This version: June 1994IS MONEY NEUTRAL? SOME EVIDENCE FOR ITALY * (original) (raw)

Fiscal Dominance and Money Growth in Italy: The Long Record

Explorations in Economic History, 2001

Fiscal dominance, that is the extent to which government deficits condition the growth of the money supply, has been the prevailing regime in Italian monetary history from the creation of the state in 1861 to the 1980s. The nature of the institutional structure linking budget deficits to monetary base creation has changed over time. In the early days, the profit-seeking banks of issued exceeded intermittently the legal ceiling on their outstanding currency to lend to government. The influence of public finance on monetary policy became even stronger, first, in the 1930s and, later, in the 1970s. The joint event of an independent central bank and lower budget deficits are responsible for a reversal of fiscal dominance ion the 1980s and the 1990s. JEL Classification: E51, E58, N13, and N14. 1 1 where S = interest-bearing government securities, GE = total government expenditures, excluding interest payments, T = total tax revenues, and TR = transfer to government by the central bank (i.e., seigniorage).

Deficits, Money Growth and Inflation in Italy: 1875-1994

Economic Notes, 1999

In this paper, we examine econometrically the``®scal dominance'' model of the Monetary History of Italy proposed by . We test the proposition that monetary policy is endogenous to ®scal policy, and that such an endogeneity creates a speci®city in the process generating Italian in¯ation. We perform our econometric tests by estimating a small structural linear econometric model, addressing carefully the issues of data-congruency of the speci®cation, non-stationarity, cointegration, and credibility of the over-identifying restrictions. Our econometric investigation is based on a sample of annual observations from 1875±1994 and exploits the structural break which occurred in 1975, when Baf® became Governor of the Bank of Italy and the lack of independence of the central bank was ®rst perceived as a problem. Baf® started the slow evolution process leading to the independence of the central bank, which was institutionally rati®ed by his successor Ciampi, when, in 1981, the Bank of Italy interrupted his commitment to buy all the government bonds left unsold in the public tenders (the``divorce''). Our empirical analysis over the sample 1875±1975 con®rms the existence of a link between government de®cit and money growth, and of a long-run relationship between the quantity of money and the price level; the evidence also stresses the relevance of supply side factors in the determination of in¯ation. When the model estimated for the sample 1875±1975 is applied to the period 1975±1994, a clear structural break in the relation between government de®cits and money growth emerges.

The demand for money in the Italian economy: 1867–1965

Journal of Monetary Economics, 1980

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the demand for money in Italy using data for the period 1867-1965. It finds that during this time this demand was a stable function of two key variables: permanent income and the rate of interest. Courchene, Peter Howitt, Geoffrey Kingston, David Laidler. Michael Parkin and Aman Ullah for criticism and suggestions and to Luciano Venturini for research assistance. The comments of an unknown referee have also been most helpful. Errors and shortcomings are my own responsibility. 'The data used by Giarda (1968) cover the period 1937-1965. 'See also Frowen and Arestis (1976), and Gray, Ward and Zis (1976).

Disaggregated Public Spending, GDP and Money Supply: Evidence for Italy

The aim of this article is to analyze the relationship between public spending and GDP controlling for the money supply in Italy for the period 1990-2010 at a disaggregated level, using a time series approach. After a brief introduction, a survey of the economic literature on this issue is shown, before estimating this nexus for ten items of public spending according to the COFOG functional classification. Cointegration tests reveal a long-run relationship between GDP, money supply and eight spending items. Moreover, Granger causality tests results show evidence in favour of Wagner's Law in two cases (Y→G), while a bi-directional flow has been found in only one case. The Keynesian hypothesis (G→Y) is supported by five series of spending. Some notes on the policy implications of this analysis conclude the paper.

European integration and monetary transmission mechanisms: the case of Italy

Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2001

The focus in this paper is on the monetary transmission mechanism in Italy and how it has changed with the increased independence of the Italian Central Bank and the increasingly fixed exchange rates of the ERM. The sample period 1974-1994 is divided into two parts approximately corresponding to the different systems. Based on a VAR model for money, income, prices, and interest rates the cointegration properties of the data in nominal and real terms are analysed. Long-run price homogeneity is empirically rejected and the economic and econometric consequences for a real money analysis are described. Altogether we find little evidence that the use of M2 and the short interest rate as intermediate targets has effectively controlled price inflation in this period.

A cointegration analysis of the relatonship between bank reserves, deposits and loans The case of Italy, 1965–1987

Journal of Banking & Finance, 1990

In this paper we investigate the relationship between bank reserves, deposits and loans using a time series approach. The empirical results show that free reserves cointegrate with both deposits and loans and the causal nexus runs from deposits (in the short run) to reserves and from deposits and loans (in the long run) to free reserves. This reflects the fact that the Bank of Italy has never followed a policy of unconditional money stock targeting with strict monetary base control. We also find that in the short run deposits are causally prior to loans; this reflects the fact that Italian banks have mainly pursued an asset management policy. Over the full sample deposits and loans are not cointegrated; this may be due to the introduction of the ceiling on bank loans.

Economic stagnation and recession: the difficult Italian transition to the Monetary Union

Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 2019

The stagnation of the Italian economy since the mid-1990s can only be understood with reference to the great transformations that occurred in the previous two decades. This long interval was characterized by a process of rapid modernization and, also, by economic policy mismanagement. These changes generated an inefficient institutional model, a dysfunctional variant of the coordinated market economies of Continental Europe. In the mid-1990s Italian policymakers had to make painful and swift fiscal and institutional adjustments to correct economic imbalances and comply with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. These adjustments were, however, incomplete and did not solve the two most important problems that explain the fragility of the Italian economy in the financial crisis: stagnation of productivity and little internal adjustment (in terms of wage dynamics and reallocation of labour and capital across sectors and firms) to fend off the consequences of a loss of competitiveness in world markets. RIASSUNTO La stagnazione dell'economia italiana dalla metà degli anni '90 può essere compresa solo con riferimento alle trasformazioni avvenute nelle due decadi precedenti. Questo lungo intervallo è caratterizzato da un rapido processo di modernizzazione, ma anche da politiche economiche incoerenti e dissipatrici, che hanno generato un modello istituzionale inefficiente, una variante "disfunzionale" delle economie di mercato coordinate dell'Europa continentale. Alla metà degli anni '90 i governi italiani hanno dovuto avviare aggiustamenti fiscali e istituzionali rapidi e dolorosi per cercare di correggere gli squilibri economici e soddisfare le regole del trattato di Maastricht. Tali aggiustamenti sono stati, però, incompleti e non hanno risolto i due problemi più importanti che spiegano la fragilità dell'economia italiana nella crisi finanziaria: la stagnazione della produttività e la mancanza di un adeguato aggiustamento interno (in termini di dinamiche salariali e di riallocazione del lavoro e del capitale tra settori produttivi e imprese) per limitare le conseguenze della progressiva perdita di competitività sui mercati internazionali.

Disinflation in Italy: An analysis with the econometric model of the bank of Italy

Journal of Policy Modeling, 1988

This paper offers a quitltitative analysis of the determinants of the disinflation process in Italy between 1980 and 1986, using the quarterly model of Banca d'Italia. By means of conditional simulations, the contribution of international factors, such z< the drop in oil prices, and the role played by government policies are identified. In particular, the effects of monetary and exchange rate policies and the policy of "precommitment" of prices and wages on the disinflation process are evaluated. The role of the policy on publicly regulated prices is also analyzed. It is found that a more accommodating exchange rate policy would have amplified the inflationary impact of the second oil shock while allowing only for small gains in income. The gradualness of the restrictive monetary policy is also evaluated. Finally, the complementarity between monetary policy and exchange rate policy in the period, given the constraint imposed by the balance of payments, is emphasized. *This is a condensed version of a working paper that is going to be published in Italian in the Banca d'ltaha series of "Contributi all'analisi economica." The authors are grateful to Piero Rubino for productive discussions and to Albert Ando and Giampaolo Galli for useful suggestions. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banca d'ltalia.