Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond (original) (raw)
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Islamist Movements and the Process of Political Development in the Middle East
2 When I was at the Department [of State], we pursued a policy of excluding the radical fundamentalists in Algeria, even as we recognized that this was somewhat at odds with our support of democracy. Generally speaking, when you support democracy, you take what democracy gives you. […] If it gives you a radical Islamic fundamentalist, you're supposed to live with it. We didn't live with it in Algeria because we felt that the radical fundamentalists' views were so adverse to what we believe in and what we support, and to what we understood the national interests of the United States to be. And so, you can't put down a hard and fast rule to apply in each and every case. James A. Baker III, September 1994 1 Present day autocrats are continuing to bargain with their people: their very existence and identity in exchange for yet again foregoing freedom and democracy. With the same cynicism, Arab autocrats are trying to strike another bargain with the West: either you support us (autocrats) or face the deluge (Muslim fanatics). Of the three forces competing for Arab public space, autocrats have a monopoly of state coercive powers and resources and have used them brutally. Theocrats have the monopoly of the mosque and the claim of virtue and have used them shrewdly and loudly. Democrats are squeezed in between, outgunned by the autocrats and outnumbered by the theocrats, but with claims of legitimacy and the support of a silent majority. Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, November 2006 2 America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them. And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments -provided they govern with respect for all their people.
Political Islam and the Arab Uprisings
Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings: Governance, Pluralisation and Contention, 2018
This book emerges from the observation that much has changed in the field of political Islam following the popular uprisings that rocked the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010-11, nowadays widely referred to as the Arab uprisings or 'Arab Spring'. Prominent instances of such change include the dramatic rise to (and fall from) power of moderate Islamist political parties/groupings in Egypt and Tunisia-forces that had been violently repressed and/or dismantled by pre-uprisings authoritarian regimes-, the pluralisation of the field of Islamist political players, including most notably the formation of Salafi parties and their ascent to political prominence in electoral and institutional politics, the escalation of sectarian conflict between the region's Sunni and Shi'a communities, exacerbated by war in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, as well as the emergence of the jihadi-Salafi organisation al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS) which advances formal ruling pretentions over territories in Syria and Iraq, a new quality to such groups. All of these developments suggest that a renewed analysis and approach to the study of Islamist political and social actors are needed. While extant pre-uprisings scholarship had already noted part of these dynamics and devoted efforts to their analysis-such as for instance the case of Salafi participation in electoral politics, or the growing relevance of the sectarian variable in MENA politics-it can hardly account for their development in the new environment that the 'Arab Spring' has brought about. A cursory look at the scholarship available on the subject of political Islam post-2011 seems to suggest, in fact, that the uprisings constitute just one phase in the long history of Islamist political and social forces present in the MENA, a history characterised by periods of political opposition, inclusion and co-option by authoritarian leaders.
The Islamist Movements in Transition
2013
The post‐revolutionary process in the countries of the MENA region witnessed the rise to power of Is‐ lamist parties and their public dominion. After a year and a half, a strong reaction came from the op‐ position camp that felt threatened by their overwhelming power. This conflict is a struggle between two types of middle class that have different visions of the nation‐state. Furthermore, the social liber‐ alization process encouraged the rise of a second Islamist bloc, the Salafist. While the scriptural and political Salafists accept the rules of democracy and present themselves on the electoral scene as competitors of the Ikhwani parties, the Salafist‐jihadists remain on an anti‐systemic level of confronta‐ tion. The example of Ansar al‐Sharia in Tunisia shows the complexity of the Salafi jihadi movement of the last generation that emerges as the social movement of a disenfranchised youths that failed to be integrated.
Subsequent to 9/11 the conclusion was drawn that the prevalence of authoritarianism in the Middle East undermined Western interests by contributing to the emergence of Islamist terrorism. This paper argues that there is no evidence that a causal relationship exists between the democratic deficit in the Middle East and the emergence of Islamist terrorism. The paper explores the three main types of Islamist terrorism: the transnational terrorism of al Qaeda; the Islamist terrorism associated with national liberation movements such as Hamas and Hizbullah; and Islamist terrorism in the context of domestic insurgencies such as the Egyptian Gamaat Islamiya and the Algerian GIA. The case studies show that the Islamist movements' lack of political participation and repression contributed to radicalisation in some cases, but not in others. The paper also explores the obverse argument, whether political participation leads to the emergence of non-violent Islamism. The Turkish Justice and Development Party, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Tunisian Nahda and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front are studied in this context. The evidence, again, is mixed: the moderation of some movements is clearly linked to their being included in the political process, but in other cases repression had the same outcome.