Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions (original) (raw)
Related papers
Inquiry, 2020
In this article I argue that the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts needs examination, not just in its details but in its philosophical standing. We need to consider whether the distinction is motivated by (sometimes unwittingly) assumed problematic philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of our dependence on the words of others and the rationality of speech reception. Working with an example of the act of telling, I argue against the idea that the distinction is self-evident or easy to draw. By developing an analogy with perception, I argue further that defending the distinction requires one to engage in an argumentative dialectic with powerful alternative positions. I end by suggesting that taking the challenge further would require us to look more closely at how passivity and rationality might be reconciled in the reception of speech.
Intention and Responsibility in Speech Acts
2014
I have argued elsewhere (Navarro-Reyes 2010) that the kind of excuses that appeal to a lack of intention in the performance of a speech act do not, in general, try to deny that the deed itself took place (i.e., in cases where we say that the act is performed unintentionally, we would not imply that the act was not performed at all, but that it was performed in a particular way). If this is correct, speech acts token performances ought to be defined independently of the speaker’s putative illocutionary intentions. In this paper I will pursue this idea by discussing the views of Alston (2000), a prominent champion of the intentionalistic account, who defines speech acts in terms of the notion of “taking responsibility”. Unlike Alston, I will claim that ‘unheard speech acts’ are not a legitimate category within speech acts, whereas cases of ‘unintended speech acts’ might be correctly considered as legitimate cases of speech acts, since they do effectively change the normative context.
The classification of speech acts revisited: a dialogical and actional perspective
Austin perceived the need to classify speech acts as early as 1962. According to his own testimony, his attempt remained inchoate (1962: 147-163). In 1969, Searle constructed a classification which was subsequently used to characterize the primitive forces of illocutionary logic . The relevance of that classification stems from a certain idea of communication. I would like to show that an alternative classification can be developed through a resolutely pragmatic approach to communication, rather than through a representational and semantic approach to language.
On the Relationship between Speech Acts and Psychological States
2014
This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It consists of the following three theses. 1. We believe, ceteris paribus, that other people's speech acts concur with their beliefs. 2. Our speech acts, ceteris paribus, concur with our beliefs. 3. When our speech acts deviate from our beliefs, we do not, ceteris paribus, declare the deviations to other people. Concurrentism sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes when he says an indicative sentence, what the speaker does after he says an indicative sentence contrary to what he believes, why Moore's paradox occurs, why it is puzzling to say some variants of Moorean sentences, and why it is not absurd to say other variants of Moorean sentences.
Three Approaches to the Study of Speech Acts (Dialogue and Universalism 1, 2013, 129-142).
Dialogue and Universalism, 1, 2013, 129-142., 2013
The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach, the main tenet of which is that performing illocutionary acts consists in making conventional moves in accordance with patterns of social interaction. It is claimed that, first, each of the discussed approaches presupposes a different account of the nature and structure of illocutionary acts, and, second, all those approaches result from one-sided interpretations of Austin’s conception of verbal action. The first part of the paper reconstructs Austin's views on the functions and effects of felicitous illocutionary acts. The second part reconstructs and considers three different research developments in the post-Austinian speech act theory—the intentionalist approach, the institutionalist approach, and the interactionalist approach.
The many faces of speech act theory — editorial to special issue on speech actions
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, 2009
Over the past decades speech act theory has evolved in many directions and, as a result, it may be more reasonable to talk about speech act theories than one received model. Most of the contemporary developments explicitly refer to John L. Austin and John Searle as their mentors. However, the (still growing) heritage has been used in a selective way and some of the newer approaches are not mutually compatible. What remains constant through all of them is the focus on language as a type (and means) of action and the underlying belief that communication is composed of linguistic acts. It is also important that these acts are not performed in isolation, but typically, in natural communication, form complex structures. It is, at least partly, the evasive nature of the interplay between the linguistic form used and the context in which it appears that constitutes the puzzle of performativity and illocutionary force.
18 Intention ( Including Speech Acts ) 1
2017
This chapter deals with some of the different senses that the term ‘intention’ has in pragmatics, and the way they are related to each other. I shall begin by distinguishing one employment of the term, which belongs to our folk psychological practices of understanding actions in terms of reasons, from a more technical use, related to the aboutness of language. After a brief historical sketch, I describe the intentional approach to pragmatics as an attempt to account for the intentionality of language (its aboutness) in terms of intentional action. I will do so by explaining the basic tenets of two very influential proposals: the Gricean theory of conversation and speech act theory. This chapter finishes with a review of contemporary debates on the foundations of pragmatics where intentions have a predominant role to play.
Towards a history of speech act theory
1990
That uses of language not only can, but even normally do, have the character of actions was a fact largely unrealized by those engaged in the study of language before the present century, at least in the sense that there was lacking any attempt to come to terms systematically with the action-theoretic peculiarities of language use.
Speech Act Theory: From Austin to Searle
Augustinian: A Journal for Humanities, Social Sciences, Business, and Education., Vol. 19, Issue #1, pp. 35-45, 2018
The speech act theory is one of the rigorous attempts to systematically explain the workings of language. It is not only widely influential in the philosophy of language, but in the areas of linguistics and communication as well. This essay traces the development of this theory from J. L. Austin's first formulation of the theory to John Searle's further systematization and grounding of it. The essay first situates the theory in the general approaches to the philosophy of language. After which, it explicates the main features of the theory as initially articulated by Austin and further improved by Searle. Among the innovations introduced by Searle, the essay highlights the following: the distinction between the utterance and propositional acts, the distinction between the effects of illocutionary acts and those of perlocutionary acts, a consistent set of criteria for classifying speech acts, and the grounding of speech acts in terms of rules and facts.