The Moral Content of the Concept of Privacy (original) (raw)
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The Introduction shows that privacy can be conceptualised in terms of seclusion and solitude, anonymity and confidentiality, intimacy and domesticity, so that it is unnecessary to agree on a definition of privacy in order to analyse it philosophically. It shows that democratic theory and practice provide a set of working assumptions about what is valuable and right, equal and unequal, free and unfree which enable us to distinguish privacy from other values, and to resolve those disagreements about its nature and value which are, in fact, resolvable by some combination of theory and practice.
The Alternative Definition of Privacy
In my presentation, I assume three hypotheses, validate them and come to a conclusion that leads to the alternative definition of privacy. a) Apprehension is an unpleasant emotion that is specifically linked to our public appearances. b) Privacy is a system, in which apprehension can be undone. c) Confidence or trust (used here as synonyms), when it comes to personal information, undoes apprehension. If (a), (b) and (c) are true, hence: d) Privacy is made of a network of trustworthy relationships that concern the use of personal information, no more, no less. To proceed, I will need to define the concepts I have named above, especially by distinguishing confidence from what I call “reasoned confidence”. In order to do so, I will oppose two different historical conceptions of privacy: the “classical” and the “alternative”; and will show that the latter is the contemporary conception of privacy.
Technology and Society (ISTAS), 2010 …, 2010
In this polemical paper we present a Socratian dialogue that both critiques privacy and addresses its value. The purpose of this dialogue is to address questions that are often begged in the contemporary discourse around privacy, surveillance and technology — a discourse that assumes that privacy is a personal and social good without necessarily arguing the case. To prosecute the debate we have Aspicio — who will argue that privacy is a condition that is not only limited as a personal and social good, but is undesirable in many important respects. Aspicio is confronted by Occulto, who will argue that privacy is a condition that can and should be obtained and defended In the course of the dialogue our interlocutors discuss privacy as a right; privacy and modernity; privacy, the public sphere and the private sphere; privacy and individualism; the value of surveillance; and privacy, embarrassment and shame.
The Contemporary Definition of Privacy
The public-private distinction appeared in the Greek polis in order to separate the society in two parts: the implemented and the former. The old regime only remained in the household as the absolute power of the household master upon his household (oïkos) – which was economical (from oïkos-nomos) or private. On the contrary, the new regime – which was political or public – was constituted by free and equal citizens. In other words, kingship, which previously belonged to one or to a minority, was equally divided among all citizens. They were collectively the king of the polis and were individually the kings of their own households. “Public” and “private” are now perceived as characterizing the institutionally recognized types of relationships. Civic friendship was the relationship between citizens: a free mutual agreement between equals, described by laws. The relationship between a household master and the components of the household – wife, children and slaves – was based on domination. Furthermore, the Greeks conceived a higher level of friendship, which Aristotle first described as a relationship between equals who have the same values in common, making explicit rules pointless. At some extent, Aristotle’s ideal was to replace civic friendship by friendship. The three available generic types of relationship are therefore domination, friendship – whose core is our conception of trust – and civic friendship – whose core is what I call reasoned trust. They have a common purpose: allowing peaceful interactions between individuals. But the public-private distinction only accepts two of these relationships out of the three. Antique societies failed to institutionally recognize friendship until the era of Christianity, which negated the public-private distinction to make trust through faith in God the only recognized relationship. During the Modern era, the public-private distinction was raised again, firstly in accordance with the Roman ideal, but on the basis that all human beings were considered to be free and equal, something changed. Workers emancipated themselves and women also. Our societies began to exclude domination. We kept reasoned trust through the rule of law, in order to organize the public part of society, where people do not personally know each other. In our private lives, trust began to replace domination. Trust then became the safeguard of personal information. Because of our desires to interact peacefully with others, we fear that such interactions would fail. We usually are protected of failures by law when they concern actions but the judgments of others and sometimes their consequences are not guaranteed. Therefore, we try to prevent our fear of a malicious judgment and its potential consequences by securing information. This was formerly possible through domination: those dominated would not be listened to. The same is now possible through trust: those that I trust will judge me, or speak about me, in accordance with my values. I then define privacy in the contemporary sense, as a network of trustworthy relationships that implicate the use of personal information. My task will be to clearly explain this definition.