Далибор Денда, Сербская армия 1804-1918, Институт славяноведения РАН, Нестор-История, Москва, Санкт-Петербург, 2021, 176. стр. (Ма Немања Глишић) (original) (raw)
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TANK UNITS IN THE ARMY OF THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA (1930–1941) Excluding the countries defeated in the World War I, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was among the last to form its tank units (1930). Although the first tank unit was established some four years before Wehrmacht tank unit, the development of this branch was much slower in the Yugoslav Army than in the German Army. The main reasons were inability to procure adequate armor fighting vehicles from abroad and non-existence of domestic industries capable of independent production, but also a lack of awareness with people whose influence was crucial for the development of the Yugoslav Army of the importance of this combat means in a future war. The first serious development plan, made by division general Milan Dj. Nedić, appeared relatively early, in 1932. Made in accordance with the French model, and in line with the French doctrine postulates, this plan, with some less significant modifications, was the main source of ideas for the development of the armor units in the Yugoslav Army. Even it had been implemented, the question remains whether the achievement of the Yugoslav Army would have been any better, for the organization that followed the French model proved ineffective in the spring 1940. Yugoslavia lacked trained personnel to enlarge formations of tank units. The accelerated training provided in 1940 was not sufficient to prepare the officer cadre, let alone to provide sufficient number of noncommissioned officers and soldiers, so that even with the procurement plans completely implemented the Yugoslav Army would have faced the same problem. Considering all this, the results of Yugoslav tank units in combat actions against the enemy who surpassed them in technology, number and tactics could have been easily predicted.
YUGOSLAV TANK UNITS IN THE APRIL WAR The Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia entered the April war in 1941 with two tank battalions and a squadron of light cavalry tankettes. The actions by the Yugoslav tank units did not yield any significant results. The tank companies attached to two combined detachments and deployed along the Kumanovo-Strumica line fell short of offering serious resistance to the enemy. Other armor units (two incomplete tank battalions and a unit of cavalry tankettes) did not achieve considerable results either. The first tank battalion did not even succeed in getting assembled. The unit in Zagreb surrendered without fight; the tanks belonging to auxiliary unit were destroyed during the bombardment of Belgrade; and the rest of the tanks in the Sarajevo-based company were disabled by the crews. More experienced and better trained personnel were recruited for the second battalion which took part in fierce battles around Doboj, facing the attacks by the Ustaša’s fifth column from its own re-ar. This battalion lost most of its own armor fighting vehicles (26 out of 37 tanks), which confirms the fact that even the most up-dated Yugoslav tanks were no match for the tactically and technologically superior German units. In order to neutralize the Yugoslav tank units, the Germans relied not only on their supremacy in the air, armored vehicles and trained crews, but also on 75 mm anti-armor guns, which the Yugoslav army did not have as part of its armaments. According to available records, the only relatively successful resistance to the enemy was set up by the squadron of fast fighting vehicles in the battles in Topola, but it was also destroyed in the course of fight. The overall impression of the activities of the Yugoslav tank units in the April war is not different from the general remark on the attitude of the whole armed forces, who, except for a few examples of courage and self-initiatives, were infected by defeatism, vulnerable to actions by the fifth column and unused to fight against up-dated combat means, so that they could offer only sporadic and short lasting resistance. However, comparing to the West Front, where the Germans won the war in 1940 not because they outnumbered their rival, but because of their superior tactics, the Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia surpassed their opponent not only in tactics and trained personnel, but also in the number and quality of combat means.