Beyond Hempel: Reframing the Debate about Scientific Explanation (original) (raw)

Carl Hempel, "Two Models of Scientific Explanation"

9 0 5-1 9 9 7) classic account of explanation is widely known as the "cover ing-law model. " It includ es two species : the Deductive-Nomological Expla nation and the Probabilistic-Statistical Explanation . Since its introduction in the semi nal pape r co-autho red by Hempel and Paul Oppenh eim (1948), the model has been intense ly debated and criticized in the philosophy of scien ce literat ure. For although certain experiments are always necessary to serve as a basis for reasoning, nevertheless, once these experiments are given, we shou ld derive from them everything which anyone at all could possibly derive; and we shou ld even discover what experiments rema in to be done for the clarification of all furt her doubts. That would be an admira ble help, even in political science and medicine, to steady and perfect reasoning concerning given symptoms and circumstances. For even while there will not be enough given circumstances to form an infallible judgment, we shall always be able to determine what is most pro bable on the data given. And that is all that reaso n can do.

The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation

2017

While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other. The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation Kaetlin Dia...

[SpringerBriefs in Philosophy] Scientific Explanation || How to Study Scientific Explanation?

2013

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

1995: Scientific explanation: A critical survey

Foundations of Science, 1995

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabflistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, tile height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models.

Explanation Is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation

Social Science Research Network, 2002

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explains without drawing attention to causes-that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinct from that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes the explanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation of the standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physical theories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals or aspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insight for a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstone of a new theory of scientific method.

1995/1996: SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A CRITICAL SURVEY

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic why-explanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabflistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, tile height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models.

On Explanation: Aristotle and the Received View (Hempel)

As seems reasonably clear right off the bat; the nature of what we consider reasonable explanation has changed in the last couple of millennia. This is made clear by the obvious change in the understanding of the word 'we' in the previous statement. As the audience of science (or what could be considered a relatively continuous form of explanation of the universe around us) has changed so has what would be thus considered an adequate explanation. It should be rather straightforward then, that any comparison in this regard between Aristotle and Carl Hempel (approximately 2300 years apart) in terms of solely showing difference is not particularly insightful or useful. As a result, the attempt is here, is made to (first) understand the methods of explanation (in isolation) as discussed by both Aristotle (Book II; Physics) and Hempel (excerpt; Aspects of Scientific Explanation) and (then) predict what some possible interaction of these models would entail.

How to Study Scientific Explanation?

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.