Reflections on the Evolution of Morality (original) (raw)
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On the Evolutionary Origin of Morality
Beytülhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 2022
In this study, I will approach morality from a naturalistic perspective and defend that morality is a product of evolutionary processes shared by both human and non-human animals rather than that of human culture. My natural- istic approach is based on simpler components instead of high-level cognitive capabilities such as cognition. Rationality , judgment, and free will are indeed pre- sented as necessary for morality in classical definitions of morality. However, I will put forward that the roots of morality can be understood as the biological disposition in the evolutionary process. Moreover, in this paper, I will propose that morality is not a phenomenon that ought to be restricted to humans. I think morality is not a phenomenon that is exclusively human; rather, morality can be expanded to non-human animals. To defend this claim, I will indicate that mo- rality has a natural content and that this content does not have a structure that can only be justified on a rational basis, but that this normative structure can be established through biological/evolutionary mechanisms and can be explained in this way.
THE ASCENT OF MORALITY, FROM NON-HUMAN TO HUMAN ANIMALS: AN EMOTION-BASED ACCOUNT
2021
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether morality is uniquely human, and to argue that emotions are the basis of morality in the sense that moral behavior is produced by emotions. In order to support my suggestion, I first intend to investigate the nature and function of emotions. Furthermore, I adopt an evolutionary perspective suggesting that our biology pushed us toward caring about certain things surrounding us. In accordance with this assertion, I endeavor to examine whether moral judgments and moral beliefs can be illustrated in a non-cognitivist way from the perspectives of both naturalist philosophers and evolutionary scientists. Accordingly, I defend the view that moral judgment is a non-propositional, psychological attitude. From a contemporary perspective, we might argue that Hume‘s interpretation of moral judgment adopts a non- cognitivist and non-propositional attitude. Moreover, moral judgment does not express a proposition that describes facts and is truth evaluable; rather, it expresses feelings. In this sense, moral judgment is a psychological inclination to feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, the particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval in terms of moral judgment.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2015
This article looks at the origins of human morality, and examines the contributions of both biological evolution and cultural evolution. Biological evolution may help explain certain categories of moral behavior (such as altruism), as well as certain morally relevant capacities (such as empathy). Cultural evolution may explain how different moral systems emerge in different times and places, and why they tend to foster aspects of human nature that enhance group success and discourage aspects of human nature that undermine it. Morality must be understood as the joint production of both biological and cultural evolution.
Reflections on the evolutionary basis of morality
Metascience, 2017
is a distinguished primatologist who has worked for decades studying the behavior of primates, especially chimpanzees. This book presents De Waal's 2003 Tanner Lectures on Human Values, in which he argues that ''the building blocks of morality are evolutionarily ancient'' (7). The book also includes responses to De Waal's argument by the evolutionary psychologist, Robert Wright, and by three philosophers, Christine Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher, and Peter Singer. De Waal replies to his commentators in an afterword, and there is a useful introduction by Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober. De Waal argues that the behavior of primates, including especially chimpanzee behavior, provides evidence that the emotional and motivational building blocks of morality are present in these animals. Further, given that human beings evolved from primates and that our closest primate relatives are chimpanzees, De Waal argues, we have reason to believe that these emotional and motivational building blocks are evolved characteristics of human beings as well. The emotional and motivational characteristics in question are empathy, prosocial tendencies, including a willingness to cooperate as well as a willingness to look out for the well-being of conspecifics who are not kin, and a tendency to seek fairness of treatment and to reciprocate. De Waal concedes of course that morality is ''more than this,'' but he holds that morality as we know it in humans would be ''impossible'' without these building blocks. He holds, then, that morality as we know it in humans is a product of evolution in that it rests on evolved emotional and motivational features that are ''continuous'' with what is found in other primates (7). Morality is not solely a product of culture or other environmental influences. Instead of simply and straightforwardly arguing for the views I have outlined, however, De Waal structures his discussion as an argument against something he
Beyond the sociobiological dilemma: Social emotions and the evolution of morality
Is morality biologically altruistic? Does it imply a disadvantage in the struggle for existence? A positive answer puts morality at odds with natural selection, unless natural selection operates at the level of groups. In this case, a trait that is good for groups though bad (reproductively) for individuals can evolve. Sociobiologists reject group selection and have adopted one of two horns of a dilemma. Either morality is based on an egoistic calculus, compatible with natural selection; or morality continues tied to psychological and biological altruism but not as a product of natural selection. The dilemma denies a third possibility-that psychological altruism evolves as a biologically selfish trait. I discuss the classical treatments of the paradox by Charles Darwin ([1871, focusing on the role they attribute to social emotions. The upshot is that both Darwin and Trivers sketch a natural-selection process relying on innate emotional mechanisms that render morality adaptive for individuals as well as for groups. I give additional reasons for viewing it as a form of natural, instead of only cultural, selection.
An evolutionary perspective on morality
2011
Moral behavior and concern for others are sometimes argued to set humans apart from other species. However, there is some evidence that humans are not the only animal species to possess these characteristics. Work from behavioral biology and neuroscience has indicated that some of these traits are present in other species, including other primates. Studying these behaviors in other species can inform us about the evolutionary trajectory of morality, either helping understand how the behaviors evolved and which environmental characteristics were critical for their emergence. While this evolutionary approach to human behavior is not always well received, a brief historical look indicates that this has not always been the case. For instance Adam Smith, better known for his economics than his natural history, was clearly sympathetic with the view that moral behaviors are present in species other than humans. This paper focuses on how individuals respond to inequity, which is related to moral behavior. Recent evidence shows that nonhuman primates distinguish between inequitable and equitable outcomes. However, this is primarily in situations in which inequity hurts the self (e.g. disadvantageous inequity) rather than another (e.g. advantageous inequity). Studying such responses can help us understand the evolutionary basis of moral behavior, which increases our understanding of how our own morality emerged.
Evolution: Education and Outreach, 2009
Abstract: After presenting Darwin’s own views on the evolution of the moral sense and the Victorian spectrum of opinion on the relevance of natural selection to morals, I go on to discuss the eugenics movement and the racialist assumptions of earlier Darwinians. There are echoes of these assumptions in a number of contemporary theorists, but evolutionary ethics has largely moved beyond them to explore instead the biological basis for altruism and co-operation as well as moralistic and political aggression.
Traits and functions in the evolution of morality
This paper is about evolutionary explanations. They come in different kinds but mostly need traits and functions. Evolutionary theory requires traits to be inheritable although not in a strong genetic sense: ideas of “inheritance pattern” and “inheritable pattern” are explored. Function is also a necessary concept, but complex and diverse, and it lacks causal power on traits. The debate on the evolution of morality is cautious and already far from naive “just-‐so story” explanations, but theoretical analysis fleshed into morality-‐related examples can aid towards the development of critically conscious and up-‐to-‐date explanatory hypotheses in this field.
Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation
2021
The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission of social norms. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. It then outlines a novel theory of moral cognition that I have previously argued explains these findings better than alternatives. Finally, it shows how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do—in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living.
An Evolutionary Vindication of Moral Facts
This paper addresses two general questions. First: is it possible to give an explanation in evolutionary terms for the behaviors, language, and sentiments that have been considered distinctly moral? Second: if such an evolutionary account is possible, what can its existence tell us about what morality is? I engage with a view typified by Richard Joyce in The Evolution of Morality (2006). This view answers the first question in the affirmative and the second by arguing that the existence of an evolutionary explanation of moral behavior, language, and sentiments should in fact lead us to agnosticism about the existence of morality, at least in the sense in which it has been commonly understood. I push back against Joyce’s arguments for moral agnosticism, instead arguing that the evolutionary account itself gives a foundation for a new kind of moral naturalism.