A problem or a solution? The referendum as a mechanism for citizens' participation in constitution-making (original) (raw)
Constitutional referendums and deliberation
Deliberative Constitution-making. Opportunities and Challenges , 2023
Constitutional referendums are important instruments at the end of numerous constitutional review processes. In recent years, these referendums are combined with deliberative instruments such as open forums, stakeholder conferences, and citizen assemblies. Constitutional referendums are also used in modern authoritarian regimes to strengthen the base of legitimacy of incumbent presidents. In the new Direct Democracy Integrity Index, experts evaluate the integrity in the different phases of the referendum cycle. In this index, citizen participation is one aspect in the pre-referendum phase. In this article, the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017, and the Russian and Italian constitutional referendums in 2020 were analysed. The expert survey showed that referendums in the authoritarian regimes in Turkey and Russia have deficits of integrity in the pre-referendum phase. Authoritarian referendums often include symbolic outreach programmes and constitutional deliberation. But these crowdsourced constitutional processes are characterized by integrity insufficiencies. Nevertheless, the Italian referendum also lacks broad participatory instruments.
Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry
Modern Law Review, 2009
In recent decades the use of referendums to settle major constitutional questions has increased dramatically. Addressing this phenomenon as a case study in the relationship between democracy and constitutional sovereignty, this article has two aims. The first is to argue that these constitutional referendums are categorically different from ordinary, legislative referendums, and that this has important implications for theories of constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, the article suggests that the power of these constitutional referendums to re-order sovereign relations raises significant normative questions surrounding the appropriateness of their use. The article engages with these normative questions, enquiring whether the recent turn in republican political theory towards deliberative democracy may offer a model through which sufficiently democratic referendum processes can be constructed.
Research Note: Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-hegemonic?
Political Studies, 2000
Are most referendums controlled and pro-hegemonic, i.e. do governments only submit issues to referendums if they are certain that they will win (as asserted by Lijphart, Butler and Ranney)? This paper shows conclusively that the constitutional referendums in Western polities have performed the functions of constitutional safeguards, and that the governments have been unsuccessful in their attempts to control the referendum.
Review of Referendums as Representative Democracy, by Leah Trueblood
2025
In times of crisis, the strength of our commitments is tested, and we often must reassess the basis upon which they rest. For many, the shortcomings of representative democracy can be avoided when significant constitutional questions-e.g., secession, devolution, or joining supranational bodies like the European Union-are put to a referendum. Referendums are celebrated for allowing citizens to express their views on fundamental constitutional questions directly. It is often said that this is more in line with considering citizens as free and equal and that referendums, as exercises of direct democracy, breathe fresh life into political systems increasingly estranged from the citizenry. Leah Trueblood's Referendums as Representative Democracy challenges that position. It argues that referendums are "better understood as exercises in representative democracy" rather than mechanisms of direct democracy (p.1). Trueblood's argument concerns the reasons for holding referendums. It is usually thought that referendums should be held because representatives cannot make certain decisions. Trueblood, however, rejects this premise (p.2). She does so by challenging the assumption that certain decisions belong to representatives while others to voters. For her, the decision-making processes of voters and representatives are inseparable. So, according to her, it is not the case that referendums "respond to democratic deficits" by substituting voters' decision-making for representatives' (p.75). Rather, she states that referendums are successful when "they respond to democratic deficits by connecting voters to representative democracy and its commitments" (p.75). The book is divided into two parts: a negative part dedicated to rejecting the idea that referendums are exercises in direct democracy and a positive one where she introduces the conception of referendums as exercises in representative democracy. The first part comprises chapters
Explaining the Paradox of Plebiscites
Government and Opposition
Recent referendums show that autocratic regimes consult voters even if the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They have been doing so with increasing frequency since Napoleon consulted French citizens in 1800. Why and when do dictatorial regimes hold referendums they are certain they will win? Analysing the 162 referendums held in autocratic and non-free states in the period 1800–2012, the article shows that referendums with a 99% yes-vote tend to occur in autocracies with high ethnic fractionalization and, in part, in sultanistic (tinpot or tyrannical) regimes, but generally not in communist (totalitarian) states. An explanation is proposed for this variation.
Whose Political Constitution? Citizens and Referendums
German Law Journal, 2013
One notable feature about the debate between “liberal” and “political” constitutionalism has been its elite focus. The courts and the legislature are discussed in efforts to determine the appropriate role of each in processes of constitution-framing and changing. But this task is often set up implicitly as a zero-sum game. Although it might be claimed that citizens are tangentially relevant to this power struggle, a detailed account of whether citizens should, and how they might, play a direct role in constitutional authorship is seldom, if ever, placed on the table. This paper considers the elite orientation of this debate, questioning whether this is in normative terms acceptable, and in empirical terms credible, particularly as we consider how, over the past three decades, the referendum has emerged as an important vehicle for constitutional change in so many states.
King's Law Journal, 2023
The paper argues that Chile's failed constitutional experiment shows that referendums can play an important if limited role in democratic constitution making. Chile’s distinctive path to constitution making sets it apart from other recent problematic experiences with constitutional referendums in Latin America and supports the claim that they may serve both enabling and constraining functions that are valuable for constitution making within democratic contexts. The case of Chile, however, also shows that referendums cannot substitute nor compensate for seriously defective representative institutions and, thereby, that they will work better or worse depending on the overall health of the democratic system within which they operate. This suggests that constitutional referendums and other democratic institutional arrangements move together.
Introduction to the Debate: Do Referendums Enhance or Threaten Democracy?
Swiss Political Science Review, 2018
Within the last two and a half years, citizens of Great Britain cast their ballot to decide on Brexit; Italians held a popular vote on whether to reform their political institutions; Swiss voters decided on the public media financing plan; and Irish nationals voted on marriage and abortion regulations. In addition to this "referendum madness" (The Economist 2016), an increasing number of political actors are calling for introducing provisions for so-called direct democratic procedures in existing representative democracies. As commentators have noted, "it looks like there will be no going back on the use of referendums" (Renwick 2017). Yet democratic theory does little to inform debates about the desirability of these processes. We suggest that this gap is due, at least in part, to the fact that democratic theorists generally consider "referendums" as a homogeneous category of political processes. Focusing on the popular vote moment only, they ignore that the processes preceding these votes greatly differ. The fact that Brexit was a top-down referendum, whereas the Italian Constitutional referendum was a bottom-up referendum, the Swiss vote a popular initiative, and the Irish votes, mandatory referendumswhich means, among other things, that the processes were triggered by different actors, were about different kinds of texts, and led to more or less binding decisionsremains too often concealed in normative discussions. This gap contrasts with recent developments in democratic theory that focus on questions about how best to implement democratic processes such as mini-publics to enhance democratic systems (see e.g., Ferejohn 2000; Smith 2009; Warren and Pearse 2008). To be sure, proposals have been made to sequence or couple undifferentiated "referendum" mechanisms with other institutional devices to enhance their quality (Gastil and Richards 2013; Saward 2001). But democratic theory has remained largely silent about how best to institutionalize these processes in the first place so they enhance rather than undermine democratic systems (rare exceptions include Lacey 2017; Set€ al€ a 2006; Tierney 2012). The aim of this Debate is to remedy this situation by launching a normative discussion about the institutional design of popular vote processes. Leaving the question of whether these processes should at all take place in democratic systems behind, we start from the facts (i) that these processes are part of the repertoire of democratic processes of existing democratic systems and (ii) that they are implemented through a variety of institutional designs, which empirical research has shown influence the kind of impact these processes have on democratic systems. This new starting point raises a range of largely unexplored
Referendums in a Representative Democracy
Etymologically, democracy means the "rule of the people", yet in most countries (Switzerland is a partial exception to the rule, See Kobach (1992)), the role of the populus is limited to periodic elections. Britain is not an exception. To be sure, there are several arcane provisions for citizen involvement in Britain at the local level 1 , but at the national level, citizens" opportunity to vote directly on policy issues is limited as referendums have been comparatively rare.