Tribalism, Islamism, Leadership and the Assabiyyas (original) (raw)

The Islamist Parties and the Military Regime in Pakistan

In: Considering the Future of Democracy in Pakistan, Bettina Robotka (ed), (Südasien / Working Papers; Number 1), 33-48 , 2001

The paper was submitted at a Workshop of the South Asia History Seminar of Humboldt University on 24 June 2000, revised for publication by 2001. It discussed the issues confronting the Islamist parties and the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, coming to power on October ,12, 1999 in their mutual dealings. In public, it is mainly the leader of the Islamic Party, or Jama 'ati-Islamf (JI), Qazi Hussain Ahmad, and the leader of the Party of Islamic Clerics, or Jamiyyat-e 'Ulama '-e Islam (JUI), Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, who speak for the growing Islamic sector in Pakistan on political subjects and also on relations with the country's rulers. Lately, also Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, representing the Jamiyyate 'Ulama '-e-Päkistän (JUP), who is normally not very vocal in the media, has gained some prominence due to his role as a co-ordinator of relations with the military regimes. The appellation 'Islamic sector' is used here as a conditional term to describe the vast array of theological Islamic parties, groups, educational and welfare institutions whose members and adherents become increasingly numerous and vocal in the public sphere of the country. They represent a very broad spectre of activity ranging from contemplative missionary groups, to religious seminaries, to political parties, to radical sectarian organisations, and to militant and outright terrorist outfits. They draw on a rising share of public support from very diverse sections of society and they are unanimous on one count, that is their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in the country. In their opinion, the state and the public sector, the ruling elites fail to deliver on economic opportunities, social concems, education etc. They feel, therefore, tempted to take developments in their own hand, to provide guidance, opportunity and authority where it is conspicuously absent. They are forming into a sprawling Islamist counterculture which, though unsuccessful on the hustings, nevertheless commands the attention and respect of the ruling elites to an extent where the Islamic groups cannot take over the reins of power formally and yet the ruling classes cannot conduct a policy ignoring or alienating them.

Ideology and the Quest for Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East

EJMSS Volume 3 NO 3, 2023

The Middle East is unstable and it has not been able to successfully evolve any effective political system. All experiments with parliamentary democracy, military dictatorship and single party state system seem to have failed. There is tendency towards centralization, state centralism and even despotism. The internal structure of almost all the Arab states is fragile, weak, lacking institutional framework and it is at best in transition. This study establishes that governments in the Middle East are largely unrepresentative and most irresponsive to public sentiments. Ruling cliques in league with vested interests exercise power without responsibility and accountability. As a result, people generally feel left out and neglected. The study argues that people are agitating to remove these basic difficulties in order to lay the foundations of a modern progressive Middle East, able to hold its own in the fiercely competitive world of today. Hence, the study adopts "Political Islam" as a theory to interrogate the discourse while relying on secondary sources to gather the needed information.In a critical sense, the study observes that the main streams of Islamic resurgence can be broadly classified under two heads: one, those which have primarily religious motivation; and two, those which are dominated by socio-political considerations. It concludes that its dynamism is becoming more prominent everyday and its radical character is being underlined with greatest vigor and clarity. In view of this, the study recommends that the West should not perceive contemporary Islamic resurgence as a threat. It should rather appreciate and respect other cultures for peaceful coexistence .

"Glossy Global Leadership: Unpacking the Multilingual Religious Thought of the Jihad", in Green, Nile (ed.). Afghanistan’s Islam: From Conversion to the Taliban. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017, pp. 189-206 and pp. 299-307, DOI: http://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.23

This chapter draws on periodicals in Dari, Urdu, Arabic, and English published by various Afghan parties involved in the Jihad period of the 1980s. I challenge prevailing views that dismiss Afghan Islamic debates in response to the Soviet invasion as lacking in seriousness, intellectual vitality, originality, or even any engagement with the local context. Instead, I suggest that Afghans actors emphasized the international calling and the global significance of their military and political efforts. These were steeped much more in Shi'i imaginary and profoundly influenced by the Iranian Revolution than has been acknowledged so far. I also show how the experience of the Jihad gave rise to new conceptions of the individual, the family, and finally the nation. The time of struggle sharpened discussions about both the structure of the current, camp-based polities and the future political setup of a liberated Afghanistan.

Leadership Categories and Social Processes in Islam: The Cases of Dir and Swat

Journal of Anthropological Research 42: 1-13, 1986

Following the four-stage model offered by Brett (1980), of learned (Mufti), warrior (Murabit), arbitrator (Marabout), and inspirational leader (Mahdi), this paper compares and contrasts the political evolution of the kingdoms of Swat and Dir on Pakistan's northwestern frontier. Mutations and transformation of these roles are placed within the context of British colonial authority and the encroachment of the Pakistani state,

SOME REMARKS ON THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE AND POLITICAL PILLARS OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE. MODERN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2021, 26/1, pp 59-80

2021

The article focuses on the ideological pillars of the ISIS or the so-called Islamic State and aims to explain the ideological core of the ISIS by examining the roots and pillars of this extreme terrorist Jihadists, Wahhabist and Salafist organization. The article seeks and explores the roots in Jihadism, radical form of Salafism and partially radical Arab nationalism, but it also looks partially at the "legacy" of Saddam Hussein's regime (1979-2003) in Iraq (many former high ranked officers of Saddam's military, BAATH party and also several intelligence officers were actively involved in ISIS) and the Arab post-colonial and post-cold war world.

“The Struggle for the Soul of Tatar Islam,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideologies 5 (2007): 26-39.

Hudson institute is a non-partisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. We challenge conventional thinking and help manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary and collaborative studies in defense, international relations, economics, culture, science, technology, and law. Through publications, conferences, and policy recommendations, we seek to guide global leaders in government and business.