A Evolução Do Peacekeeping: Suez, Ruanda e República Democrática Do Congo (original) (raw)
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Peacekeeping has been a practice developed by the United Nations Organization for more than 60 years and has proved to be a more or less successful aiding response towards the peaceful resolution of hostilities. However, following the termination of the Cold War, during the tumultuous years of the 1990s, the UN peacekeepers recorded some of the major failures on the territories of Eastern Europe and Africa – more specifically, in Angola, Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. Thus, at almost only ten years after these events, in the early 2000s, the PK policy promoted by the UN began a process of reformation, in order to adjust to the new international arena. Hence, a more ‘robust’ character is implied, indicating a tendency to resort to certain peace enforcement features and thus permitting the use of force by the blue helmets under the UN flag. Having this in mind, in the attempt to explain the evolution towards more coercive mandates of the UN PKOs, the paper intends to demonstrate the hypothesis according to which the Security Council, through its decision-making and action-implementing powers, holds a significant part of responsibility for the failure of peacekeeping and its imperative recent reforming. The examination of such subject is important as it provides the basis of a better understanding of the international security system, by identifying the main weaknesses of the main UN body which is accountable with fostering peace.
The political trajectory that characterised post-cold war epoch underscores a dangerous centrifugal trend in the nature of violent conflict; civil unrest and guerrilla warfare that undermine the charter of United Nations of promoting international peace and security, and the discourse of peace coexistence at the forefront of international cooperation agenda in Africa, South East Europe and Middle East. The international response to this new wave of conflicts has been articulated through the structural mechanism of United Nations as peacekeeping intervention. Despite the successes and failures associated with UN peacekeeping interventions, the trickle of studies spawned by this quest has, developed into a flood of normative and empirical analyses of various aspects and process of International peacekeeping, while limited in unravel the factor that responsible for these successes and failures. This paper argues that the national interests of the super-powers are the potent factors that will determine the success and/or failure of UN peacekeeping operations, using peacekeeping experience in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) as a potential case. In this paper, an attempt is made to look at the framework of global politics within which peacekeeping unfolds and how it applies not only in DRC but also in Macedonia, Liberia and Somalia, thereby making it possible to develop an analytical construct for International peacekeeping successes and failures. The paper then concludes that given the contemporary geopolitics and the established structure of UN Security Council, if all super-powers are overtly and strongly committed to any UN peacekeeping operations and genuinely committed to resolving disputes in the trouble spots of the world without any primary or secondary interest in the conflicts involved, then the UN peacekeeping operations will be successful in restoring and sustaining permanent peace in the affected state(s).
This Diploma dissertation aims to understand how the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect influenced the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO. The FIB is an armed branch of MONUSCO with a mandate to neutralize armed groups. This deployment breaks from the principles that have guided prior Peacekeeping operations: neutrality, consent of the parties and non-use of force unless it is to protect the mandate. I will use data from the United Nations meeting records and interviews with diplomats and peacekeepers, trying to cover the UN decision making process. I argue that the RtP doctrine influenced the UN and its member States in their decision to deploy the FIB. In order to prove the influence of RtP I studied the positions of key actors involved in this process. Finally, this work focuses on Pillar II of the RtP doctrine, namely the international community‟s responsibility to assist states when they are unable to meet their duty to protect their populations.
United Nations and African Union peace operations: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo
2021
From UN to AU to Hybrid: The Record of Peacekeeping Operations UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, on a visit to Ireland in July 2009, stated that the United Nations employed 78,000 military personnel, 11,000 police and 23,000 civil servants in 16 peacekeeping operations and 27 other political missions the world over, but needed much more help to do its job properly in lands wracked by fighting, famine and poverty (United Nations Peace Missions in Peril, 2009). He added that achieving UN goals would mean building up the capabilities of regional peacekeeping players, including the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). The Secretary-General's statement betrays a sense of weariness which stands in stark contrast to the innovative spirit surrounding the modest beginnings of UN peacekeeping. 1 The first UN peacekeeping mission was launched in the Middle East in 1948, followed one year later by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Early UN missions focused on the monitoring of ceasefires, the creation of buffer zones between hostile armies and the demarcation of petmanent borders. The endeavours of the Security Council in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution (not to mention post-conflict peacebuilding) yielded rather mixed results. Peacekeeping, however, proved an instant success, at least measured by the The author is a visiting Professor at the Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Prior to that he worked as political affairs officer in the UN Mission in the Congo and the Security Council Affairs Division at UN Headquarters.
This paper deals with the establishment of the so-called " Intervention Brigade " in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Security Council Resolution 2098. In doing so, it outlines the history of Peacekeeping and how its fundamental principles – consent, impartiality and the restricted authorization to use force in self-defence only – have been re-interpreted along with the expansion of Peacekeeping mandates in order to show that the establishment of the Intervention Brigade is not as revolutionary as it seems at first. A closer inspection of how the Peacekeeping mission in the DRC evolved further supports this characterization since MONUSCO has operated on the basis of a " robust " mandate for long and thus has been involved in various military operations ever since. The specifically novelty of the Intervention Brigade is its explicitly " offensive " character, which
Is peacekeeping intervention? This is the central theme which runs throughout this thesis. Since its conception in the mid-1950s, peacekeeping has significantly evolved from traditional, passive, monitoring and observing operations to robust, multi-dimensional stabilisation operations. This raises questions as to whether this is simply a natural evolution of peacekeeping or whether it marks an expansion of the concept of peacekeeping beyond its boundaries, pushing it into the realm of peace enforcement or intervention. Put simply, has peacekeeping evolved too far? Focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), this thesis seeks to understand the relationship between United Nations peacekeeping and the principle of non-intervention. It therefore explores the boundaries between the two, by examining peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks, questioning whether, at times, peacekeeping becomes a form of intervention. Uniquely applying a Third World Approaches to Internatio...
ABSTRACT The study examined conflicts and challenges that impede the effectiveness of the UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) in the Congolese State. The study is based on the analytical review of secondary sources. Conflict has continued in the eastern Congo that has been the epicenter of all phases of Congolese wars. The conflict dynamics are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. The origin of the UN PKOs in Africa started in the Congolese State in 1960. Despite long year of deployment and being the world‘s largest PKO and the first to use the intervention brigade; Congolese state has remained conflict-stricken nation in Africa. For the first time, the UN PKO received one of the first Chapter VII mandates and intervention brigade that pushed the boundaries of accepted peacekeeping doctrine from peacekeeping mission to peace enforcement operations is in the Congolese state. Based on Barry Buzan‘s Security Complex as conceptual framework, the study uncovered that Congolese conflict is strongly linked into state politics and Regional security dynamics of the Great Lake Region. The regional politics and security complex and competitive regional states‘ power struggle to gain geopolitical power are seriously impeding the success of the UNPKO and challenging efforts to resolve Congolese conflicts. The Congolese state failure to do a catch by consolidating gains has remained the greatest challenges for the UNPKOs. Therefore, the study suggests strengthening Congolese state institutions and addressing the regional security dynamics to bring peace in the region. Keywords: Conflicts, Congolese State, UN Peacekeeping Operation, Challenge, Great Lake Region and State Failure
Critically assess the UN’s peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War.
The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations were introduced in 1948 after turmoil in the Middle East. Since then, peacekeeping has matured and evolved in order to try to provide stability and security around the world. Many challenges and missions have crossed the path of UN peacekeeping operations, which consequently brought a great forum of discussion between the pro-peacekeeping advocates and the groups that critique it. This essay argues that UN peacekeeping operations are difficult to justify, and need a reform in order to meet the needs for 21st century security threats in order to guaranty a sustainable peace. It needs to be emphasized that peacekeeping was and still is unique in its features as each mission is different and has its individual areas of issues and successes. Thus, it is advised to look at peacekeeping as a toolbox that provides specific solutions for specific issues, rather than a complete practice that fits all. This diversity creates gaps and leads to criticism that this paper will address. Since the post Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKO, also known as DPKO, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations) have evolved from their initial purpose of “facilitate[ing] ‘liberal international relations’ whereby states resolve their differences through open diplomacy… [to a] concept [that acknowledges that] violent conflict is related to illiberal governance” (Bellamy, 2004: 151). This paper acknowledges that UN PKO, or a similar body of reaction and protection is necessary. In order to lay fundamental grounds to this study, this essay will trace the emergence and development of peacekeeping in the context of the UN. It is important to discuss the UN in great details, as it is the driving vehicle that makes peacekeeping what it is. It sets the ground rules of conduct and gives its legitimacy. Second, realist, and neo institutionalism ideology on its course of actions will further deepen the understanding of the concept of peacekeeping. It will look at three stages of peacekeeping: the 1990s, period of trial and error with the example of Somalia, then the 2000s, dominated by Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2010s and the first mandate of the use of force strategically in DRC. It needs to be said that Iraq and Afghanistan were not UN peacekeeping missions. However, for this study it is crucial to include them, because these conflicts were decisive in the re-evaluation of UN PKO structure. Therefore, this essay will show through these examples that peacekeeping since its initial mandate is weak, unclear, and becomes difficult to justify due to the changing nature of warfare. This essay also aims to clarify the concept of governance because the main features of traditional peacekeeping were engraved in the notion of liberal international relations through open diplomacy to illiberal governance within conflict. Third, this paper will look at US policy for peacekeeping such as the Clinton policy review and the brief example of Guatemala. This will demonstrate that governmental willingness and cooperation remains a vital part in the whole process of peacekeeping. Despite good intentions and efforts to make it work, UN PKO do not provide a balanced account of power between stronger and stable states against weaker and destabilized states. Therefore, by looking at the undermined position of the UN and UN PKO, this paper will conclude that peacekeeping is not an effective practice post Cold War. In addition, it does not meet the demands to alleviate security threats and provide a sustainable peace around the world. Importantly, for the purpose of this argument, this study is only focused on criticizing UN PKO in the post Cold War era without incorporating any aspects of the role and power of the media in the 20-21st century and robust peacekeeping.