate property rights but that it is nevertheless often objectionable. Matthes argues that cultural appropriation contributes to the oppression of disadvantaged cultures. Nguyen and Strohl argue that it violated the intimacy of cultures. This paper argues that neither Matthes nor Nguyen and Strohl succeed in showing that cultural appropriation is often objectionable.