A Review of “Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russian Republics (original) (raw)
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Ethnic and Nationalist Mobilization
Given the plethora of work in the field of nationalism and ethnic conflict since 1990, a review such as this can do little more than sketch some of the scholarly juggernaut’s main lines of advance and try to provide a reasonably concise overview. We begin by outlining the scope of the work and the dis- tinct European origins of the nationalism literature and American roots of the ethnic conflict field. We then move sequentially along lines laid out in figure 1, from theories of ethnicity and nationalism to a consideration of the litera- ture on ethnic conflict and violence. This follows into a discussion of democ- ratization and nationalism, including democracy in divided societies. Next we address domestic mobilizing actors such as ethnic fraternities, patriotic socie- ties and ethnic parties. The analysis is capped by an examination of the role of international, transnational and globalizing forces on the nation, and the impact of nationalism on foreign policy. This chapter will focus on advances in the study of ethnic and nationalist mobilization. In so doing, it will move from the microsoci- ological to the macropolitical, and shift from the distant past to the more recent period (Figure 1). Thus, we begin with an examination of indigenous, territorialized ‘primary’ ethnicity, and proceed to watch the ethnic phenome- non become transformed into political reality. Each stage of this process is analytically discrete and home to a distinct literature. We shall review each in turn.
This paper argues that nationalist movements in Russia can have a certain role to play in the Kremlin’s management of nationalism in the country, despite the fact that they might promote a very different form of nationalism than the state leadership itself. The aim is to show with the help of regime management theories that the existing nationalist movements are beneficial for the regime either by promoting values favourable to the regime or by forming a certain outlet for dissent, which is then easier for the regime to monitor. This does not mean that the movements selected for analysis couldn’t be self-sustainable and original, but the alternative they offer ideologically is rather shallow. Additionally, the paper aims to show how the management of the selected example movements can help to define and draw the limits of state nationalism: which ideas are supported, which are repressed, and which perhaps replaced? By way of a conclusion, it is suggested that the selected example movements represent the vast field of contemporary Russian nationalism that is managed by the regime, which combines ethnic and civic features of nationalism and uses it as an ideological tool.
American Journal of Sociology, 2002
This book begins with Tony Kushner's oldest living Bolshevik lamenting the failure of one grand theory and seeking another. Marla Brettschneider presents a grand democratic theory that could be supported by activists and scholars sharing the concerns of people of color, women, gays and lesbians, young people, and others politically marginalized within the United States. Radical democratic theory is a politics of recognition and respect for a U.S. political environment of social diversity across and within communities, as all-encompassing as the Bolshevik's grand theory, but not as decisive. Brettschneider asks important questions of and for contemporary radical democratic theory: "What does it mean to theorize democracy from the margins of society? Can we learn to listen to each other and to those historically disenfranchised?" (p. 201). The book is a call for contemporary radical democratic theorists to focus our attention on these questions, a critique of those contemporary democratic theorists who do not, and a recognition of the collective theory-building enterprise in which those who have been following a similar calling are engaged. She urges contemporary democratic theorists to understand groups and communities as dynamic entities with histories of disagreement and internal dissent. The focus of the book is not, however, an explicit exposition of Brettschneider's historical method for contemporary democratic theory. Such a focus would have helped the reader understand how her approach differs from scholars who share her interest. (Her first book employs her method in the study of Jewish identity politics and democratic theory [1996]). Instead, in this book, she provides an historically and theoretically informed account of contemporary radical democratic theory. She describes an identity politics that is substantially delinked from Marxist class analysis and in which minority groups and communities seek recognition and respect (Chapters 2 and 4). Relying not on activists at the margins themselves, but primarily on well-published scholaractivists, including
The Russian nationalist movement at low ebb
Russia Before and After Crimea. Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press., 2018
In this chapter I will consider changes in Russian nationalist movement, which we may witness ‘after the Crimea’. I will explore nationalist activities conducted from below, not by the authorities. But taking into account the whole spectrum of relations between the authorities and nationalists, including manipulations and repressions. I will show, how Russian nationalist movement, which in its current form had been formed in mid-2000-s, started to decline from the very beginning of 2010-s, while it was not obvious. Russian ultrarights looked not very strong but rather promising before the Ukrainian war, while they were busy with internal problem already. Since the war had started, splits on the issue whom to support in this war, and growing repressions on behalf of the authorities coming soon after that, made the crisis in the movement visible and accelerated the processes of the total decline. I will analyze these processes from the beginning of the war in Spring 2014 till parliamentary election in September 2016, focusing separately on pro-Kremlin and oppositional nationalists. The latter in fact are separated for pro- and anti-‘Novorosiya’ sectors, which will be explored separately. Special attention will be paid to so called national-democrats. The chapter includes the reviews of visible nationalists organizations and groups as we can see them for September 2016. There are several parameters which have to be taken into account: level of activities on the streets (rallies and public gatherings), violent activity (from brutal hate crimes to so called raids, rather mild for these groups), involvement in Ukrainian events, relationships with other nationalist groups and non-nationalist forces, construction and deconstruction of coalitions, participation in parliamentary elections. The chapter is not much focused on ideological trends in nationalist milieu, because these issues were studied before, but it’s obvious, that the future of the Russian nationalist movement in general depends on making ideological choices to not less extent than on looking for new sources for recruiting new activists. And these two major challenges, which nationalists meet now, are interrelated.
Theory and Society, 1996
In the preceding analysis, I attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of some of Weber's key theoretical ideas on nations, nationalism, and imperialism by way of a comparative examination of contemporary Russian and Serbian nationalism. More specifically, I try to show how long-term historical and institutional legacies, shared memories, and defining political experiences, played themselves out in the contemporary period, influencing the different availability of mass constituencies in Russia and Serbia for nationalist mobilization under the auspices of new “empire-saving coalitions.” But political outcomes are never wholly pre-determined as historical legacies are subject to different cultural interpretations and political contest. To put it simply, nationalism is made and remade by politicians and ideologists; and there is no need to gloss over the frequently bloody and unpredictable consequences of their struggles with unduly abstract sociological generalizations. Instead, we should theorize our narratives, while giving contingency its place. I suggest that the presence of a highly symbolic issue (such as the World War Two experiences of Serbs in Croatia, the mythology of Kosovo, Sevastopol or the mythology of the Russian fleet), which touches on the core historical mythology of one “nation,” but is contested by another on different grounds (demographic, ethnic, or for reasons of “historical justice,” for example) increases the likelihood of national conflicts. Once highly symbolic issues are involved, national conflicts quickly assume the form of struggles over “ultimate values” not subject to compromise and conflict-regulation. However, as the Russian case demonstrates, other symbolic legacies (the experience of Stalinism) might be powerful enough to override nationalism. I also suggest in this article a few simple ways in which we can interpret, and possibly, test the likelihood of the emergency of national conflicts: the significance of prestige considerations, the absence of compensatory mechanisms such as economic prosperity, the egalitarian character of nationalist appeals, the dynamic of status-reversal, and the theory of the superimposition of conflicts. To understand the exclusivist overtones of much of contemporary nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, it would also be necessary to pay more attention to the political-cultural and social-structural legacy of Communist rule. The prevalence of uncompromising stances among political leaders, the absence of mechanisms of conflict-regulation, the hostility to proceduralism and legal mechanisms as a means of resolving the emerging “national questions,” and the appeal of the new nationalism to “state-dependent” and traditionalist strata are among the most important elements of this legacy.
Contemporary Russian nationalisms: the state, nationalist movements, and the shared space in between
For several years, various nationalist groups and the Russian state have been competing over nationalism as a political concept and for popular support to nationalist claims. This paper analyzes the relationship between the state and anti-government, ethnocentric nationalistic groups that gather annually in an event called “the Russian March.” Emphasis is on the change in that relationship that happened in 2014, when the state added efforts to channel and mobilize the nationalists to its previous repressive and controlling measures. The article conceptualizes the competition over the nationalist argument in contemporary Russia as a case of dissentful and consentful contention in hybrid regimes, and shows how the dissentful nationalists have been forced to make way for the more consentful ones. Until recently, the room for maneuver for the radical nationalists was relatively wide. The events in Ukraine, however, divided the nationalists, and since 2014 radical nationalists have faced increased state repression. At the same time, pro-government nationalist actors have strengthened, and new players have appeared in the field. These developments tell us not only about the Kremlin’s diminished tolerance for dissentful contention, but also about the importance of the nationalist argument in Russian politics today. FULLTEXT AVAILABLE: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00905992.2016.1272562