Illusory own body perceptions: Case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness (original) (raw)
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Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014
'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter reviews various disruptions to own-body perception, including what is known about their neural correlates. It argues that it is crucial to distinguish between the sense of ownership for one's body as an object of perception-the body-as-object-and the sense of ownership for one's body as that by which and through which one perceives the world -the body-as-subject. Despite the fact that illusory own-body perception provides an excellent case for illustrating this distinction, most discussions to date of own-body perception have failed to make this distinction and apply it to the various clinical and experimental findings. The chapter summarizes one recent model of the body-as-subject, according to which the body-as-subject is based on sensorimotor integration. Finally, it uses this model to clarify the phenomenon of illusory own-body perception, and it suggests directions for future research.
Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition, 2013
Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.
Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components—body ownership and self-location—are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.
The bodily self: Insights from clinical and experimental research
This review article summarizes neuropsychological descriptions of abnormal body representations in brain-damaged patients and recent neuroscientific investigations of their sensorimotor underpinnings in healthy participants. The first part of the article describes unilateral disorders of the bodily self, such as asomatognosia, feelings of amputation, supernumerary phantom limbs and somatoparaphrenia, as well as descriptions of non-lateralized disorders of the bodily self, including Alice in Wonderland syndrome and autoscopic hallucinations. Because the sensorimotor mechanisms of these disorders are unclear, we focus on clinical descriptions and insist on the importance of reporting clinical cases to better understand the full range of bodily disorders encountered in neurological diseases. The second part of the article presents the advantages of merging neuroscientific approaches of the bodily self with immersive virtual reality, robotics and neuroprosthetics to foster the understanding of the multisensory, motor and neural mechanisms of bodily representations.
The bodily self and its disorders
Current Opinion in Neurology, 2014
PURPOSE OF REVIEW The experience of ourselves as an embodied agent with a firstperson perspective is referred to as 'bodily self'. We present a selective overview of relevant clinical and experimental studies. RECENT FINDINGS Sharing multisensory body space with others can be observed in patients with structurally altered bodies (amputations, congenital absence of limbs), with altered functionality after hemiplegia, such as denial of limb ownership (somatoparaphrenia) and with alterations in bodily self-consciousness on the level of the entire body (e.g. in autoscopic phenomena). In healthy participants, the mechanisms underpinning body ownership and observer perspective are empirically investigated by multisensory stimulation paradigms to alter the bodily self. The resulting illusions have promoted the understanding of complex disturbances of the bodily self, such as out-ofbody experiences. We discuss the role of interoception in differentiating between self and others and review current advances in the study of body integrity identity disorder, a condition shaped as much by neurological as by social-psychological factors. SUMMARY We advocate a social neuroscience approach to the bodily self that takes into account the interactions between body, mind and society and might help close the divide between neurology and psychiatry.
Spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition, 2008
Visual, somatosensory, and perspectival cues normally provide congruent information about where the self is experienced. Separating those cues by virtual reality techniques, recent studies found that self-location was systematically biased to where a visual–tactile event was seen. Here we developed a novel, repeatable and implicit measure of self-location to compare and extend previous protocols. We investigated illusory self-location and associated phenomenological aspects in a lying body position that facilitates clinically observed abnormal self-location (as on out-of-body experiences). The results confirm that the self is located to where touch is seen. This leads to either predictable lowering or elevation of self-localization, and the latter was accompanied by sensations of floating, as during out-of-body experiences. Using a novel measurement we show that the unitary and localized character of the self can be experimentally separated from both the origin of the visual perspective and the location of the seen body, which is compatible with clinical data.
The bodily self and its disorders: neurological, psychological and social aspects
Purpose of review The experience of ourselves as an embodied agent with a first-person perspective is referred to as ‘bodily self’. We present a selective overview of relevant clinical and experimental studies. Recent findings Sharing multisensory body space with others can be observed in patients with structurally altered bodies (amputations, congenital absence of limbs), with altered functionality after hemiplegia, such as denial of limb ownership (somatoparaphrenia) and with alterations in bodily self-consciousness on the level of the entire body (e.g. in autoscopic phenomena). In healthy participants, the mechanisms underpinning body ownership and observer perspective are empirically investigated by multisensory stimulation paradigms to alter the bodily self. The resulting illusions have promoted the understanding of complex disturbances of the bodily self, such as out-of-body experiences. We discuss the role of interoception in differentiating between self and others and review current advances in the study of body integrity identity disorder, a condition shaped as much by neurological as by social-psychological factors. Summary We advocate a social neuroscience approach to the bodily self that takes into account the interactions between body, mind and society and might help close the divide between neurology and psychiatry. Keywords body integrity identity disorder, illusion paradigms, interoception, social neuroscience INTRODUCTION Human beings are self-conscious individuals whose thinking and behaviour is grounded in basic bodily processes. These processes transcend the sole domains of somatosensation and motor action; our body can be seen, its parts can be localized in space in pitch darkness, we know where we are heading to, and can follow our heart. Body space is a multisensory space, continuously made up by exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive impressions. The bodily self is made up of the multiple interactions between these impressions. Accordingly, the range of disorders affecting a person’s bodily self is considerable; the body can be experienced as lost, not belonging, not under control, empty, ugly, detached or duplicated. Human beings represent a social species. However private and intimate a person’s body may appear, bodily