Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy (original) (raw)
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Selectorate Theory, the Democratic Peace, and Public Goods Provision
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics. * We would like to thank
W e propose a new standard for evaluating the performance of electoral democracies: the correspondence between citizens' party preferences and the party composition of governments that are formed after elections. We develop three criteria for assessing such correspondence: the proportion of citizens whose most preferred party is in government, whether the party that is most liked overall is in government, and how much more positively governing parties are rated than non-governing parties. We pay particular attention to the last criterion, which takes into account how each citizen feels about each of the parties as well as the intensity of their preferences. We find that proportional representation systems perform better on the first criterion. Majoritarian systems do better on the other two.
Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival
American Political Science Review, 2008
Although democracy is a key concept in political science, debate continues over definitions and mechanisms. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow (2003) make the important claim that most of democracy's effects are in fact due to something conceptually simpler and empirically easier to measure than democracy: the size of the minimum winning coalition that selects the leader. The argument is intuitively appealing and supported by extensive data analysis. Unfortunately, the statistical technique they use induces omitted variable bias into their results. They argue that they need to control for democracy, but their estimation procedure is equivalent to omitting democracy from their analysis. When we reestimate their regressions controlling for democracy, most of their important findings do not survive.
2015
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, ma-joritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
2012
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, ma-joritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 postwar parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending. JEL classifications: H00, D72, D78.
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?
2003
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending. JEL classifications: H00, D72, D78.
Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others
2003
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the composition of governing coalitions, whether these are conceived as electoral alliances between classes or alliances between class parties. Our argument implies a) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, while center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems, and b) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
American Political Science Review, 2006
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
Why voters prefer coalitions: Rationality or norms?
Political Science, 2011
This article asks if voters might prefer coalitions or single-party governments for ideological or normative reasons. Of course, they might prefer coalition to single-party governments for many reasons, one set clustering around the rational preferences of partisans largely in terms of expectations of electoral success or failure, and the other around the influence of norms or ideology. In terms of 'rationality', small party supporters should want their party to have a role in government. Large party supporters should prefer single-party government, unless their loyalties are weak, or unless they expect the large party they dislike will have the best chance of forming a government, and therefore hope that its power might be diluted by having to form a coalition. Meanwhile less partisan voters might or might not be influenced by norms that favour broadly based, consensual governments that command majority as compared to plurality support, that minimise parliamentary conflict, and that make it possible for successive governments to follow more consistent policies over time. Regardless of partisanship, some people might prefer strong governments, particularly if their disposition is authoritarian. Ideology might have effects independent of partisanship. Norms and preferences for type of government might also interact as part of change in a political culture. Using data from five elections that have generated coalition and/or minority governments in New Zealand, a country previously accustomed to single-party rule, this article tests these hypotheses and explores the implications of the findings.
Constitutional Political Economy , 2014
The statistical relationship between economic development and duration of democracy is one of the strongest in Political Science. Nevertheless, the theoretical mechanisms underlying this statistical link have been debated for decades. Adam Przeworski has proposed the simplest explanation, by indicating that wealth itself increases the probability of sustaining democracy, economic development and democratic stability are thus directly related. This paper discusses whether the assumptions of the influential model of Przeworski (Public Choice, 123(3–4):253–273. doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4, 2005) are plausible, and extends the analysis to a setting in which: (a) absolute per capita income varies; (b) people have preference for democracy independently of income; and (c) consumption is subject to diminishing marginal utility. The analysis demonstrates that the mechanics proposed by Przeworski (2005) are particularly recursive. One of the assumptions in his model implies in and of itself the final conclusion of the analysis, and if this contentious cornerstone is removed or slightly changed, it is no longer possible to conclude that economic development could create per se any democratic equilibrium.