Norm and Truth (original) (raw)
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2020
The text examines the status of the truth in the legal norms, trying to answer the questions of whether they can be a subject to a truth assessment and, if such assessment is possible, how a truth value can be attributed to legal norms. To achieve this goal, first of all, the text discusses some basic linguistic conceptions concerning the nature and truth of legal norms and subsequently, a complex approach is being proposed for attributing truth-value to legal norms. On the one hand, the latter’s being studied by the methods of deontic logic and theory of possible worlds, and on the other hand, their relation to truth is being explained by semantic anti-realism.
Towards a Sigmatics of the Word ‘Norm’: An Ontological Turn in the Semiotics of the Normative
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique
During the twentieth century, the development of semiotics and philosophy of language had a great influence on the investigation of normative phenomena, particularly within the philosophy of law: the analysis of normative language became the prevalent methodological approach among many legal philosophers, and the science of law was frequently understood as an analysis of the object language of law. This approach led to the development of a linguistic ontology of the normative and to a semiotic theory of the validity of norms, in which norms are conceived of as linguistic entities, and their validity is accordingly conceived of as a predicate of normative sentences. However, the resort to a semiotic approach for the investigation of normative phenomena does not necessarily imply the adoption of a linguistic ontology of norms. The semiotic analysis of the possible referents of the word ‘norm’ elaborated by Conte (“Studio per una teoria della validità”, Giappichelli, Torino [1970]1995;...
The paper aims at formulating a certain trilemma that applies to justifying moral norms. The trilemma can be succinctly stated as follows: any attempt to derive a “moral-ought statement” from an “is-statement” with a justificatory goal (i.e. to justify the “moral-ought statement”), even if it were successful in its “derivation” part (i.e. logically correct), would be unsuccessful in its “justificatory” part for one of the following three reasons: (1) it would consider each human action of which a factual statement can be made as morally obligatory, thus “justifying” a large number of implausible moral norms; or (2) it would presuppose a moral norm not derivable from facts; or (3) it would not explain why the distinction – made based on extra-moral criteria – between those factual statements about human actions from which moral norms can be derived and those from which they cannot be derived should count as morally relevant. The trilemma is illustrated in the paper by an analysis of Searle’s well-known attempt at deriving “ought” from “is”. Some further implications of the trilemma regarding the proper way of justifying moral norms are also examined.
In this paper, we intend to reexamine our view of norms as twofold objects, with a mental and social side, and a fundamental mechanism of the micro-macro link. In the light of what has been said in Volume 1 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Pattaro 2005), some aspects of a theory developed elsewhere by the authors will be reconsidered. With regard to the mental side of norms, the main properties of normative beliefs will be reconsidered and some issues emerging from a reading of Pattaro will be addressed, in particular, (i) normative autonomy, (ii) norm acceptance, and (iii) the interplay between norms and goals. With regard to the external side, a unitary view, bridging the gap between conventions and norms, will be put forward, and some steps will be taken towards defining a notion of external (i.e., impersonal) commands, conceived of as a dimension in which both norms and conventions are situated. Finally the applicability of this notion to the study of norm innovation will be discussed.
The Polish 20th Century Philosophers' Contribution to the Theory of Imperatives and Norms
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2011
Inquiries concerning the theory of imperatives and norms prosecuted in Poland in the 20 th century covered practically the whole scope of this theory. In a uniform conceptual scheme, the paper shows main results of this research done mostly within the Lvov-Warsaw School tradition. It begins with presenting the Polish theoreticians' approach to three correlated theoretical situations containing our preferences (opposed to impulses, decisions and tendencies), accepted values and imposed obligations. The second step is discussing their views on means of verbalising these situations, i.e. by help of imperatives, evaluations and norms (opposed to consultatives, instructions and optatives) correspondingly. The paper is closed with examining the Polish logicians' trials of reconstruction of imperative-normative argumentation.
Normative decision is a choice called upon to substantiate aims of the normative authority (for example a legislator, judge or moral reformer). The latter wants to transform the real world as per its deontic alternatives. Decision is based on knowledge of: the real world, the typical characteristics of human behaviour, and the postulated possible worlds of the valid law. It spells out knowledge of the valid normative system and of social facts subject to normative regulation. It is true that this knowledge is usually insufficient, but it is conducive to a set of admissible decisions. Herein lies the possibility for free choice on the part of a the legislator or an law interpreter. A knowledge underlying a normative decision can be either true or false. It bears on norms as well: a norm should measure up to defined aims and values and to accumlated empirical knowledge determining its veracity. This type of truthfulness can be understood in the context of the coherent theory of truth. Cit.:16) BOUZOV,V.,2004, Norms as Decisions – in: ARHE, Casopis za filozofii, N2, Novi Sad, pp.113-117.
P. Theodorou, P. Alves, A. Baka (eds). Phenomenology of Law and Normativity (Springer 2024)
2024
This collective volume fills an important scholarly gap against the widespread, mainstream take on the philosophy of law and the sphere of social acts and social realities. It revisits and reinvigorates the phenomenological account of some of the major questions and themes of jurisprudence such as the nature and structure of social acts and social realities, the texture of the sphere of praxis, the foundations of law, ethics, and economics, and the fundamental issue of the normativity of positive law. This volume argues that wherever there is a demand for grounding law and aspects of its context, the phenomenological method can provide a priori—albeit corrigible in their application—access to essential truths about the corresponding elements of interest. The present work reflects upon the place in and potential impact on the theory of law and its context of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl—largely overlooked by legal philosophers and legal theorists. Further coverage contains those who have built upon these ideas of Husserl, such as Alfred Schutz, Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Adolf Reinach. The contributions address new issues and questions from the general perspective of the phenomenology of law, of normativity, and of the sphere of social acts and social realities. It is a response to the received view of legal positivism by presenting informed arguments in support of the view that phenomenology has the potential to achieve a deeper grasp of legal normative concepts such as rights, claims, obligations, promises, and apologies. Boundaries between law and morality as well as legal and social ontologies are also approached from a phenomenological perspective. The present volume appeals to students, researchers, and professionals working in phenomenology, ethics, legal philosophy, and human rights theory and practice.
Constitutive, Prescriptive, Technical or Ideal? On the Ambiguity of the Term "Norm"
Normativity, Meaning, the Promise of Phenomenology, eds. and Matthew Burch, Jack E. Marsh and Irene McMullin, London: Routledge., 2019
The paper starts by pointing out that the terms "normative" and "norm" operate in several different senses in contemporary phenomenology. It distinguishes between three main contexts in which these terms are used today: first, analyses of the basic structures of intentionality; second, investigations of interested perception and the dynamics of appearing; and third, discussions of the experiential grounds of ethics. In these three contexts, the terms "norm" and "normative" are used in different meanings and with different connotations. The basic ideas of regulation, rule-following, and correctness are implied by all usages, but the types of rules and the types of correctness at issue vary. In order to organize the field, the paper distinguishes between six different and mutually irreducible senses of the term "norm" and identifies several ambiguous usages in which these senses conflate. The paper ends by suggesting a practical solution for the specification of phenomenological discourses on normativity.