The importance of identity in Iran's foreign policy (original) (raw)

Nicola Zolin

**The importance of identity in Iran’s foreign policy**

**Abstract:** This essay will answer the following questions: how does a particular definition of identity shape Iranian foreign policy? Do values and ideological perspectives have a prominent role in shaping Iran’s international relations? To answer these questions I apply a hybrid approach, combining elements from various current theoretical debates, which might be appropriate to understand Iranian approach to foreign policy until today. I will assume an historical perspective to frame the importance that the role of identity have in shaping the political agenda of the country. I will apply a constructivist theoretical dimension to explain how Iran has used in many cases the “logic of appropriateness” to justify his actions in the international arena, as an attempt to “do the right thing”, respecting its ideology and values. I will explore the impact of identity in Iranian society and analyze the different identity narratives, which have been defined and applied differently throughout time. I will research on how Iranian’s foreign policy has also evolved into a series of pragmatic decisions, and when and how Iranian interests have been determined either by a particular assumption of the state’s identity, or by material necessity.

***The concept of Identity in International Relations***

The notion of identity defines a given group that shares the same race; ethnicity, cultural background and religious belief^{[1]}, but various interpretations give to the concept of identity a fluid meaning. An interesting definition is provided by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, who identify five key uses for the term: “Identity can be understood as a ground or basis for social or political action, a collective phenomenon denoting some degree of sameness among members of a group or category, a core aspect of individual or collective ‘selfhood’, a product of social or political action, or the product of multiple and competing discourses.“^{[2]}

Identity is the subtext of almost any argument in international relations, and it has - as an explicit concept - only recently moved into the mainstream of international relations research.^{[3]} Williams argues that neorealist and other mainstream international relations theories purposefully ignore the way they rely on the concept of identity. They concentrate on the systemic distribution of power and ignore the effect of domestic variables in determining states’ foreign policy priorities. Neorealist theory relies on notions of state behavior dependent on several assumptions about the nature of states and how they are formed. Discussing international relations theory debates as a clash of mainstream and identity theories is misleading, because all theories rely on identity, just some more explicitly than others.^{[4]}

The constructivist theory sees identities as not objectively grounded in material forces, as claimed by realism, but as the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas. Identity is a “socially constructed self that people continually co-construct and reconstruct in their interactions”^{[5]}. The constructivist explanation of state behavior is based on the ‘‘logic of appropriateness” which means that ‘‘human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations."^{[6]} However, according to Brubaker and Cooper, the constructivist notions provide no insight into the process by which coercion is used to compel identification. Drawing on Kant and Hegel, debates in political theory and international relations generally assume that an identity cannot be constructed without the simultaneous creation and negative stereotypy of an ‘other’. It is related to the notion of the “us” and “them”, with both of them holding a very strong feeling of belonging. The difference is how each identity group perceives the other. The most extreme formulation of this claim is Carl Schmitt’s assertion that political identities can best be formed in the course of violent struggles against adversaries.^{[7]}

Hegel built on this formulation, and brought to it his understanding that modern states differed from their predecessors in that conflict among states, he contends, helps each to become aware of them by encouraging self-knowledge among citizens. Other figures, such as Nietzsche, Habermas and Rawls, draw on Homer’s Iliad and psychological research defining identity independently from the construction of ‘others’ associated with negative stereotypes. Identity construction and maintenance can often take place through positive interactions with ‘others’. The Greeks valued an approach to life and politics based on the *‘meden agan’*, which can be translated as the ‘middle way’, or ‘nothing in excess’. According to John Herz, the middle way approach can be seen as a better guide for policy than a single-minded commitment to some vision of the world that only achieves coherence at the expense of reality.

***Iran’s sense of Identity***

I believe that the ‘middle way’ approach can’t be used to describe the Iranian sense of identity throughout history, and that the “us” and “them” dichotomy has worked more effectively in creating a feeling of belonging amongst the Iranians. However, the ‘identity narrative’, developed by the diverse rulers of Iran, has been very different throughout time. There has been no political narrative able to defy people’s collective feeling of belonging to the historic lands of Iran. Such sense of identity, defined both historically and territorially, evolved from a common historical experience and cultural tradition among the people who lived in *Irānzamin*, and shared in Iranian mythologies and legends as well as in its history. Such feeling of belonging was further defined and made distinctive by drawing boundaries between Iranians (the in-group) and the ‘others’ (non-Iranians). The concept of *mythomoteur,* used by scholars to define the “soul” of a community*,* fits particularly well in describing this scenario.^{[8]} This sense of cultural identity, rooted in the Iranians’ consciousness of a common origin, in a shared religion and especially in one language, survived the Arab and all other invasions, occupations and material and human devastations and conversion to Islam that followed. Iranian identity, rooted in its Zoroastrian past, has never quite conceded defeat.

The Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) is considered to be the one that shaped the modern state of Persia, strengthening the sense of cultural and religious identification with the adoption of the Twelver Shi’ite as official religion. The Safavids enhanced the *mythomoteur* that has always existed and bore the name of *Eranshar* (empire of Aryans), which allowed Persia to resist from external pressures. Especially during the second half of the XIX century, with the *Great Game* in central Asia, Persia was subject of increasingly interferences by the Zarist empire and the United Kingdom. The fragile Qajar dynasty (1785-1925) was weakened by these external threats and has been unable to create a strong opposition to them.

Since the 19^{th} century, the construction of the concept of Iranian identity has shifted variously, embracing alternatively nationalism and Islamism. Under the monarchy of the Pahlavi Dynasty, the regime crystallized the “Persian” identity, glamorizing the ancient kings of the old Persia, changing the calendar to a secular one, forcing a single language for all the diverse ethnic groups, and festering anti-Arab sentiments. The Pahlavi Dynasty took inspiration from Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk”, father of the modern Turkish Republic, and undertook a process of modernization and secularization strongly tied to a central state bureaucracy.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 transformed this narrative completely, emphasizing instead the rules of *fiqh* and *sharia* and the major Islamic figures, trying to erase Persian Kings from history books. It sought to create a new identity among Iran’s multiethnic mosaic by reviving the concept of the Islamic ‘*umma’* as the centripetal force unifying the country’s diverse population. In the end, the Islamic Republic, like its predecessor, failed to create an encompassing notion of “Iranianness,” albeit based on the concept of Islamic unity.

The majority of the people are sensitive to both Islamism and nationalism arguments. Most of them can be considered nationalist and Islamists at the same time. The Islamist identity basically relies on the elements of Shiism heavily, to the idea of the occulted twelfth imam and to cult of the martyrs. People celebrate Islamic holidays such as Ashura, the day that Imam Hossein was killed. They base their ideology, whether moderate or radical, on Islamic scripture and thinkers like Ali Shariati, who mixed Islam with Marxism and Sartre’s existentialism and provided the ideological fuel for the Islamic Revolution^{[9]}.

The revival of the nationalist ideas is largely a reaction to the growing disillusion of the outcomes of the Revolution, but its inceptions can be found in the context of the Russo-Persian war of 1804, which was a defining moment for the development of Iranian nationalism based on the image of unity among the country’s constituent parts and groups.^{[10]} The culture of Iran previous to the Arab colonialism, the symbols of the ancient religion of Zoroaster, the remarkable writers and poets such as Ferdowsi, Khayyam and Hafez, and the legend of the heroic ancient emperor of Persia, Cyrus the Great, are a profoundly infused on citizen’s collective consciousness. Holidays and celebrations like *Nowrouz* (the Iranian new year) and *CharshambeSuri (*Fireworks Wednesday) have deep historical meanings and serve as binding agents between the ancient Persian traditions and contemporary Iran, and are for this reason generally obstructed by the government.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the West has presented, with depressing consistency, a distorted image of Iran, portraying it as a seething mass of Islamic fanaticism^{[11]}, and neglecting the actual cultural identity of Iranians. Those unaware of Iran’s history could be forgiven for believing that Iran knows nothing but Islam. The reality is far more complex and hopeful. Publicly most Iranians accept their Islamic identity, however, most are also aware of their pre-Islamic Persian identity.

***The role of identity in Iranian Foreign Policy***

To discuss the role of these different pictures of identity in Iranian foreign policy, I rejected rationalist theories that regard the Islamic Republic of Iran as objective-oriented and interest-based, that solely pursues selfish and materialistic interest as the result of cost-benefit and means-ends analysis, aimed at maximizing security and power. I assumed instead the constructivist “logic of appropriateness", which implies rule-guided behavior in which states try to “do the right thing”, rather than maximizing their given preferences as the “logic of consequentialism” implies. As Hosam Matar pointed out: ‘culture informs and in many ways determines the priorities a given state affords itself when defining its foreign policy objectives’.^{[12]} One of the main contributions of constructivist literature is to problematize the question of state identity and interests. Constructivists don’t treat state identity and interests as a pre-given and fixed variable; instead, claim that the identity (self- perception) of a state is the major source of interest formation of that state.^{[13]} As Alexander Wendt believes, “Identities are the basis of interests.”^{[14]}According with these interests, particular identities have been shaped or reinforced by the rulers of the country. When translated to practice, Iranian foreign policy can nevertheless be seen as inherently pragmatic. Political Islam plays only a minor role in relations with the international community, since the question of who is the true “commander of the faithful” in the Islamic world is of little importance for the rest of the world.

Ideology and pragmatism in fact go hand in hand in Iranian foreign policy. The Islamic Republic is both using its ideology to exploits the resources of the Iranian nation for its own ends, and to boost its status in the international community. National interests and the religious-historical identity of the society and the regime are basically intertwined. Iranian foreign policy-makers have carefully taken into account their geopolitical environment at both the regional and global level. The preeminent geopolitical position gives Iran the potential to play a significant prominent regional and global role. Indeed, the Islamic Republic see itself as the main regional actor for the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability, while developing economic links for trading its rich natural resources. Iranian diplomats see Iranian society, its ancient culture, and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, as unique attributes for gaining a prominent regional and global role. Because of such geostrategic position, Iran cannot go down the road of total isolation. Iran’s foreign policy-makers were conscious of the limits of Iran’s independence when they decided to leave behind the early isolationist tendencies. In some form or other Iran will always be connected with its neighboring regions.

For Europe and the West, therefore, the main question that arises is what position Iran could take and what role it could play^{[15]}, bearing in mind converging interests such as energy supplying and security partnership in Afghanistan. Opinions on this subject are determined on the one hand by mistrust of an Islamic regime and fear of religious fundamentalism, and on the other by surprise at the pragmatism of Iranian foreign policy. Depending on which of these perceptions is the dominant one, this leads to two opposing assessments of Iran. The first argument asserts that Iranian policies are dominated by religious irrationalism, which, in combination with Iran’s nuclear program is seen as a global threat. This argument emphasizes the importance of the Shi’a religious conception of the return of the Mahdi, the occulted twelfth Imam. As Thomas Finger once wrote, “since Iran is the world’s leading Shia power, many Iranians expect that it will play a major role in preparing for the Mahdi, and Iran’s existence and regional influence is therefore a necessary condition for this return.^{[16]} The second argument views Iranian ideology just as a rational one, focused on defending its own interests.

Both perceptions find the roots of their arguments on the relations that Iran has established with its perceived enemies, the neighboring states and the United States. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has been challenging the United States hegemony and its allies, by undermining regional stability.^{[17]}The narrative of the revolution was an accumulation of past and current memories and experiences, based on the interpretation of dire events such as the Operation Ajax and the decades long American meddling into Iran affairs during the Pahlavi period, as well as America’s support for Israel and Sunni Monarchies.^{[18]} Such narrative was based on ending global oppression, under the banner of Islam.^{[19]}Iranian self-identity-definition of protector of the oppressed against the oppressors is best manifested in Iran’s stance against the West in general and the United States and Israel in particular, known as the “arrogant powers.” The Revolution was about removing the United States and the Shah out of Iran, to eliminate America’s influence of the region, and to liberate their Arab neighbors of oppression.^{[20]} Barnett points out that ‘identity is linked to the construction of the threat and represents a potential source of alliance formation.’^{[21]} This is reflected in the Islamic Republic’s strong support of the Palestinian cause, which stresses the only way to liberate the occupied territories in Palestine, is through armed struggle^{[22]} and alliance-forming between former enemies Arabs vs. Persians under a unifying Islamic identity. The universal characteristic of Islam gave Iran’s narrative on resistance a powerful Jihad tool as it inspired many Sunni activists to give them hope in liberating occupied Palestine.^{[23]}

Self-Other and their relationships can produce friends, enemies, rivalries, and influence in global politics through interactions and ideas^{[24]}. Iran’s identity of resistance, Islamic unity, and Shiism has created competing identities, interests, and rivalries that produced in-group out-group categories. Khomeini condemned Sunni Gulf states by calling monarchy ‘shameful’ and ‘disgraceful’ and tried to foment uprisings in neighboring states by oppressive rulers who serve the United States.^{[25]} The Iranian revolution not only provided Shiite Iran upward mobility in the world, but emboldened the Shi’as of the region to protest and riot against their oppressors for greater rights in Shi’a communities in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia to attempting a coup in Bahrain to establish an Islamic government.^{[26]} In response to these events and the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States and its Sunni allies tried to contain Iran’s rising identity and influence by supporting Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).^{[27]}

Patterson and Monroe pointed out that a ‘narrative is utilized as one of the most widespread and powerful forms of discourse in human communication.’^{[28]} Iran’s clear narrative about its nuclear goals is coupled by the United States misperception of Iran’s intentions and lack of trust on how Iran sees its political environment, or how it goes about its goals. United States has taken robust measures in sanctions in its efforts to derail Iran’s nuclear progress and to reduce Iran’s influence. Ahmadinejad’s Senior Advisor, M.S. Hashemi, conveyed the symbolic meaning of its program as he notes the heart of Iran’s nuclear energy program is ‘the symbol of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s technical and political capabilities, the bravery of the nation…its pursuit of dignity, and the Iranian-Islamic national identity’.^{[29]}We see in this statement how a particular notion of identity, clearly define Iranian foreign policy interest and objectives.

The ideology of rejection of the West, employed by the Ahmadinejad administration, has been partially reversed by the new president Hassan Rouhani, elected to solve the impasse of the nuclear negotiations and to ease the country from the crippling international sanctions. Rouhani has declared his pragmatic belief in multilateralism, collective actions and balanced combination of cooperation and competition. Such approach involves an expansion of bilateral and multilateral relations through engagement with states and organizations, including international economic institutions. This implies the need to improve relations with Europe and to ease the tensions with the United States. Such an interest-driven policy shift has far-reaching consequences for Iran’s relations with the international community. Recently, Iran’s current foreign minister Zarif, has described how “multilateralism and the collective search for common solutions to common problems, has proved its desirability and practical efficacy at both the regional and the global levels”, emphasizing the fact that “willful cooperation has gradually developed as a new working pattern of interaction among states” and that it “has come to replace the once predominant and now discredited pattern of confrontation, unconditional subservience, and perpetual rivalry.” Rouhani called for a discourse of “prudent moderation”, to move Iran away from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving long-term comprehensive development. Foreign minister Zarif has defined prudent moderation as an approach based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive engagement.^{[30]}Rouhani’s challenge is to balance between national, regional, and global needs. In foreign policy the new administration is seeking dialogue and interaction with other nations with persistence and flexibility, in order to reduce tensions, build confidence, and achieve détente.

**Conclusion**

This research engaged in answering the question of how does a particular definition of identity shape Iranian foreign policy and which values and ideological perspectives have a prominent role in driving it. We have seen how the Islamist ideology have been prominent since the Islamic Revolution in shaping Iranian foreign policy, and emboldening Shi’a communities in the neighboring countries. We have seen nevertheless, how new forms of nationalism and traditionalism emerged out of the growing disenchantment of the population with the ideology of the revolution. In consequence of this, we have seen how, in order to attain its domestic and international interests, Iran has to give up a policy of ideological confrontation with its perceived enemies, to slowly shift towards a pragmatic and interest-driven approach of dialogue and cooperation aimed at solving its economical problems, as well as maintaining internal cohesion and mitigate the opposition.

But the challenges ahead are manifold, and some of them are inherently connected with the identity narrative employed by the Islamic Republic since 1979. Therefore, while seeking dialogue and cooperation, Iran has to balance its declared priority to promote Islamic democracy as a form of governance and to support the cause of the oppressed people, Palestinians *in primis*. The necessity of a new form of dialogue with the international powers has been understood by the new administration during the latest nuclear negotiations with the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany). The unexpectedly fast pace of progress in the negotiations so far, augurs well for a speedy resolution and for the opening up of new diplomatic horizons that would surely benefit Iran and its people as well as the international community.

However, the increasing tensions in the Middle East, the Syrian conflict, the rise of the ISIS and ultimately the Israeli’s invasion of the Gaza strip, which might turn into a new intifada throughout the West Bank, are profound challenges that can obstacle Rouhani’s path towards dialogue and interaction, and are likely to worsen the internal power cleavage between the President of Iran and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini. Conflicting interests, sustained by conflicting ideology, can lead to continuous hostile policies between Iran and its perceived enemies, leading to misunderstandings and the loss of many economic, social and political opportunities. A critical situation that Iran cannot sustain at this very historical moment.

1. http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blog/show?id=780588%3ABlogPost%3A240166&commentId=780588%3AComment%3A240667&xg\_source=activity ↑
2. Richard Ned Lebow, Identity and International Relations, International Relations 2008, SAGE ↑
3. Research Report on the Use of Identity Concepts in International Relations By Michael Horowitz (Harvard Identity Project, July 2002) ↑
4. Research Report on the Use of Identity Concepts in International Relations By Michael Horowitz (Harvard Identity Project, July 2002) ↑
5. (Williams, 1998: 206).

Partridge, 2006, p38 ↑
6. James March, G., and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52, no.4 (1998): 951. ↑
7. Richard Ned Lebow, Identity and International Relations, International Relations 2008, SAGE ↑
8. Riccardo Redaelli, L’iran Contemporaneo, 2009 Carocci Editore ↑
9. http://freethoughtblogs.com/marginoferr/2014/05/23/islamic-identity-vs-persian-identity-in-iran-and-why-i-reject-both/ ↑
10. Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran by Alam Saleh ↑
11. http://www.faithfreedom.org/oped/PaoloBassi51003.htm ↑
12. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12690 ↑
13. Mahdi Mohammad Nia, A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy ↑
14. Alexander Went (1992): 398. ↑
15. Walter Posch, The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism, The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy ↑
16. http://uprootedpalestinians.blogspot.it/2013/01/the-mahdi-and-irans-foreign-policy.html ↑
17. The Rise of Iran: An Identity Fight to Challenge the Existing Power Establishment Contesting US Hegemony, Israeli, and Sunni Powers in the Middle East, Lina Haddad Kreidie ↑
18. Nasr, 2007; Takeyh, 2006 ↑
19. The Rise of Iran: An Identity Fight to Challenge the Existing Power Establishment Contesting US Hegemony, Israeli, and Sunni Powers in the Middle East, Lina Haddad Kreidie ↑
20. Rubin, 2006 ↑
21. Barnett 1996: 410 ↑
22. Moussalli, 2008 ↑
23. Nasr, 2007 ↑
24. Larson, 2012; Wendt, 1999 ↑
25. Takeyh, 2006 ↑
26. Nakash, 2006; Nasr, 2007 ↑
27. Nasr, 2007; Takeyh, 2006 ↑
28. Patterson and Monroe 1998: 316 ↑
29. Tehran Times, 2009 ↑
30. What Iran Really Wants–Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era, By Mohammad Javad Zarif ↑