The Social Constructions and Experiences of Madness (original) (raw)
Related papers
An ideal disorder? Autism as a psychiatric kind
2017
In recent decades, attempts to explain autism have been frustrated by the heterogeneous nature of its behavioral symptoms and the underlying genetic, neural, and cognitive mechanisms that produce them. This has led some to propose eliminating the category altogether. The eliminativist inference relies on a conception of psychiatric categories as kinds defined by their underlying mechanistic structure. I review the evidence for eliminativism and propose an alternative model of the family of autisms. On this account, autism is a network category defined by a set of idealized exemplars linked by multiple levels of theoretically significant properties. I argue that this network model better captures the empirical phenomena, the historical growth of the category, and the ways the category has been shaped by social norms and interests. Finally, I defend a realist interpretation of network categories against the challenge from eliminativists.
Synthese, 2021
Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses.
The mismeasure of autism: a challenge to orthodox autism theory
Autonomy the Critical Journal of Interdisciplinary Autism Studies, 2013
Mismeasure of Man about the use of science to justify a subordinate role for women, poor people, and black people based on an unfounded thesis that itwas natural. Twenty years ago, in her article entitled The Mismeasure of Woman, the feminist writer Carol Tavris wrote of the domination of women by men. In the light of these works concerning the apparent mismeasure of certain people, I consider the position of autistic people in the context of their relationship with the predominant (typically developing) neurotype and, more specifically, the treatment of autism as adisorder. I review current orthodox autism theory -executive functioning, the extreme male brain theory, theory of mind, and weak central coherence -as well as various newer, and arguably neglected, theories including the enactive mindhypothesis, interaction theory, and the narrative practice hypothesis. I conclude that autism has been mismeasured by a predominant neurotype medical communityand propose a synthesis of autism theory that, in my view, provides a better explanation of autism than any synthesis of orthodox theory as well as providing support for my view that autism is natural human difference.
Does autism merit belief? : developing an account of scientific realism for psychiatry
2017
The PhD outlines criteria under which a psychiatric classification merits belief and, as a case study, establishes that autism merits belief. Three chapters respond to anti-realist arguments, three chapters establish conditions under which psychiatric classifications merit belief. Chapter one addresses the pessimistic meta-induction. I historically analyse autism to show there has been sufficient historical continuity to avoid the pessimistic meta induction. Chapter two considers arguments from underdetermination. I consider the strongest candidate for an alternative to autism, classificatory changes which occurred between 1980 and 1985. I argue this does not constitute underdetermination because those changes were methodologically and evidentially flawed. Chapter three considers theory-ladenness. I consider the two strongest candidates for background theories which might have a negative epistemic effect (cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis). I show these have little influence o...
The lack of emotional relations is not replaced by the " savant " characteristics (see Asperger syndrome) but by their immersing into stereotypic instincts. In other words, they compensate their divergent intrinsic emotions with imitated convergences (eg., the monotonous " convergence obsessed " logic of hammering, wringing hands etc.) Today's science cannot declare this to be convergent, especially for the fact that psychotic autist patients prove to be weak at convergence, but the male/female proportion reflects on notable facts (with Kanner syndrome it is 3:1 or 4:1, while Rett syndrome only affects females). Can we declare Kanner and Rett syndromes to be basically female brain disorders? Asperger-autism has been scientifically considered as a type of " male-brain disorder " since 1991 (Baron-Cohen theory). The proportion of male-female is approximately 6:1 with this disease. The author would like to demonstrate a very special case, the Asperger-autism as a " cognitive autism. " It is common to address autistic disorder as " pervasive " or " comprehensive " ontogenetic disorders because they affect all areas of adolescent psychological development negatively. But as the expression itself suggests, we are not aware of the specific disorders directly. As it will turn out we cannot deal with autism as on complex disorder, we should rather use the term in plural, i.e., autisms and autistic disorders.
The Construction of Autism: Between Reflective and Background Knowledge
Constructivist Foundations, 2021
Context Numerous analyses emphasize the historical variability and social construction of the autism category. As a result, many beliefs and stereotypes about autism function unconsciously in social awareness as background knowledge. Problem We present the results of a survey concerning the social perception of autism and we draw attention to the possible impact of the specific ways in which people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are perceived, as revealed in the survey, on how this social identity might be created. Method A questionnaire consisting of two parts-closed-ended questions and free associations-was used in the survey. 355 participants answered the questions concerning the nature of autism, its causes, sources of information and experiences in contact with people on the spectrum. Results The results shows that there exists a cognitively interesting divergence between the level of knowledge declared by the respondents, based on credible sources, which is indicative of a positive attitude toward people with ASD, and the more negative attitude seen in the free associations. Implications Despite the level of social reflective knowledge, relations between people with ASD and neurotypical people seem to be lined with feelings such as fear, anxiety or uncertainty. This should draw attention to the need for a deeper and more conscious analysis of societal beliefs about autism. Constructivist content The theoretical framework for this survey is social representations theory (SRT), which derives from the constructivist paradigm. By showing the important role of individuals' background knowledge in the construction of autism social representation, the results of the survey confirm the usefulness of the constructivist approach to the analysis of the autism phenomenon.
Doing Abstraction: Autism, Diagnosis, and Social Theory
Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic upsurge in the prevalence of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). As researchers have investigated the responsible sociohistorical conditions, they have neglected how clinicians determine the diagnosis in local encounters in the first place. Articulating a position "between Foucault and Goffman," we ask how the interaction order of the clinic articulates with larger-scale historical forces affecting the definition and distribution of ASD. First, we show how the diagnostic process has a narrative structure. Second, case data from three decades show how narrative practices accommodate to different periods in the history of the disorder, including changing diagnostic nomenclatures. Third, we show how two different forms of abstraction-Type A, which is categorical, and Type B, which is concrete and particular-inhabit the diagnostic process. Our analysis contributes to the sociology of autism, the sociology of diagnosis, the sociology of abstraction, and social theory.