Feeling the Life of the Mind: Mere Judging, Feeling, and Judgment (original) (raw)
Related papers
Kant-Studien, 2024
It is well known that Kant connects judgment and feeling in the third Critique. However, the precise relationship between these two faculties remains virtually unexplored, in large part due to the unpopularity of Kant's faculty psychology. This paper considers why, for Kant, judgment and feeling go together, arguing that he had good philosophical reasons for forging this connection. The discussion begins by situating these faculties within Kant's mature faculty psychology. While the 'power of judgment' [Urteilskraft] is fundamentally reflective, feeling [Gefühl] reveals itself as essentially non-discursive. Their systematic connection emerges through the principle of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit], which the former legislates for the latter. I claim that we must understand this notion in terms of the suitability of the faculties for each other, as displayed in mere reflection. That is, we can only recognize the fitness of two things for each other through feeling, which, in turn, is the only way that we can engage in the activity of merely reflecting judgment. I conclude by gesturing at an even further way in which judgment and feeling are related, based on their mutual role in orienting all of the faculties of the human mind.
A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1
Mind, 2019
The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire (§2), I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition (§3) and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, the...
Towards a Transcendental Critique of Feeling (A Response to Grenberg)
2016
This paper focuses on responding to Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that my discussion of Kant’s feeling of respect leaves no meaningful room for investigating feeling first-personally. I first make clear that I do think that feelings can be investigated first-personally, both in that they can be prospective reasons for action and in that – at least in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment – there are feelings that we should have (for aesthetic reasons). I then show that at the time of writing the “Incentives” chapter of the second Critique, Kant had not yet determined an a priori basis for aesthetic (or affective) normativity. On this basis, I argue that the “Incentives” chapter provides a sort of consolation prize for not (yet) having an transcendental account of feeling. In that sense, it’s a properly transcendental analysis of feeling in which Kant examines feeling from within and a priori to show that there are good (moral) reasons to have certain feelings. I end by acknowledging t...
Kant and the Feeling of Life: Beauty and Nature in the Critique of Judgment (Introduction)
SUNY Press, 2024
Immanuel Kant’s critical project is thought to have achieved its systematic completion in his third Critique, the Critique of Judgment. In this book Kant investigates two domains of experience: the aesthetic and the teleological. These experiences are analysed and discussed in two distinct parts of the work: one part is devoted to the beautiful and the sublime, the other is devoted to the natural world. Both parts have had powerful impacts on a variety of fields beyond philosophy proper: art theory, political theory, and conceptions of the natural world have all taken clues from Kant’s Critique of Judgment. However, one of the puzzles of Kant’s discussion—and a puzzle not easily solved—concerns the unity of the book itself. How do the two parts belong together? Can Kant’s analysis of judgment be understood as a unified project in the end? This question takes us to the heart of his analysis of judgment. One suggestion has been that this unity can be found by focusing on what Kant calls the “Lebensgefühl” or “feeling of life”. Although Kant makes use of this concept at key junctures in the Critique of Judgment, and indeed at points across his corpus, the significant role played by ‘life’ for Kant remains significantly understudied as an area of sustained investigation. This volume contributes to filling that gap, bringing together essays focused on Kant’s conception of life as a throughline for approaching his work, with readings aimed at identifying its connection to Kant’s discussions of the imagination, of our experience of beauty and of the sublime, our approach to the organism, and our understanding of politics and morality. Taken together, these essays serve as an occasion for discovering a keystone concept for understanding the connection and unity of Kant’s Critique of Judgment.
A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings
Mind, 2019
The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function-and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term 'emotion' nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as 'feelings'. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire (§2), I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition (§3) and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively.
Aesthetic Comprehension of Abstract and Emotion Concepts: Kant's Aesthetics Renewed
In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward a view that the feeling of pleasure in the experience of the beautiful can be stimulated not merely by perceptual properties, but by ideas and thoughts as well. The aim of this paper is to argue that aesthetic ideas fill in the emptiness that abstract and emotion concepts on their own would have without empirical intuitions. That is, aesthetic ideas make these concepts more accessible to us, by creating image schemas that allow us to think about these abstract concepts in a way linked to sensory experience, thereby imbuing them with a more substantive meaning and understanding.
On Aesthetic Judgments and Contemplative Perception in the Critique of the Power of Judgment
Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2020
The paper argues that much of Kant’s largely formalistic account of aesthetic appreciation stands on the idea that the judger is able to engage with the object of her judgment purely sensibly and hence non-conceptually or non-cognitively. This is to say that the judger must be able to ground her judgment on the immediate sensory affection by the object (which makes her judgment an aesthetic judgment of sense) or on the object’s sensible form (which makes her judgment an aesthetic judgment of taste). The paper also argues that these two purely sensible grounds, accessible in the aesthetic examination of objects, underlie the feeling involved in such judgments. In broader terms, the paper outlines how Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment suggests what might be called a contemplative model of perception.
2001
""It might at first seem that the senses (the five traditionally recognized conduits of outer sense) would have very little to contribute to an investigation of Kant's aesthetics. Is not Kant's aesthetic theory based on a relation of the higher cognitive faculties? Much however can be revealed by asking to what degree sight is essential to aesthetic judgment (of beauty and the sublime) as Kant describes it in the 'Critique of Judgment.' Here the sublime receives particular attention." Published in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses [Kant and the Berlin Enlightenment: Proceedings of the 9th International Kant Congress] 5 vols., ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), Vol. 3, pp. 512-519."