Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Wittgenstein's Influence: Meaning, Mind and Method
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1990
In the first and shorter part of this essay I comment on Wittgenstein's general influence on the practice of philosophy since his time. In the second and much longer part I discuss aspects of his work which have had a more particular influence, chiefly on debates about meaning and mind. The aspects in question are Wittgenstein's views about rule-following and private language. This second part is more technical than the first.
'With what account of meaning does Wittgenstein provide us?' The questioner here assumes that Wittgenstein does provide an account of meaning. But: What _grounds_ are there for assuming such? Does not Wittgenstein encourage us to question the assumptions underlying the questions we as philosophers are wont to ask? Should one not do so here? Should one not bring to consciousness this assumption, thus breaking its spell on one? For, once one articulates the hitherto-unconscious assumption that Wittgenstein must have an account of meaning one can acknowledge its status (as non-obligatory) and subject it to scrutiny. This, our paper does. We give reason for thinking that Wittgenstein offers no account of meaning, _at all_.
Philosophical Investigations, 2007
studied Wittgenstein with Rush Rhees and D. Z. Phillips at the University College of Swansea, Wales, and with Cora Diamond at the University of Virginia, USA. It is not surprising, therefore, to read him stating in the Preface to the Historical Dictionary (HD) that his understanding of Wittgenstein lies with "some minority views," a description that fits both the Swansea school and the New Wittgensteinianism espoused by Diamond. But there is some disagreement between members of these two schools on how to interpret Wittgenstein's core understanding of the method and tasks of philosophy, and since Richter's professed aim in Wittgenstein at his Word (WW) is to defend a New Wittgensteinian interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, it is clear where his ultimate allegiance lies.This fact may not be crucial for a reading of HD, which offers selected summaries of main ideas that Wittgenstein and other major Wittgensteinians hold, but it is very critical for an evaluation of WW. New Wittgensteinians take Wittgenstein's primary aim in philosophy as that of providing therapy for confusions that result from adopting metaphysical approaches to philosophical problems. The therapy shows, according to this interpretation, that these problems are non
1982
Master's thesis for Dept. of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada. Its main goal is to shed light on the nature of philosophy from the point of view of the 'later' Wittgenstein. The work on which Kowalsky focuses primarily is Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Kowalsky argues that in Wittgenstein's final view philosophy properly so-called seeks to retrieve the everyday, 'common-sense understanding' of things in the world; and at the same time to expose the basic conceptual errors at the root of all ways of doing philosophy (e.g., logical positivism) which cast doubt on or undermine that common-sense understanding. Kowalsky suggests that Wittgenstein's idea of 'grammatical' investigation resembles to some extent Husserlian phenomenology, including its concept of 'eidetic science.' In the third and final chapter of the thesis, Kowalsky calls into question the view, put forward by Stanley Rosen among others, that the later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is radically conventionalist or historicist.
Meaning and Linguistic Usage: Ten Comments on Later Wittgenstein
2021
The "use" theory of meaning arose from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. On this approach, language and meaning are public affairs and learnable from public sources. Wittgenstein's teaching to "look for the use" of language was partly aimed in criticism of Cartesianism and similar doctrines of modern epistemology-down to the early work of Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein rejected the notion that we might start off with reference to private, indubitable ideas or impressions and build from them to justify our knowledge of the external world. Language, meaning and reference are first of all public in character; and there can be no purely private language with meanings and/or referents which could only be known to a single person. We learn the language used to describe the world and to ascribe mental states to self and others on the basis of publicly available usage and (defeasible) criteria of application; and linguistic usage is grounded and understood in relation to our ongoing cultural practices, interactions and activities. The commonalities of perceptual experience-and the general reliability of perception-arise from biological evolution, and common evolutionary descent; and these are the biological facts underlying the philosophical appeal, persistence and plausibility of empiricism. The commonalities of thought, in contrast, arising out of the plasticity of mind, depend on interpreting linguistic expressions in a common, publicly available, object-oriented language. The empirical lexicographers who formulate definitions for dictionaries follow and elaborate Wittgenstein's advice on meaning and usage. Dictionary definitions and entries are based on extensive empirical studies of usage. Moreover, along with consulting experts, the same empirical practice is also important in writing dictionaries of technical terms of use in the various sciences. This point is important in understanding the relationship between the "use theory" and the languages and practices of the sciences. Dictionary definitions, understood as common meanings, generally aim to classify, comprehend or encompass, unify and explain the empirical evidence of usage. As will be argued, this last point constitutes a departure from or development of Wittgenstein and the "use theory."
Wittgenstein's Contributions to the Discourse of Language and Meaning
The role of language as a vehicle of thought makes way for human thinking to be as multifaceted and diverse as it is. This is for the reason that with language, one can describe the past or speculate about the future and so deliberate and plan in the light of one’s beliefs about how things stand. To cement this view, language enables one to imagine counterfactual objects, events, and states of affairs. In this connection, it is intimately related to intentionality, the feature of all human thoughts whereby they are essentially about, or directed toward, things outside themselves. If, as is the case, language allows one to share information and to communicate beliefs and speculations, attitudes and emotions, then, it creates the human social world, uniting people into a common history and a common life-experience. In the end, what we see is that language is an instrument of understanding and knowledge. Along these lines, the philosophical investigation of the nature of language—the relations between language, language users, and the world—and the concepts with which language is described and analyzed, both in everyday speech and in scientific linguistic studies become pertinent and absolutely imperative. On the whole, philosophy of language as an academic and philosophical discipline is distinct from linguistics. This is for the reason that its investigations are conceptual rather than empirical. But this, however, does not mean that philosophy of language will not call to mind the message in which linguistic and other related disciplines reveal. Of course, it must pay attention to the facts which linguistics and related disciplines reveal.
The Use Theory of Meaning: A Reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research, 2019
There is an unexamined use of words and language in writing and speaking. Philosophy always stresses on argumentation that carries meaning. Wittgenstein even draws pictures of language to relate it to its idea, usage and meaning. This paper, therefore, intends to highlight the relevance of use theory of meaning in Wittgenstein's philosophy.