State-society relations and inter-communal dynamics in conflict: Non-Muslim minorities in post-IS Iraq (original) (raw)
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Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaeans in Iraq: A Survival Issue
introduction Iraq is a home for some of the oldest minority communities in the Middle East, such as the Christians, the Yazidis, and the Mandaeans. Their number in Iraq has been decreasing since April 2003. They have been the target of extreme Islamist groups—whether Sunni or Shiite— to eliminate them physically or to destroy their places of worship, shops, and even their homes. Most of Iraq's minorities have left their homes for safer areas or for exile. Their situation is deteriorating greatly, despite the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and conscious. In my paper, I am examining the current conditions of the religious minorities in Iraq since the fall of the former regime in April 2003. Most of these people were the early people to inhabit Mesopotamia. Losing them through physical elimination, intimidation, and immigration will deprive Iraq of its mosaic composition. I am studying the surge of violence against such religious minorities in Iraq, exploring why such offenses are committed, and what motivates the perpetua-tors to commit such acts. I will pay special attention to the minorities' recent exodus from Iraq to neighboring countries. Data is collected by examining minorities' literature, current political history, news of current events, and interviews with some of these minorities living abroad. This study will shed light on the plight of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq who are confronted with harsh conditions since law and order was shattered in Iraq. The study will investigate the major causes of the Iraqi minority's recent exodus from Iraq to neighboring countries of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and elsewhere. Are minorities leaving Iraq because of economic, social, religious, ethnic, or security reasons or a combination of some, or all of these factors? It is important in the time of reconstruction and building a civil society in Iraq to solve the minorities' issues in a free, plural, and federal Iraq. After concluding my research, I will offer some policy recommendations to the Iraqi authorities or to other concerned parties, to maintain a culturally diverse society, whether the solution will be resettlement out
Conference Report: Return and Recovery of the Yezidi and Christian Minorities in Iraq
OPEN THINK TANK, 2019
Since 2014 and the rise of terrorism by the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region turned into a haven and a home to a displaced religious, ethnic and cultural diversity in Iraq. Among the IDPs, there are Kurds, Yezidis, Chaldo-Assyrians, Turkmen, Armenians and Arabs, Kakais, Shabaks, etc. Meanwhile, the suffering was not limited to the Christian and Yezidi communities, but all the societies of both countries continue to suffer from the consequences of the ISIS’s reign of terror and the effects of the fight against the organization. This is especially true for ethnic and religious minorities that faced systematic persecution and displacement by the jihadi groups, mainly ISIS. However, Christian and Yezidi minorities were most targeted minorities of ISIS for two reasons. The first one is ideological as those two minorities are not Muslim. The second reason geographical. Areas were ISIS was mostly active in Iraq were mixed areas such as Ninihav plain and mountain Sinjar. . Since the beginning of the crisis, the Kurdistan Region hosts more than 300.000 Yezidi Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the Ninawa Province, particularly from the Sinjar region. With a lack of serious reconstruction efforts in their home region, the Yezidi community in Iraq faces an uncertain future. Similarly, the once vibrant Iraqi Christian community has suffered years of oppression and displacement that have resulted in an ongoing exodus. Because of such trends, Iraq’s Christian community and heritage is at stake. The Popular Mobilization forces PMF also pose a series threat to the return of those IDPs to their areas. This state-owned militia has grown considerably in size, power and leverage. It controls massive areas in Iraq, including Christian and Yazidi areas. Members of PMF militia reject to withdrew from the IDPs areas or allow the return of the population using various pretexts, including the presence of mines and remnants of war, as well as allegations of the possible return of IS. It is important to mention here that PMF is in Sinjar mainly to have access to Syria. Similar is the case in the Anbar area. Currently, Kurdistan Region hosts nearly 1.5 million IDPs and refugees. According to the KRG Ministry of Interior’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC,), only 32000 of this number have either returned to their homes or migrated to a third country. This one-day conference focused on the current socio-economic and security situation of the Yezidi and Christian communities in Iraq. The conference aimed to identify the challenges that both communities face. In particular, it focused on identifying the needs of these minorities as well as on debating concrete policies and measures that can ensure the persistence of both Yezidis and Christians in Iraq.
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022
This study addresses the forced migration and internal displacement of ethnic and religious minorities in the so-called disputed areas of Iraq, with a focus on the Yazidi minority. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the populations of these areas, especially non-Muslim religious minorities, have been targeted by jihadi organisations and armed groups. This persecution reached its peak following the invasion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014 and the perpetration of genocide against the Yazidi minority, which fled or was forcibly displaced to Kurdish areas in the north and Arab areas in central and southern Iraq. The Yazidi minority was almost entirely uprooted and displaced to cities in the Kurdistan Region. This study covers contextual developments and gaps related to an Iraqi minority in the disputed areas, discussing the factors and obstacles preventing the return of displaced Yazidis to the Sinjar region.
Special Report, 2016
Executive Summary Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh. The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the ‘Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan’ is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic. The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq. The research team noted the phenomenon of militarization of the communities, as a result of the aforementioned polarization. With the exception of Zoroastrians and Jews, all the other communities have established military units or militias to fight against ISIS, either on KRG’s side or the central government’s side. Given that these militias do not intend to disband after the ousting of ISIS, they will play an important role in the Erbil-Baghdad rivalry. Meanwhile, the Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities are highly likely to be driven into conflict. In the case of the Christian community, the religious leadership opposes militarization, as it deems that the protection of Christians is the mandate of the official state authorities. In addition, the religious leadership has been accused of having a ‘passive’ stance, an accusation, which together with its opposition to the arming of Christians, has engendered a rift between the political and the religious leadership. Particularly vulnerable are the over 2 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraqi Kurdistan, whose population is estimated to be 5 million. The refugees and IDPs seem to be affected by the aid budget reductions, but they are also at risk of drawing the hostility of the host community, who might consider hem passive recipients of governmental assistance. The return of IDPs is a thorny issue, not only because of the possible revenge attacks, but also due to the total destruction of some regions. The lack of resources and, in some cases, the lack of willingness to reconstruct the regions renders the return of IDPs a point of contention. In this context, the emigration flows are expected to increase significantly, particularly among the Christian and the Yazidi communities. The cooperation between the communities is rudimentary. The initiatives for dialogue are limited both between the communities and within each community, either because dialogue comes second in the urgency of fighting ISIS or because similar initiatives have failed in the past. In general, the communities seem to promote their interests separately from each other and, at times, at expense of each other, particularly when it comes to the issue of the autonomous zone in the Nineveh region. Cooperation and dialogue is of significant importance in the context of discussions for the creation of an autonomous zone in the Nineveh region, an idea that is very popular among the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Turkmen communities. Nevertheless, while the majority supports the idea, they seem to lack a clear and common plan vis-a-vis the status of the autonomous zone, whether it will be under the administrative control of KRG or the central government, the role of the international community and the specific arrangements for the coexistence between the different communities. While the idea of creating an autonomous zone for the religious minorities has an overall positive reception, the scenario of a Sunni autonomous zone is treated with skepticism. Except from some Sunnis, the only other external supporter of this scenario is Turkey. In any case, the odds for such a scenario to materialize are poor, given the suspicion towards the Sunni community. The notion of distrust and fear of the ‘other’ is rampant, especially against Arab Sunni Muslims and Sunni Muslims in general. Although there is a distinction – at least on a rhetorical level – between the Arab Sunni Muslims who fled and those who stayed and allied themselves with the ‘Islamic State’, the majority does not want to continue living next to Arab Sunni Muslims. Given the lack of a central command over the various armed groups, and the fact that there is no plan to bring those responsible to justice, revenge attacks will probably be inevitable. These acts of revenge may even occur against members of the same community, especially in the case of Turkmen.
Christianity and Freedom, Volume 2: Contemporary Perspectives, 2016
Barber, Matthew. "They That Remain: Syrian and Iraqi Christian Communities amid the Syria Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State." In Christianity and Freedom, Volume 2: Contemporary Perspectives. Edited by Allen D. Hertzke and Timothy Samuel Shaw. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. This chapter discusses the recent status of Christian communities in Iraq and Syria, providing historical background and then focusing on the seismic events that transpired from 2011 through 2014. Sections deal with historical context for Iraqi and Syrian Christians, the experience of Christians in the Syria conflict, the origins of the Islamic State (IS/ISIL) organization, the experience of Christians under IS control, the expulsion of Mosul's Christians, factors behind the inability of Christians in Mosul to accept a jizya arrangement under IS rule, and prospects for Christian survival in these two countries.
Ph.D. dissertation, 2021
Books and Articles………………………………………………………….…………125 Newspapers and Magazines……………………………………………….…………..130 Appendix…………………………………………………………………….……..…133 Many helped me along the way on this journey. I want to take a moment to thank them. First, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my research supervisor, Keiko Sakai, for guiding me throughout my Ph.D. studies. I am indebted to her for providing me sources and share her experience and insight about Iraq. This thesis would not have been written without her help. Besides my supervisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. Ken Ishida, and Prof. Yoshiko Kurita, for their insightful comments and encouragement. I would like to thank my family and friends in Iraq for their help in gathering information and conducting the interviews. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to my friends from Karbala University, Baghdad University, and al-Nahrain University, for providing me with information and support. I would also like to thank my friends at Chiba University for their help. I am grateful to my friend, Takashi Oshio, for all the support he offered me throughout my stay in Chiba. I am also thankful to my friend Estefania for her kind assists. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Florentina Irimia, for her love, support, and encouragement. I would like to thank her for helping me revising and proofreading this thesis. There are similarities between sectarianism and banal-nationalism and the interchangeability between them, as Haddad introduced the idea of banal sectarianism borrowing Billing's notion of banal nationalism. There are similarities between ethnic and religious identity mobilization. The Sunni-Shia divide proves it, as the conflict is often viewed as a Shia-Persian and Sunni-Arab divide. These interchanges could explain the securitization of sectarian identities and the increase of its political mobilization in Iraq. Umut Ozkirimli (2010, 173) argues that politicians claim to speak for the nation and play the patriotic card when it is needed. The political actors' discourses are important in the reproduction of ethno-sectarian identity because they are familiar figures; their words reach millions, what they say, and how they say it is extremely significant. Furthermore, another equally important and influential element is the media. It equally contributes to identity production. Both present themselves as representatives of the nation's interests. In Iraq's case, political actors and media in Iraq claim to speak for the nation, employing 'we' and drawing boundaries between 'us' and 'them', the others. This rhetoric of the political actors in Iraq helps identity productions and increases the sectarian tension as well. Research Methodology This project relied primarily on qualitative research methodology. More specifically, Arabic primary materials, both written and audiovisual sources, served as the basis for an analysis of political and religious leaders' discourses. Discourse analysis was conducted in order to understand how the population interpreted political and religious speeches. For this purpose, I conducted interviews with ordinary people and tribal leaders during my field research (November 2017-January 2018) in Iraq and later on through phone calls. I interviewed Sunni and Shia people in cities like
UNTYING THE KNOTS Of RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN IRAQI KURDISTAN
2016
Beside the threat of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan is facing deep political and economic crisis that have negative implications on religious pluralism, particularly, in the face of uncertainty after the liberation of Mosul and the broader region of Nineveh. The work of KRG and, more specifically, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, in conjunction with various initiatives from representatives of different communities in the Ministry are noteworthy. Law 5 of 2015 for the 'Protection of the Components [Minorities] of Kurdistan' is one of the fruits of their efforts. This promising, albeit limited, work shows the intention of KRG to create an environment of religious tolerance, which (will) distinguish it from the rest of Iraq and the wider region. This view, however, is not always shared by the politico-religious leadership and the members of the communities, who often portray these changes as merely cosmetic. The religious and ethnic communities are alarmingly fragmented and are mired by inner-communal disagreements. The divide is not only across religious/doctrinal lines, but also political ones. A basic factor is the polarization driven by the conflict between KRG and the central government of Iraq.
The Struggle of Ethno-Religious Minorities in Iraq: The case of Kaka'is
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Kakaism, a minority religion primarily found in Kurdish regions of western Iran, and eastern and northern Iraq, is a case of ethno-religious struggle. Kaka'is practice is an ancient faith, deeply rooted in the Metric religion, which can be traced back to 5,000 years B.C.E. Followers of the faith have been exposed to violence, armed conflicts, and atrocities, and deprivation from the four pillars of the minority rights: the right to exist, the right to non-discrimination, the right to protection of identity, and the right to civic participation. Although the focus of this paper is on the struggle of Kaka'is in Iraq, the comments and conclusions might be relevant for similar contexts in which ethno-religious minorities are oppressed.