Unifying Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism (original) (raw)
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Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem
Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to conceptual and practical confusion. After noting the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric, the article presents the following arguments: there are some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable; the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are better understood as instances of speciesism and human chauvinism; it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism because there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all; moreover, because the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is counterproductive in practice.
In Defence of Environmental Anthropocentrism
Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae, 2024
The critique of anthropocentrism has accompanied environmental thinking since its inception. However, we lack a deeper analysis of anthropocentrism and its forms. The authors of this study concentrate on analysing selected forms of anthropocentrism that were prominent in different periods of the history of European culture. They offer a basic typology of anthropocentrism and characterize philosophical, religious, philosophical-theological and philosophical-scientific anthropocentrism. They also include a fifth form of anthropocentrism, which they call environmental anthropocentrism. The authors consider changes that are important from a philosophical, ethical and axiological perspective and analyse the potential of anthropocentrism in comparison with some of environmental anthropocentrism its alternative forms, such as biocentrism and cosmocentrism. They also attempt to assess the significance of environmental anthropocentrism and the potential for its implementation in human-environmental relations. The environmental anthropocentrism proposed here is a potential solution with applicability to the search for a moderate, humble, non-arrogant, respectful and responsible human approach to relations with nature.
Anthropocentrism: More than Just a Misunderstood Problem
Journal of Agricultural Environmental Ethics, 2018
Anthropocentrism, in its original connotation in environmental ethics, is the belief that value is human-centred and that all other beings are means to human ends. Environmentally-concerned authors have argued that anthropocentrism is ethically wrong and at the root of ecological crises. Some environmental ethicists argue, however, that critics of anthropocentrism are misguided or even misanthropic. They contend: first that criticism of anthropocentrism can be counterproductive and misleading by failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate human interests. Second, that humans differ greatly in their environmental impacts, and consequently, addressing human inequalities should be a precondition for environmental protection. Third, since ecosystems constitute the ''life-support system’’ for humans, anthropocentrism can and should be a powerful motivation for environmental protection. Fourth, human self-love is not only natural but helpful as a starting point for loving others, including nonhumans. Herein we analyze such arguments, agreeing with parts of them while advancing four counter-arguments. First, redefining the term anthropocentrism seems to be an attempt to ignore behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the risk of the planet. Second, if addressing human inequalities is a precondition for environmental protection, biodiversity protection will remain out of the scope of ethical consideration for an indefinite period of time. Third, anthropocentric motivations can only make a positive contribution to the environment in situations where humans are conscious of a direct benefit to themselves. Fourth, ‘self-love’ alone is an inadequate basis for environmental concern and action. We also explore the question of agency, shared responsibility, and a fair attribution of blame for our environmental predicaments.
Anthropocentrism and Nature - An Attempt at Reconciliation
Due to the manifold ecological problems associated with exponentially growing human populations and their collective interactions with Earth’s various ecosystems, many environmentalists have lamented that nature is being destroyed by humanity. The theoretical framework which presumably accounts for our species’ destructiveness is pejoratively referred to as anthropocentrism, the view that humans are the sole bearers of intrinsic value on our planet, whereas all nonhuman aspects of the biosphere, whether biotic or abiotic, are of merely instrumental value to the satisfaction of human interests. I argue, however, that environmental thinkers’ critiques of anthropocentrism are ultimately misplaced. Humanity’s ecological predicament is not the result of overvaluing humanity as such but of permitting institutionalized forms of ethical egoism to underlie policies that narrowly focus on the short-term, frivolous interests of current individuals at the expense of the vital interests of future generations.
Journal of The History of The Behavioral Sciences, 1983
Darwin's theory of evolution encompasses both nonanthropocentric and biocentric elements. T. H. Huxley, Peter Kropotkin, and Patrick Geddes accepted the general theory and attempted to make use of it in writing about social and political questions.
Anthropocentrism in the Anthropocene: Towards an Ostensive Humanism
Environmental Humanities, 2025
The idea that we must move beyond anthropocentrism to overcome interspecies injustice and environmental collapse is widespread within the environmental humanities. Yet, the concept of anthropocentrism remains ambiguous, and so do some of the arguments raised against it. What exactly should we move beyond and why? The article attempts to answer these questions and clarify the merits and limitations of both anthropocentric and post-anthropocentric views within ethics and ontology. This article proposes that although some implausible and morally problematic forms of anthropocentrism should be denounced, there are other ways in which we must remain anthropocentric. The article disambiguates the concept of anthropocentrism and assesses the key arguments against it, before it goes on to outline a minimal form of anthropocentrism that we call ostensive humanism. Ostensive humanism is compatible with many post-anthropocentric ideas but suggests that the ethical and political project aimed at ending interspecies injustice and the climate crisis inevitably points to human beings as its moral addressees.
Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?
Environmental Values, 2007
Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Nortonʼs ʻconvergence hypothesisʼ: the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Nortonʼs convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for feeling, anthropocentrism has very different practical implications from nonanthropocentrism; it undermines some of the common attitudes – love, respect, awe – that people think it appropriate to take toward the natural world.