Ironic imperialism: how Russian patriots are reclaiming postmodernism (original) (raw)
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esearch on Russian foreign policy has until recently been dominated by conventional descriptive studies based on politicized and moralizing either pro-Russian or anti-Russian narratives. Some constructivist researchers have tried to produce more reflective studies grounded in modern theories of international relations. Much has been written about Russia’s uneasy relations with Europe both in Russia and the West. However, there has been a noticeable lack of intellectual effort to apply postcolonial analysis to this problem. The book by Viacheslav Morozov is an interesting attempt to bridge international relations with postcolonial theory in Russian studies. Chapter 1 of the book makes a case for the application of postcolonial theory to gain a deeper understanding of the tensions and contradictions of Russia’s international standing. Specifically, it advances the thesis of Russia as a “subaltern empire.”1 The concept of subaltern is borrowed from postcolonial theory and refers, according to Morozov, to an oppressed nation deprived of subjectivity and ability to articulate its own narrative. By combining the two concepts, “subaltern” and “empire,” the book argues that the country is simultaneously part of both the global imperial core and the Western periphery. This mixed experience has resulted in a unique state of Russian identity, which Morozov defines as “hybrid subjectivity,” another term borrowed from postcolonial studies. Hybrid subjectivity, according to Morozov’s interpretation of postcolonial studies, is a situation when the colonized subject is able to mimic the discourse of the colonizer, thus subverting it and making colonial domination a profoundly ambiguous phenomenon. To illustrate this condition, Morozov uses the example of the group of Hindus, who study the Gospel but refuse to accept that it was introduced to them by Europeans. Similarly to Indians, who accept the universality of Christian values, but refuse to acknowledge their origin in the European culture, Russia, [End Page 463] even when it opposes the West, nevertheless frames its own demands in the “Western” language (Pp. 23–24). Drawing on this frame of analysis, the chapter concludes that the added value of the postcolonial perspective is its ability to explain uneasiness in Russian–European relations and to demonstrate that the only subject on the horizon of Russian politics is the West itself (Pp. 6, 157–164). Chapter 2 of the book provides a critical overview of several strands of the reflectivist international relations literature (postcolonial, constructivist, and critical revisions of the English school). In particular, the book argues that a variety of constructivist scholars, especially those who explicitly pursue the task of theorizing Russian schools of international relations, eventually end up analyzing their own identity rather than the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of the field. Furthermore, the book argues that even though separate constructivist studies identified similar patterns of the discursive landscape in Russia, China, Iran, and Japan, most of them still pursue a case-focused approach, which does not allow generalizations about the nature of identity, discourse, and othering mechanisms. Postcolonial theory, according to Morozov, allows a comparative perspective and can account for this pattern (P. 44). Another limitation of the constructivist school, namely, its in-ability to take into account material factors, is addressed in chapter 3. In describing Russia’s economic dependency on the West, Morozov combines approaches by Alexander Etkind, Boris Kagarlitsky, and Vsevolod Sergeev. He concludes that external economic rationale (demand for fur, hemp flax, timber, grain, and currently gas imported by Russia to Europe) reveal the interrupted pattern of the country’s uneven and combined development as a semiperiphery of the capitalist core over the past several centuries (P. 89). The persistence of this extractive economy model leads to identification between the security apparatus and the state per se. The preponderance of a centralized and militarized state with its grip over the economy, as well as the persistence of resource-oriented economic development has constituted the two main distinctive features of Russia up to today (P. 94). The colonization of vast Eurasian space by Russian elites strengthened this pattern and eventually led...
FORUM University of Edinburgh Postgraduate Journal of Culture & The Arts, 2018
This paper explores the reappearance of the dissident in Russian contemporary literature following Putin’s rise to power, focussing in particular on how the country’s formerly highbrow dissident counterculture is now moving closer to the realm of popular culture. Tracing the link between the intelligentsia, literature, and dissent all the way up to the supposed death of all three phenomena in the post-collapse years, this article argues that a dissident revival is not only ongoing, but directly linked to Putin’s manipulation of historical consciousness and the nostalgia discourse in Russia. Using Boris Akunin, one of Russia’s most popular contemporary writers, as an example, this paper demonstrates how his activity as an author and a public figure has changed in reaction to Putin’s totalitarian turn in politics, resulting in an increasingly more pointed counter-narrative to the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse on history. Through sketching Akunin’s artistic principles as a writer and addressing the importance of the nostalgia discourse for post-Soviet Russia’s identity struggles, this article will discuss how Akunin’s exploration of the intersection between popular culture and highbrow literature may be indicative of a modernisation of the entire Russian intelligentsia tradition and pointing towards the future of literary dissent in Russia.
Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 2001
eliminate the not infrequent mistakes and typos. The illustrations should be more closely integrated with the argumentation and analysis.. This is an interesting and substantial collection of articles. What it is not, however, is a post-Soviet primer on post-modernism. While the oppositions evident in the topics discussed above fit the current popular framework of conflicting "constructed identities," for the most part this interpretive matrix can either be replaced by older interpretive frameworks with no less, and probably more, explanatory power or is not actually practiced in the articles. The arguments about "constructed identity" by Schleifman and Holquist could just as easily be recast as pursuit of economic selfinterest by locality, center, and Cossackry respectively in an explanatory matrix that predates Marx. Engel presents a case for inclusion of women, using post-modernist terminology-"problematize the narrative"-but otherwise not distinguished from longstanding arguments of feminists. The articles on the Orthodox Church and multiparty politics are straightforward historical narratives with barely a nod to postmodernism. Kosach's article most comfortably assumes the contours of postmodernist argumentation. This is not accidental. T'he post-modernist approach works best when its subject is un-self-conscious. In both Mozhaisk and with the Cossackry folk are pursuing the time-honored practice of naked self-interest, so pointing out that the emperor has no clothes is not particularly revelatory. That does not mean that post-modernism is inapplicable to either Mozhaisk or Cossackry, but it does mean that the sources utilized should come from ordinary people who are un-self-conscious representatives of the Mozhaisk sacredotal vision or the Cossack claim for ethnicity. This collection is valuable because of the content of the articles, and it would have been better had it not been stretched to fit a post-modernist mold..
Anti-war Russophone Poetry after Feb. 24, 2022: Reinterpreting Russian History and Culture
2024
Since launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, Russian authorities have provided several narratives to justify their aggressive actions and war crimes. According to the first, their war is only a response to the actions of the "Nazis"; therefore, the current war is a continuation of the Great Patriotic War in which Russia defeated Hitler. The second asserts the superiority of Russian culture over Ukrainian and explains the attack on Ukraine by the desire to protect the Russian language and culture on Ukrainian territory. Both of these narratives can be categorized as ressentiment, a term coined by Nietzsche that refers to a feeling of hostility towards an individual who is deemed responsible for one's failures or hardships. This reaction involves glorifying an idealized past and vehemently opposing anything associated with the freedom and cultural values of another. Russophone anti-war poetry written after February 24th, both in Russia and abroad, deconstructs these propaganda narratives and offers its own narrative strategy for talking about Russian history, which I term the poetics of "de-ressentiment." This essay analyzes anti-war poems by Russian-speaking poets and identifies the principles and tasks of de-ressentiment in the context of Russia's catastrophic policies. The paper explores how Russian-language anti-war poetry tries to find the right language to discuss the most traumatic topics in Russian history and proposes a total revision of Russian history and culture. This de-ressentiment revision should break free modern Russia's destructive focus on its past that deprives it of any future.